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sentations that underlie object vision represent properties of entities in the distal
world. The second is the Transformational Thesis : the function of the vision system
is to transform information that is latent in the retinal image into a representational
format that makes it available for use by further perceptual or cognitive systems.
The ultimate aim of my project is to show that these two themes are in tension,
and to suggest how the tension may be resolved.
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Chapter 1: Questions of Content in Vision
1.1 Telling the Story of Vision
The general topic of this thesis is how vision science explains what we see, and
how we see it. There is after all a main narrative to what we may call the story
of vision. From the light that hits the retina information about the visible world
is extracted, and then transformed, as it is carried through multiple stages of pro-
cessing along the visual pathways of the brain. We see because each of these stages
constitutes a collection of internal representations that make explicit information
about different signals pulled from the patterns of electromagnetic radiation that
reach the eyes. Representations of edge and orientation, tuned to the 2D structure
of the retinal image, give way to those for shape, color, and motion, so that by the
end we perceive something coherent, concrete and whole: a world of objects and
events, bathed in light.
Or so the story goes. This narrative is the core of what I will call the
information-processing framework in vision science, which is the dominant research
program in the field (Marr, 1982; Palmer, 1999). There are two common themes to
this narrative that I wish to focus on:
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The Distal Object Thesis : the end-stage internal representations that
underlie object vision represent properties of entities in the distal world.
The Transformational Thesis : the function of the visual system is to
reformat (“transform”) information latent in the retinal image into a
representational format that makes it available for use by further per-
ceptual or cognitive systems.
I am interested in these themes because of what they imply about the role of
representational content in the story of vision. The ultimate aim of my project is
to show that these two common themes to the information-processing narrative are
in tension, and to spell out how the tension might be resolved.
On the one hand, the Distal Object Thesis entails that the internal repre-
sentations that underlie object vision qualify as a form of mental representation,
and reflect a sense in which visual perception is indeed “objective” (Burge, 2010).
Furthermore, I will argue that these consequences of the thesis are well-founded;
that is, mental representations—or rather perceptual representations—are an in-
dispensable posit in explanations of object vision. On the other, I show that the
Transformational Thesis rests on the presupposition that the content of the internal
representations in the visual system are fixed by a causally reliable, information
carrying relation. The tension arises because carrying information is insufficient for
fixing the content of mental representations (Fodor, 1984). Thus explanations that
rest on the Transformational Thesis will be inadequate to explain facts that depend
on the Distal Object Thesis. Fortunately, certain philosophical theories of inten-
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tional content, or the “aboutness” of mental representations, offer some strategies
for reconciling these two themes in the story of vision.
1.2 Background and Motivation
Before I summarize the discussion to follow, let me provide some philosophical
context for my project. Specifically, I will discuss the notions of mental represen-
tation, intentional content, and how philosophical discussion of these notions are
related to the explanatory practices of cognitive science more generally.
One of the most salient features of the mind is that it exhibits intentionality :
mental states are directed towards, or “about”, entities, properties or states of
affairs. While ‘intentionality’ is a philosopher’s term of art, the idea that it picks
out is quite familiar. For example, the various mental states we attribute to ourselves
and others all appear to exhibit intentionality, including attitudes such as beliefs
and desires, and perceptual states such as seeing or hearing. When I believe the
day is sunny, desire it to be sunny, or see that it is sunny, the intentional content
of my belief, desire, or perceptual state is that a certain state of affairs obtains. At
first pass, a mental representation is an internal state of my mind/brain, which is
characterized in functional or neural terms, and is a bearer of intentional content.1
Philosophical discussion of mental representations, and intentional content,
has typically focused on two sorts of issues: “vertical” issues concerning the place of
the mind in the natural order, and “horizontal” issues concerning the explanatory
1I will offer more thorough characterizations of the notions of intentional content and mental
representation in Chapter 2.
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role of mental representations in cognitive science (Rey, 2002). Let me elaborate on
each of them.
Providing a theory of the intentional content of mental representations was
one goal of the vertical project of “naturalizing” the mind: showing how our mental
lives arise from physical matter. The representational theory of mind (RTM) is
one prominent vertical approach. According to RTM, possession of mental states
is to be analyzed in terms of realizing mental representations. For example, under
RTM, all there is to believing some proposition P is for an individual to realize some
mental representation that has the intentional content P, and plays the appropriate
functional role in our psychology (Field, 1978; Fodor, 1987). If we accept RTM,
then mental states reduce to mental representations, and the task of characterizing
the intentionality of the mind turns into the task of providing a theory of intentional
content: a non-circular analysis of intentionality which appeals exclusively to (non-
intentional) properties of the natural world (Fodor, 1984). This project is not as
popular as it once was (for criticisms of the project, see Stich, 1992; Tye, 1992), but
it is still common to tie—or even pigeon hole—theories of content to the aims and
ambitions of this project (see: Cohen, 2004; Rupert, 2008; Shea, 2013). In contrast,
the horizontal project of determining whether or not mental representations are
indeed indispensable to some of the explanations of cognitive science is, at present,
comparatively fashionable (Burge, 2010; Orlandi, 2014; Ramsey, 2007). For while
few would doubt that cognitive science is knee deep in internal states that are
called “representations”, or are described using intentional idioms, it is quite a
separate question whether these posited states, in order to be explanatory, must
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have the distinguishing features of mental representations. In other words, while
one can wonder whether (metaphysically) the mind is representational, one can also
ask whether (explanatorily) the representational posits of cognitive science must be
mental.
At root my project is horizontal, since it pertains to the explanatory role
mental representations play in one corner of cognitive science. Nor is vision science
a particularly isolated corner, since the explanatory practices of the field have often
been treated as symptomatic of the larger role that mental representations do (or do
not) play in cognitive science (e.g. Burge, 1986; Egan, 1995, 2010; Ramsey, 2007).2
As stated earlier, my ultimate aim is to show that two common themes to the story
of vision are in tension, and to suggest how the tension might be resolved. This aim
is philosophically interesting for two reasons.
First, my defense of the information-processing narrative in vision science pro-
vides a counterexample against those who have argued, on very general grounds, that
mental representations play no crucial role in the explanations of cognitive science
(Chomsky, 1995, 2000; Egan, 1995, 2010; Ramsey, 2007). At least with respect to
explaining facts about object vision, mental representations are indeed an indispens-
able posit (or so I will argue). Second, it has sometimes been claimed that theories
of content, which have been developed for vertical endeavors, are simply irrelevant
to horizontal ends (Burge, 2010; Stich, 1992; Tye, 1992). The reasons for this “per-
pendicular” view of theories of content tend to vary, but generally rest on the fact
2By “explanatory practices” I mean all the scientific work (theoretical, experimental) that goes
into developing and testing different explanatory hypotheses.
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that theories of content have typically been developed to address metaphysical, as
opposed to explanatory, issues. Thus, they are simply beside the point when it
comes to evaluating what sort of explanatory role mental representations may play
in cognitive science. In contrast, my arguments provide a case-study in support of
a “parallel” view, since theories of content provide strategies to relieve the tension
I identify in the information-processing narrative of vision science. According to
this parallel view, if certain explanations within cognitive science make assumptions
about how content is fixed, then theories of content (and the challenges they face)
might indeed be quite relevant to horizontal endeavors.
1.3 Outline of the Project
My project can be thought of as proceeding in three stages, which I will now
outline, before providing brief summaries of the chapters to follow. The first two
stages relate to showing why The Distal Object Thesis, and hence a notion of mental
representation, is indispensable to explanations of object vision. The third stage
shows why the Distal Object Thesis and Transformational Thesis are in tension,
and how theories of content provide strategies for addressing the tension.
The first main conclusion that I defend pertains to general features of the
information-processing framework in which research on object vision is embedded.
Focusing primarily on the well-known work of Marr (1982), it has been vigorously
debated whether the internal “representations” that the framework makes appeal
to must be mental representations, or require any notion of representational con-
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tent at all (Burge, 1986; Chomsky, 1995, 2000; Egan, 1995, 2010). I believe that
the framework, as characterized by Marr, does minimally require a distinct content-
component, and so makes an indispensable appeal to a notion of internal represen-
tation. However, whether these internal representations are mental or not will be
wholly depend on the the visual phenomenon one is trying to explain. Thus the
conclusion of the first stage of my argument is as follow:
(1) A notion of internal representations is indispensable to the information-
processing framework in vision science.
Conclusion 1 is enough to establish that some notion of representational con-
tent is indispensable to the information-processing framework (at least, according
to Marr’s influential characterization). But a further argument is needed for why a
notion of mental representation—or more specifically, perceptual representation—is
indispensable to explanations of object vision. Providing such an argument is the
focus of the second stage of my project. A classic argument for why vision is both
objective, and representational, relates to certain facts about the explananda of vi-
sion science. One of the most salient features of visual perception is its constancies:
the fact that what we see remains unchanged, or invariant, under transformations
of the sensory input. The traditional argument within perceptual psychology for
objectivity in vision is that because what we see—the “object” of our perception—
remains constant across these transformations of proximal stimulation, the object
must therefore be something in the distal world (Brunswik, 1940; Cassirer, 1944;
Thouless, 1931). Let us call this the argument from constancy. Recently, Burge
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(2010) has revived this argument in making the case that perceptual representa-
tions are indispensable to the explanations of perceptual psychology, including vi-
sion science. While I am critical of Burge’s attempted revival, I do believe that
this sort of argumentative strategy can succeed when it comes to the viewpoint
invariance exhibited by visual object recognition—our capacity to visually identify
and categorize objects across changes in object orientation and viewing distance,
retinal position, and surface illumination (DiCarlo et al., 2012). So an argument
from object constancy can be made that supports the following conclusion:
(2) A notion of perceptual representation plays an indispensable role in
the explanation of visual object recognition.
My argument for Conclusion 2 provides a defense of the indispensability of
the Distal Object Thesis to the explanation of some core aspects of object vision.
In the third stage of my project, I show why the Transformational Thesis is in
conflict with Conclusion 2 (and hence the Distal Object Thesis), and suggest how
the conflict might be resolved.
According to informational theories, the content of a mental representation
is fixed (at least in part) by a reliable causal relation between a state and what it
represents (Dretske, 1981, 1988; Enç, 1982; Fodor, 1987, 1990). Loosely, the idea is
that events carry information about what reliably causes them to occur. According
to informational theories, whatever else the representing relation is, it is a kind of
causal, information carrying relation between a representation and its content. For
example, if I perceive a cat in front of me, and token my concept cat, the reason
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that cat is about cats, as opposed to something else, is because of the reliable
causal relation between cats and cat.3 However, informational theories face a well-
known difficulty, the disjunction problem (Fodor, 1984, 1987). A representation can
be tokened, or activated, in a reliable manner by many causes, not all of which are
part of the content of the representation. Raccoons or possums, under appropri-
ate viewing conditions (e.g. in a back alley on a dark night) might reliably cause
tokenings of cat. Likewise, an appropriately well-placed knock to the head, when
repeated, might similarly cause me to token the concept. It would seem that these
causes, though reliable, are not content determining in the same way as the relation
between cat and cats. However if content is determined solely by a reliable, infor-
mation carrying causal relation, then cat represents the disjunction of its reliable
causes.
I argue that the The Transformational Thesis presupposes an “crude” informa-
tional approach to representational content, according to which carrying information
is indeed sufficient for fixing representational content. Since typical explanations
of viewpoint invariance in recognition depend on the thesis, they also assume a
“crude” informational theory of content. Therefore, these explanations run afoul of
the disjunction problem. For this reason, absent a solution to the problem, they are
explanatorily inadequate. Fortunately, existing information theories provide some
strategies for addressing the disjunction problem, and are therefore of relevance to
theories and models of object recognition aimed at explaining viewpoint invariance.
3By “concept” I mean categorical representations that are the vehicles of thought (Fodor, 1975).
I use small caps to indicate when I am referring to the concept, as opposed to its content.
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The conclusion of the third stage is as follows:
(3) Informational theories of intentional content can contribute to the
those explanations of visual object recognition for which the concept of
perceptual representation is indispensable.
My argument for Conclusion 3 shows how informational theories might help
resolve the tension between the Distal Object Thesis and Transformational Thesis.
The breakdown of subsequent chapters is as follows:
In Chapter 2, I elaborate on my argumentative strategy for defending Con-
clusions 1 and 2, and lay out some different “recipes” for the notions of internal
and perceptual representation. I then relate some potential anti-representationalist
objections to my strategy and recipe. According to these objections, key ingredients
from my recipe are never satisfied by posits within the explanatory framework of
mainstream vision science (e.g. Chomsky, 1995; Egan, 1995, 2010; Ramsey, 2007).
In Chapter 3, I make my argument for Conclusion 1, focusing on the work
of Marr (1982). I argue that Marr makes an indispensable appeal to a notion of
internal representation. Central to my argument is showing that there is a content-
component to Marr’s approach. This is sometimes considered a “standard” interpre-
tation of Marr’s work, but I believe previous arguments have failed to identify the
proper position of this component in Marr’s multi-level approach to explanation. I
also argue that the anti-representationalist objections reviewed in Chapter 2 do no
justice to the information-processing framework, as characterized by Marr.
In Chapter 4, I take a critical look at arguments from constancy. While the
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argumentative strategy has been discussed for the better part of a century, I do not
believe it has ever been articulated in careful detail. Hence in this chapter I offer
an explicit (re)construction for the argument from constancy. I also identify some
prima facie difficulties for this style of argument. Each of these challenges suggests
a reason for rejecting an “objective” reading of perceptual constancies, which is
required to ground arguments from reference. Having presented these challenges,
I argue that the recent version of the argument defended by Burge (2010), while
promising, cannot avoid them.
In Chapter 5, I make my argument for Conclusion 2. I show that when one
focuses on the viewpoint invariance of object recognition, an argument from (object)
constancy has promise. Once one incorporates research on object persistence and
object-based attention in vision, and recognizes the role of perceptual learning in
object recognition, my argument can meet the challenges from the previous chapter.
Thus, in this chapter we see why a notion of perceptual representation (and hence
the Distal Object Thesis) is indispensable to explaining one aspect of object vision—
visual object recognition.
In Chapter 6, I make my argument for Conclusion 3. I spell out in more detail
the nature of the disjunction problem and its significance for informational theories
of content. I then argue that, due to the Transformational Thesis, research within
the information-processing framework appears to presuppose a crude informational
theory of content. For this reason, I believe explanations of the viewpoint invariance
of object recognition require a solution to the disjunction problem. I then discuss
different strategies for solving the disjunction problem; in particular, learning-based
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(Dretske, 1981), teleological (Dretske, 1988; Neander, 1995, 2012), and counterfac-
tual based solutions (Fodor, 1987, 1990). I evaluate these proposals based on how
well they accord with facts about object recognition, and key elements of the story
of vision.
So that is how I plan to proceed. So much for the threats and promises. Let’s
begin.
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Chapter 2: Recipes for Representation
2.1 Introduction
As I outlined in Chapter 1, my project proceeds in three argumentative stages,
each ending with one of my main conclusions. These conclusions are:
(1) A notion of internal representation is indispensable to the information-
processing framework in vision science.
(2) A notion of perceptual representation is indispensable to explanations
of visual object recognition.
(3) Informational theories of intentional content can contribute to the
those explanations of visual object recognition for which a notion of
perceptual representation is indispensable.
In this chapter I do three things. First, I present and defend my argumentative
strategy for Conclusions 1 and 2. Second, I spell out the notions of internal and
perceptual representation that I appeal to in Conclusions 1 - 3 in a bit more detail.
Third, I review some challenges that pose a threat to my arguments for Conclusions
1 and 2, and which I will need to overcome.
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At the outset I should say that my discussion will not be exhaustive. I do not
mean to provide a review of all the things cognitive scientists and philosophers have
in mind when they talk about “representations”. I only mean to elucidate the two
notion that are relevant to Conclusions 1 - 3, and only in so much detail as suffices
for making my arguments. What I propose to offer are some constitutive ingredients
(Burge, 2010; Rey, 1997) for different notions of representation so that we can have
some grounds for determining whether one or another notion is indispensable to
some explanation in vision science. My approach is somewhat cumulative. There
can be “representations” in more general and narrow senses. If we start with some
base ingredients, many things in the world, both natural and man-made, qualify as
representations. Add a few more ingredients, and one has what is needed for an
internal representation in a brain like ours; a few more, a perceptual representation
in the visual system. This is not the only way to try and get clear on the rela-
tionship between different notions of representation, but I think it is a reasonable
approach, given my aims. So, in other words, here I offer a sampling of “recipes”
for representation.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Subsection 2, I present my
argumentative strategy for Conclusion 1 and 2, which turns on providing recipes of
constitutive ingredients for different notions of representation. I also try to dispel
some philosophical concerns one might have with my strategy (Mallon et al., 2009;
Stich, 1996), and describe how it relates to the explanatory role of notions of repre-
sentation in cognitive science. I further specify some “generic” ingredients required
for my recipes. In Subsection 3, I describe in more detail the notion of internal rep-
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resentation I will be relying on in my argument for Conclusion 1. In Subsections 4
and 5, I enumerate my ingredients for perceptual representation. First, in Section 4,
I offer up some “staple” ingredients for making a representational mental, which are
inspired by some other recent recipes (Burge, 2010; Orlandi, 2014; Ramsey, 2007).
Then, in Subsection 5, I provide some further “special” ingredients for perceptual
content. I also distinguishing perceptual representations from mere sensory registers
of proximal inputs. In Subsection 6, I review some anti-representationalist challenges
(Chomsky, 1995, 2000; Egan, 1995, 2010; Ramsey, 2007), which if successful, would
undermine Conclusions 1 and 2. In Subsection 7, I conclude the chapter.
2.2 How to Argue About Representations
My arguments for Conclusions 1 and 2 depend on carrying out a certain kind
of procedure that can be broken down into four steps (cf. Cummins, 1989, p.145;
Ramsey, 2007, p.10).
Step 1: Specify constitutive ingredients for a notion of representation.
Step 2: Identify what role some purported representation plays in some
explanation (or framework) in cognitive science.
Step 3: Determine what ingredients something must have in order to
play the explanatory role of the purported representation.
Step 4: Compare the constitutive ingredients with those that are nec-
essary for playing the explanatory role.
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If the ingredients that are necessary for playing the explanatory role are co-
extensive with those that demarcate the target notion of representation, then we
have an argument for why the relevant notion of representation is indispensable to
the explanation (or framework) in question. My arguments for Conclusions 1 and
2 rest on carrying out this sort of procedure for notions of internal representation
and perceptual representation (my argument for Conclusion 3 rests on a similar
approach, but relating to theories of content).
A main objective of the present chapter is to provide some constitutive in-
gredients for different notions of representation, as required by Step 1. However
before I settle into this task, I need to elaborate on and defend my argumentative
strategy. In this section I first try to assuage some philosophical concerns one might
have with my approach, and the very idea of trying to offer “recipes”. Second,
I described what sort of explanatory role I think representations tend to play, in
general, in cognitive science. I also point to the sort of evidence one needs in order
to show that certain ingredients are required for playing this role. Finally, I offer
some assumptions about the general types of ingredients I think are needed when
developing a recipe for representation.
2.2.1 Representational Recipes and Matters of Taste
My strategy bears a certain resemblance to a style of argument that is quite
common in philosophy, and which has come under criticism as so-called “arguments
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from reference” (Mallon et al., 2009, Stich, 1996).1 In general terms, arguments
from reference can be thought of as a procedure that has three steps:
Step R1: Assume (implicitly or explicitly) a substantive theory of ref-
erence for a crucial term or concept.
Step R2: Argue that, given the theory from Step R1, the referent of
the term or concept has certain properties (e.g., the term/concept does
or does not refer).
Step R3: Draw some metaphysical or epistemological conclusion (e.g.,
that the referent of the term or concept does/does not exist).
This sort of argument is especially common when philosophers want to draw
strong ontological conclusions. The classic example of this strategy are arguments
for eliminative materialism, the view that our commonsense (“folk”) psychology is
a deeply false theory, and that the states it posits, such as beliefs, desires, and
emotions, do not exist (Churchland, 1981; Stich, 1983). Traditional defenses of the
view amount to arguments from reference: they move from the assumption of a
descriptivist theory of mental terms (e.g. for belief ), and the fact that nothing
posited by neuroscience or cognitive psychology satisfies the descriptions for these
terms (i.e., the terms do not refer), to the conclusion that mental states do not
exist (e.g., there is no such things as belief).2 The problem with this argument
1In his review of Ramsey (2007), Sprevak (2011) also notices the structural similarity between
the strategies.
2Briefly, under a descriptivist theory of reference, the meaning of a singular term (or “name”) is
specified by some description (definite or indefinite), and the term refers to whatever things satisfy
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is that if one assumes a different theory of reference at Step R1, one can end up
drawing a different ontological conclusion at Step R3 from the very same facts at
Step R2 (Stich, 1996). Other examples of arguments from reference can be found
in philosophical debates about scientific realism, moral realism, and the ontology of
race (Mallon et al., 2009).
While there is a definite similarity between my strategy and some arguments
from reference, one crucial difference is that I do not intend to draw any ontological
conclusions. Even if some notion of representation (internal, perceptual or other-
wise) was entirely dispensable to cognitive science, we would not be obligated to
draw the ontological conclusion that the species of representation does not exist.
Thus my argumentative strategy is closer to those aimed at determining whether
certain notions, such as “emotion” (Griffiths, 1997, 2004), or “concept” (Mach-
ery, 2005; Machery et al., 2009), are indispensable explanatory kinds for cognitive
science. Whatever the merits of these projects, they are silent about matters of
ontology.
However, even if I eschew the dubious third step of arguments of reference,
some of the criticisms of the strategy are nonetheless relevant to evaluating my
approach. I will go through three of them that seem to me especially pertinent, as
they relate to what sort of ingredients I can or should offer in my recipes. In each
case, I will argue, the issue largely boils down to matters of taste. And whatever
one’s preference, I think my approach is palatable.
the description.
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Issue 1: Referential Assumptions. The first issue relates to what sort of as-
sumptions I might be making regarding theories of reference. While the problem is
typically related to the reference of singular terms, the same sort of considerations
apply with respect to concepts. By offering recipes for notions of representation
I seem to be assuming something roughly descriptivist: representational concepts
relate to a description that specifies a set of properties (i.e., ingredients), and some-
thing is within the extension of the concept if and only if it satisfies the relevant
description. Even though I am not drawing any ontological conclusions, one might
still worry that I risk predetermining my conclusion due to my referential assump-
tions. I have a number of replies to this worry.
Although I am offering constitutive ingredients for certain notions, I do not
think I need to make any firm commitments regarding the correct theory of refer-
ence. I am happy to adopt the view that I am stipulating a descriptivist approach.
Furthermore, precedent suggests that such an approach usually works in the favor
of those who aim to draw a negative conclusion: that some term does not refer
(Churchland, 1981; Stich, 1983), or some kind is not explanatory (Griffiths, 1997,
2004; Machery, 2005; Machery et al., 2009). Indeed, this seems to be the case with
some recent arguments against the utility of notions of representation in cognitive
science more generally (Ramsey, 2007), and in vision science in particular (Orlandi,
2014). The reason for this negativity is that laying out a descriptive recipe sets a
rather high bar—it is doubtful that all the ingredients are ever in fact satisfied. So
I do not think I am doing myself any favors by assuming a descriptive approach,
beyond the virtue of being explicit about my assumptions.
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Still, if a quasi-descriptivist assumption is considered to unpalatable for some, I
believe my arguments can still be run if one assumed a different approach to concept
application, such as a causal-historical approach.3 For even under such a view, a
description might be used initially to fix the referent of a term or concept, although
the ingredients that make up the description are not constitutive. Under such a
view, I believe that a recipe would still have discriminative utility, for distinguishing
between cases. Of course my conclusions would be weaker (satisfying the description
merely gives us good reason to think a notion is indispensable), but I think these
weakened conclusions would still be philosophically interesting.
Issue 2: Folk Psychological Commitments. Granting a vaguely descriptivist
approach to Step 1, a second issue relates to what sort of facts are supposed to
ground the description. Specifically, with respect to mental representation (and
hence perceptual representations), the natural starting point are intuitions drawn
from folk psychology. There are two related concerns one may have with relying on
folk judgment in the development of some of my recipes.
First, one might argue that if my goal is to articulate any notion of “represen-
tation” utilized in cognitive science, our folk understanding will be off little help,
since our interest will be in what cognitive science tells us representations “really
3Briefly, causal-historical approaches hold that a singular term is introduced by a speaker to
refer to something. Subsequent users of the expression pick out the same referent due to a causal
chain that leads back to the speaker who legislated the referent. And although a description might
be used to initially fix the referent, it is the thing itself that is referred to, and not whatever
happens to satisfy the description (Kripke, 1980).
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are”, and not what folk psychology suggests they might be (Stich, 1992, p.252).
This is well and good when it comes to a notion of internal representation (as we
shall see below), but the problem is that without some connection to our folk un-
derstanding of mentality, it is not clear what basis we have for talking about mental
representations—including perceptual ones (Ramsey, 2007). I think a reasonable
view is that our folk judgments at least provide a starting point for constitutive
analysis, until we have good reason to reject them (Rey, 1997, p.34). This sort of
provisional acceptance of everyday theory and observation can also be found in vision
science. For example, Marr (1982, p.331-332) recognized that everyday experience
often provides the starting point for investigating how we see.
Granting that it is reasonable to appeal to folk judgment (to some degree), a
second concern is that one may be hard pressed to find agreement with respect to our
judgments about the mind (Stich, 1996). Thus one might despair that I am no more
likely to succeed with respect to a notion of perceptual representation. While I agree
that intuitive judgments may often diverge, I think this just provides motivation for
me to be be clear about my own assumptions. It is for this very reason that going
forward I will be as explicit as possible about the notion of perceptual representation
I am relying on. I fully accept that there might be a plurality of notions available.
Indeed, many distinct (but similar) recipes for perceptual representation can be
found in the literature (see e.g.,Burge, 2010; Orlandi, 2014). Minimally my claim is
that I have successfully isolated one of them, which (as I shall argue) seems to play
an indispensable role in the explanation of object vision.
21
Issue 3: The Scope of the Ingredients. A final worry concerns just how elabo-
rate I intend my constitutive analyses to be. Do I intend to offer an account of the
essence of what it is for something to be a representation? Do I promise necessary
and sufficient conditions? A careful conceptual analysis? A definitive definition?
It should be clear by now that my ambitions are a bit more modest. I believe
that it is enough that I offer recipes that allow me to correctly identify the clear
cases of representation (of one sort or another) from the vague ones (cf. Rey, 1997,
p.32; Quine, 1960). So, operationally, I am happy to treat my recipes as providing
necessary and sufficient conditions which discriminate between the cases of interest.
Consider by way of comparison, one recipe for the Rickey, a cocktail first created in
Washington, DC, in the late 19th Century:
• 2oz bourbon or gin.
• Half lime squeezed and dropped in the glass.
• Add ice and stir.
• Fill class with soda water.
A simple recipe, but there are borderline cases. Once while in DC I had a
drink that included (amongst other ingredients) rye, chartreuse, fennel orange mar-
malade, and a blood orange IPA. Delicious, but I confess to being unsure (even
after repeated sampling) whether it was indeed a Rickey, advertisement to the con-
trary. However, whether this particular concoction was a Rickey, it seems we can
still clearly distinguish the Rickey from its cousin the Mojito (which includes rum,
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simple syrup, and muddled mint), and also recognize that some elements of a typical
preparations are inessential (e.g., that it be served in a highball glass). The upshot
of this example is that for the cases I am interested in, the recipes I will offer will
suffice. For other borderline cases, I leave it up to (theoretical) taste.
2.2.2 Explanatory Roles and Evidence for Indispensability
Granting, then, that it is reasonable (given my strategy) to offer recipes for
the notions of representation I intend to employ, one might next ask what sort of
explanatory role I have in mind with respect to Step 2, or what sort of evidence
would suffice for showing, at Step 3, that certain ingredients are required for a
posited representation to play the role. Both of these issues are especially important
when it comes to defending Conclusion 2, and showing that a notion of perceptual
representation is indispensable to explanations of object recognition.
Regarding role, in many explanations in cognitive science representations (of
whatever sort) appear as both explanantia and explananda—as explanatory posits
and phenomena to be explained. On the one hand, representations are posited
to explain certain psychological phenomena (perhaps as revealed by careful psy-
chophysical experiments). And in order to explain these facts, the representations
must have certain properties related to the phenomenon of interest. On the other,
for representations that have been posited to explain the psychological phenomena,
theories and models are offered of how the representations are structured, or are
able to represent what they represent. So while the goal is to explain apparent facts
23
about these representations they themselves are also (originally) theoretical posits.
And by offering theories of models of how they work, we are simply fleshing out
the explanation of the relevant psychological phenomenon that they were initially
posited to explain (Ramsey, 2007, p.36).
This sort of “dual role” is not unique to the explanatory posits of cognitive
science. Consider by way of comparison the notion of ion channel, which is a common
example in the philosophy of science (Machamer et al., 2000). In very general
terms, ion channels were posited to explain changes in the concentration gradients
of different ions (inside and outside the cell body), which drive the action potential in
neurons. For instance, depolarization of a neuron occurs when sodium ion channels
open allowing sodium (Na+) to flood the cell body. So sodium ion channels were a
crucial posit in the explanation of the action potential. But one might also want to
know how they carry out their functional role, and offer a theory of the structure of
sodium ion channels, and how they work to gate ion flow. Thus, in a fashion similar
to representations, ion channels were both posited as part of an explanation (of the
action potential), but have also became a phenomenon to be explained (i.e., how
they are structured).4
Representations also do double-duty in vision science. Research within the
information-processing framework posits internal representations to explain facts
4There are of course some disanalogies. Psychological phenomenon have at least some connec-
tion to folk understanding, while ions are a phenomenon discovered by science. Also, arguably the
ion channel example might involve roles at different levels (Craver, 2007), which may not be true
of the two explanatory roles of representations in cognitive science.
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about vision (a claim I defend in Ch.3). To explain particular visual phenomena,
representations are posited with properties relate to the facts they are supposed to
help explain. As we shall see later on, to explain facts about object recognition,
representations of object identity and category membership are posited to explain
recognition phenomena (e.g., why recognition performance is so invariant across
transformations of stimulus viewpoint). In turn, theories and models are offered of
how these object representations might be structured, such that they can play the
role they are hypothesized to play.
In fact, the Distal Object Thesis and the Transformational Thesis each relate
to one of the two explanatory roles of representations in vision science. First, the
Distal Object Thesis points to what kind of representation must be posited to explain
some aspect of vision. Second, the Transformational Thesis relates to what sort of
explanations we are to give in light of the functional organization of the visual
system. To presage later discussion, that these two theses relate to these different
roles is important to the tension I will reveal between them.
But before I reveal this tension, I need to show that explaining object recog-
nition requires positing perceptual representations, in a sense I will be articulating
shortly. And prior to giving some substance to the notion, I think it is worth asking
what sort of evidence would show that a notion of representation is indeed indis-
pensable to an explanation. As we shall see in due course, it will be fairly easy to
show that representations of the right sort are appealed to by explanations of ob-
ject recognition; that is, that the explanations include the positing of what appear
to be perceptual representations. But simply showing that a notion features in an
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explanation is not enough to illustrate its indispensability.
By way of comparison, here is what I take to be a rather bad way to argue
if one hopes to show that some notion of representation is indispensable to an
explanation in cognitive science: first, argue that representations of the relevant sort
are posited in some successful or fruitful explanation of a psychological phenomenon;
and next, conclude that the notion of representation is therefore indispensable to
the explanation. This argument is bad because the mere fact that a notion of
representation features in an explanation does not show that it is indispensable. As
Ramsey (2007, p.1) points out, it could be as unnecessary to the explanation as the
notion of celestial sphere was to Copernicus’ astronomy.
What will be needed instead is an argument for why having the ingredients
for perceptual representation (which I present below) are essential to posited repre-
sentations playing their role within an explanation. Of course, scientists also worry
about what they “need” to posit to explain a phenomenon. Thus one might wonder
whether, in arguing for the indispensability of perceptual representation, I will sim-
ply be defending my own view about how to explain object recognition. In which
case, I am not commenting on the explanatory practices of vision science, but rather
engaging in them myself.
I have two responses to this worry. First, I think one can distinguish between
two enterprises that involve evaluating what sorts of posits are necessary for an
explanation to be successful. One involves simply positing certain entities which
one thinks are necessary for the explanation of the phenomenon of interest; another
is to determine, in general, if certain posits are in fact needed for any explanation
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of the phenomenon one might hope to offer. So in the first enterprise one does both
the positing and the explaining. In the second, one does neither.
I agree it would be problematic if I was engaged in the first endeavor, which
I am not (as I hope will become clear in due course). Rather, I take myself to be
engaged in the second, which I admit could also be considered as falling within the
scope of vision science, in so far as it might relate to foundational questions about
how the science tries to explain what and how we see. But it is also within the scope
of philosophy, in so far as one might be interested in critically evaluating the sorts
of explanations found in one branch of science. For example, a we shall see in the
next chapter, Marr (1982) was clearly engaged in both enterprises: of offering both
explanations of particular visual phenomena, and an approach for how we should
explain visual phenomena. And this is in part why his work is a touchstone for both
vision scientists and philosophers of cognitive science.
My second response is that it is not always terribly clear why vision scientists
insist on positing “representations”, in which case a fair amount of reconstruction
might be required to see why a particular notion of representation is indeed indis-
pensable. In particular, I will engage in this sort of extrapolation in my discussions
of perceptual constancy in Chapter 4, and object recognition in Chapter 5. The
theoretical connections I make could be exploited by those interested in offering
their own explanations of facts about these visual phenomena, but that would be
to adapt my arguments for a different enterprise than my own. Indeed, one could
do the same with my recipes for representation, which I will now begin to develop.
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2.2.3 Some Generic Ingredients
To get started on the right foot, I want to first offer a sort of recipe for what I
will term a generic notion of representation.5 This is intended to be a very general
notion that specifies what types of ingredients my recipes for internal and perceptual
representation must have.
One might think that in the broadest terms a representation is anything that
has content, or a “semantics”. After all a representation, whatever it is, cannot be
what it is without being “about” something.6 This is true whether we talk about
street signs, entries in the data structure of a digital computer, or internal states of
a brain or nervous system. Of course how one part of the world manages to be about
another, and what kinds of things it represents, might vary a great deal between
cases. But that some object or event in the world serves as a vehicle for content is
surely necessary ingredient for a very general notion of representation. However I
do not think it should be taken as sufficient (Fodor, 1990; Ramsey, 2007). Repre-
sentations do not exist in a vacuum. They always represent to, or for, something.
By way of example, consider a magnetic compass, which is a plausible case
of a representational device 7. On the one hand, what the needle of the compass
represents, its content, is the direction of the nearest magnetic pole—North, when
in the Northern hemisphere. On the other hand, the representational function of
5Here I take inspiration from the notion of “generic computation” offered by Piccinini and
Scarantino (2010), which I discuss in Chapter 3.
6Though see the discussion of “ersatz” representation below.
7I owe the example of a compass as a representational device to Ramsey (2007, p.29).
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the device is to track geographic North.8 The fact that the needle has some content
is not sufficient for making it a representation. Suppose a child rubs a needle on a
magnet, and places it on a floating leaf. The resulting magnetism in the needle will
cause its tip to orient toward magnetic North. When constructed by the child, the
needle and leaf is not a compass. But in a survival situation one might use the same
trick as the child, and the needle would indeed function as a compass.
The importance of the compass example is that it illustrates that at least for
some kinds of representation content is not enough. One must also show that the
object or event has a representational function. This dual requirement seems to be
generally true of the sorts of representations that interest us, including ones that
are mental. For example, Dretske (1988, p.80) makes the point in terms of reasons:
The fact that [reasons] have content, the fact that they have a semantic
character, must be relevant to the kind of effects they produce.
And Ramsey (2007, p.27) makes the same point in more general terms:
[T]o be a representation, a state or structure must not only have content,
but it must also be the case that this content is in some way pertinent
to how it is used.
So a recipe for representation requires two types of ingredients, relating either
to content or representational function. And anything that has at least these two
(types) of ingredients will qualify as a representation in a generic sense:
8We will ignore here the fact that what it tracks, and what it is used to represent, seem to come
apart. See discussion below.
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Generic representation: an object or event that: (i) is a vehicle for
content; (ii) plays some functional role in virtue of the properties of its
content.
This very general notion does not stipulate what the content is, how it is fixed,
what sort of function the object or event carries out, or the kinds of causal powers it
possesses. Objects like street signs are subsumed, as are events like when the light
changes in a stoplight. It also subsumes minds, computers, and other things that
have internal state event types that (as we shall see) are considered representations.
In this and subsequent recipes, I do not intend to take a firm stand on ex-
actly how we are to understand what functions are. For simplicity, I will assume
that functions apply to elements of a larger structure or system, and that they are
capacities of these elements that are subsumed under some sort of nomic generaliza-
tion (Cummins, 1975, 1983).9 I think that representational functions, whatever they
are, are functions in this general sense. Street signs have their function in terms
of the role they play in a larger system for regulating traffic; a compass needle has
its function by being part of a system that is composed of, among other things, a
windrose.10 The only thing I have added to differentiate something as a represen-
tational function is that the capacity is connected to the content of the object or
9There are multiple forms of functional analysis that might be relevant, given my interest in the
explanation of psychological phenomena (Piccinini and Craver, 2011). The notion of functional
analysis I have described is a form of “task-analysis”. I believe that one could rely on this or another
version of functional analysis (or incorporate it into a mechanistic approach to explanation; Craver,
2001), with little influence on my arguments to follow.
10A “windrose” on a compass is the graphic that indicates the cardinal directions.
30
event—it has its functional role in a system in virtue of the properties of its content.
Having made the argument that representational function is an ineliminable
ingredient for any notion of representation, let me differentiate my position from
three other views I do not intend to endorse. Each of these pertains to the relation-
ship between content and function in a representation.
1. Teleology.There is a line of thinking according to which a representation
must have an appropriate function, but in different sense than I intend. According to
this approach, the function of a representation is its teleological “proper function”,
and its content is “consumer-based” in that what something represents is determined
by how it is used by the system in which the object or event is embedded (Millikan,
1984, 1989; Papineau, 1987). While usually presented as a theory of intentional
content, this “teleosemantic” approach can also be considered as a very general
recipe for representation (Millikan, 1984; Ramsey, 2007). The core of the view is
that something has its (teleological) function and content in virtue of how it is
selected or used, rather than what it does. Whatever the merits of this perspective,
it is different than what I have in mind with respect to both representational function
and content, since I am not relying on a notion of teleological function.
2. Conceptual-Role. According to conceptual-role theories, content is deter-
mined by is functional role(s) in a larger system (Block, 1986; Harman, 1982). I
think that this sort of “content” that is determined by how a representation is used
is different from what I have in mind when talking of content. Let me again illustrate
using the example of a compass.
Like most representational devices compasses are designed and constructed
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with a particular functional use in mind, namely, to aid navigation; that is, they are
constructed to have a representational function, of indicating the direction of the
geographic poles, so that they can be used in navigate. However I can readily use
a compass in other ways that take advantage of its representational function, but
which do not involve navigation. For example, if you are building a house, and want
a North-South exposure, then you can use a compass to orient your construction
plan.11 Likewise, a Muslim following the Five Pillars of Islam could also use a
compass to find Qibla (the direction of Mecca) during prayer. Indeed, in general, if
I need any information regarding direction that can be derived from the direction
of magnetic North, I can use a compass, even if I do not plan on navigating.
The relevance of this distinction between role and use is that it suggests that
we can differentiate between two candidates for the content of a representation
(Cummins, 1996). On the one hand there is what I am calling the representational
content of the compass, which is related to the cardinal directions, and on the other
there is the particular “target” I might try to isolate by using it. This might be the
direction I need to walk, align my building plan, or orient my prayer mat. How a
representation is used determines the target, but not the content, of the represen-
tation, under my view. So far I have highlighted that many targets can go with one
content, but sometimes the two simply diverge. For example, a magnetic compass
is designed to indicate the nearest magnetic pole (assuming minimal magnetic dis-
11In fact, the magnetic compass was first invented for just such a function as part of feng shui
geomancy in ancient China. It was centuries later the magnetic compass was combined with the
windrose to create what we now consider the modern magnetic compass.
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turbances nearby), and for use in navigation when trying to determine the direction
of a geographic pole. But when near the Equator, or one of the Poles, it is of little
value for determining the cardinal directions no matter the intended use. The point
of all of this is that when I speak of content I do not mean a target, whereas under
a conceptual-role approach to representations the two are seemingly the same.
3. Causal Powers. I have said that a representation should have its function
in virtue of its content. Plausibly, the causal powers of something are related to
its functional role. This raises the question of whether I think the content of a
representation is somehow causally efficacious. Some have vigorously rejected this
idea. Instead, the causal powers of a representation are exhausted by its physical
or formal properties—at least when it comes to internal or mental representations
(Dretske, 1988) or representations that are also considered to be computational
symbols of some kind (Fodor, 1980). Others have argued that content is indeed
causally relevant (Peacocke, 1994; Rescorla, 2014). While an interesting issue I
intend to remain agnostic on the matter, as I believe either of the two alternatives
would be consistent with my arguments to follow.
In summary, the notion of representation I describe below are all generic: their
recipes include ingredients for both for content and representational function. But
my generic notion should be distinguished from teleological, and conceptual-role
based generic notions. And I am not taking any stand as to whether my generic
notion requires that the content of a representation is causally efficacious. We now
turn to some recipes for internal representation drawn from cognitive science.
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2.3 Some Common Varieties of Representation in Cognitive Science
Notions of representation in cognitive science are legion. For example, when a
linguist talks about “representations” of the syntactic structure of natural language,
and a neuroscientist talks about what the firing pattern of a single-cell “represents”,
it is not clear that they have the same notion in mind. Nonetheless, I think it is
possible to articulate some very general notions, which crucially are not motivated
by any considerations regarding mentality or folk psychology. In particular, in this
section I provide a recipe for a fairly broad notion of internal representation, which
I contrast with a different sense of “ersatz” representation that is sometimes found
in the literature.
2.3.1 Internal Representation
As we have already seen, I think recipes for representation need to have ingre-
dients relating to both content and function. In cognitive science it is common to
talk of “internal representations” of various kinds. At least historically, such talk
has been the result of taking the mind or brain to be a computer of some kind, in
which instances of internal representations are simply computational symbols that
are implemented by the brain (Newell, 1980; Pylyshyn, 1984). While this historical
precedent is important, I would like to rely on a more minimal conception of internal
representation that does not make overt reference to computation. In what follows,
I will rely on the following recipe for internal representation:
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Internal Representation: any internal state type of a system; that (i) is
a vehicle for original content; and (ii) performs a “stand-in” function
with respect to the internal operations of the system.
Let me unpack this analysis. By “system” I mean something quite broad. It
can be characterized in either concrete (a nervous system) or more abstract terms
(a multiply realizable functional architecture). I do not assume any amount of
organizational complexity. Bacteria or brains may do. The internal state type is an
event type that can be tokened; that is, it is something that a component or part
of the system enters into, based on internal or external causal factors.
The first constitutive ingredient I have identified is that the content be “orig-
inal”. Content is considered derived when it is a product of the artifice or con-
vention of an agent or group of agents; that is, it depends on the representational
(and indeed, intentional) capacities of an agent. In this broad sense, various repre-
sentational objects or devices have content that is derived: street signs, stoplights,
thermostats, compasses, and even digital computers. In contrast here I presume
that the content in question is not derived but original: what a particular internal
representation is about is not assigned by artifice or convention of an agent, or set
of agents. Thus, however the content is fixed, it is by a different means than things
like road signs, which have derived content resulting from human convention.
One might find it surprising that I associated original content with a notion
of internal representation. Typically originality is identified as a distinguishing in-
gredient of the intentional content of mental representations. For example, Ramsey
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(2007, p.17) states that:
. . . the aboutness of a word or a road sign is thought to exist only
through the aboutness of our thoughts—in particular, the aboutness of
the thought that these physical shapes stand for something else. . . Only
thoughts and other mental representations are assumed to have what is
called “original” or “intrinsic” intentionality.
However I think we should separate the question of whether the content of
some representation is original (or intrinsic) from the question of whether it is in-
tentional. It is quite reasonable to suppose that there are states of physical systems
that might be representations in a generic sense, but do not have derived content.
For example, perhaps individual neurons are a simple kind of representational de-
vice, which are senders and receivers of information about action potentials (Cao,
2012), or even the most primitive unit for perception (Barlow, 1972). In such a case,
what the neurons represent is not dependent on the goals, thoughts, or intentions of
an agent, yet neither is the content that they encode necessarily intentional. Along
similar lines, the “symbol grounding problem” (Harnad, 1990) in artificial intelli-
gence concerns how an artificial agent can autonomously determine the contents of
their own internal states—in other words, have original content (Taddeo and Floridi,
2005). In this case, there need be no presumption that we are speaking of mental
representation, and artificial minds.
So it seems that the notion of original content and intentional content can, at
least conceptually, be teased apart. Hence, I identify original content as an ingredi-
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ent for internal representation, and recommend identifying some other constitutive
ingredients for intentional content, as we shall see below.
The second constitutive ingredient relates to the functional role of internal rep-
resentations. A very general representational function is that some event or object
serves to “stand-in” for something else. This notion of stand-in function is regularly
invoked in cognition science, though it is not necessarily easy to characterize (Bech-
tel, 1998). Newell (1980, p.156) offers one influential characterizing of the function,
which he calls “designation”:
An entity X designates an entity Y relative to a process P, if, when P
takes X as input, its behavior depends on Y.
The core of this description is that for the process P, X takes the place of
the entity Y with respect to the process. Many representations might have this
function, especially if we presume X does not need to obtain solely with respect to
entities of some kind (e.g., if it could also be a property or state of affairs). Newell
was motivated by an analogy to symbols in a digital computer, but one can get at
the same idea more intuitively: something has a stand-in function when we directly
reason about it to draw conclusions about something else. In this respect, something
functions as a “surrogate” that allows us to:
. . . reason directly about a representation in order to draw conclusions
about the things it represents. . . In such cases we use one sort of thing
as a surrogate in our thinking about another. . . (Swoyer, 1991, p.449).
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For example, arguably a compass functions as a stand-in (or “surrogate”)
for the direction of geographic North when I use it to navigate while hiking. In
Newell’s terms, the needle of the compass (X) has the function to designate the
direction of the nearest magnetic pole (Y), with respect to my deliberation process
(P) about how to modify my route. Or in more intentional terms, by reasoning
about the needle direction, and what it tells me about the polar directions based on
my current position on the trail, and comparing this information to landmarks and
polar coordinates topography of the trail map, I can draw a conclusion about how
to make my way back to the car.
Hopefully these gestures are sufficient for grasping the idea of a “stand-in”
function. So characterized, one might wonder if a “stand-in” function is the way to
think about representational functions in general. For example, Haugeland (1991,
p.62) states that something which: “stands in for something else in this way is a
representation; that which it stands in for is its content ; and its standing in for
that content is representing it.” So perhaps being a stand-in is indeed the only
function any representation ever has. I am non-committal on this issue. And rather
than attempting a more complete characterization of the ingredients for internal
representation, let me illustrate the notion using two kinds of internal representation
often posited in cognitive science.
The first kind of representation is of an internal state of a system that is part
of a stage in the transformation of information. This internal state functions as
a stand-in for something, as part of the functional organization of the larger sys-
tem in which it is embedded. For this reason, it is common to talk of this sort of
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representation as “encoding” certain information about a stimulus, which is then
“decoded” by a later stage of processing, or as either the input or output represen-
tation of a process. This notion of what we may call, following Ramsey (2007), an
“io-representation” is intimately connected with the information-processing frame-
work in vision science (Marr, 1982), as we shall see in the next chapter. The second
kind of representation involves modeling or simulating some domain. This kind of
representation rests on some form of structural mapping, or isomorphism between
properties of the representation and the domain it represents (Gallistel and King,
2009; Palmer, 1978; Shepard, 1984). Following Ramsey (2007), we may call these
“s-representations”. Although the kind of internal representation we are interested
in will be io-representations, s-representations also qualify as a form of internal
representation as I have defined them.
These two notions of internal representation are sometimes identified with
specific commitments about the functional architecture of the brain (e.g., Ramsey,
2007). As a matter of history it is true that the notion of internal representation is
deeply connected to the view that the mind/brain is (in some sense) a computational
system (Fodor, 1980; Newell, 1980; Pylyshyn, 1984).12 In this respect the notion
of internal representation I have presented is closely connected to the idea of a
computational symbol over which the rules and operations of a system (i.e., the
12This statement is ambiguous, since I am fudging a distinction between computational function-
alism as a metaphysical thesis about the mind, and computationalism as a view about explanation
(Fodor, 2000; Piccinini, 2010). However the difference between these views does not matter for
present purposes.
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computations it carries out) are defined. However I want to resist presupposing a
notion of computational symbol when talking of internal representation. Perhaps the
internal representations I am describing, and the architecture they require, qualify
as computational in a generic sense (Piccinini and Scarantino, 2010): they can
be considered medium-independent vehicles that are manipulated as part of some
process that has the function of manipulating them in accordance with rules defined
over the vehicles. But I do not want to presuppose more than this.
What I do think is important is that the notion of internal representation I
will be employing does not have its origin in folk psychology, but rather emerged in
cognitive science from reflection on the organization of the sorts of (computational)
devices we commonly engineer for detecting and representing signals, and storing
and analyzing data.
2.3.2 Ersatz Representation
Having specified a notion of internal representation that was gleaned from
cognitive science, I want to contrast it with a different notion that is also sometimes
encountered in the literature. According to this notion, “representation” is just a
synonym for a “computational symbol”, which need not have any sort of content or
“semantics”. I will call this the “ersatz” notion of representation, since the internal
states of systems that it picks out are not representations in the minimal generic
sense I spelled out earlier (because they lack content).
It is an ongoing debate in the philosophy of computation whether you can have
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computation without representation (Piccinini, 2008). Matters depend, of course,
on the precise way in which each notion is characterized. The relevance of the ersatz
notion for present purposes is that some have argued that it is the only notion that is
in fact employed—or needs to be employed—in the explanations of cognitive science
(Chomsky, 1995, 2000; Stich, 1983). I am happy to recognize this very general notion
of internal “representation” whereby one means any internal state of a system over
which some sort of (computational) operation is defined, but such a state would not
be a representation of the sort I have in mind.
So I mention this usage of the term ‘representation’ only in order to acknowl-
edge it, and set it aside.
2.4 A Recipe for Perceptual Representation I: Some Mental Staples
With a notion of internal representation at our disposal, the next step is to
enumerate the further ingredients that are required to make a perceptual representa-
tion. I have broken this task into two parts: (I) providing some “staple” ingredients
for when an internal representation is mental; and (II) providing further “special”
ingredients that distinguish when an internal representation of a sensory system is
not just mental, but also has perceptual content. I take up (I) in this section, and
(II) in the next one. And although my aim in this section is to provide some of the
constitutive mental ingredients for perceptual representation, I will proceed by in
part considering ingredients for mental representation more generally.
At root a mental representation is an internal representation (characterized
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in functional or neural terms) that is a vehicle for intentional content. This makes
sense, since intentional content, or intentionality, is typically considered a mark of
the mental. It is also common to distinguish the sort of intentionality in question
as being original, which we have already included in the recipe for internal repre-
sentation. So other ingredients must be identified to distinguish intentional from
merely original content. Before doing so, let me make two clarifications regarding
the character and scope of the ingredients I will offer for mental representation.
First, in providing a set of mental ingredients for representation, I am nei-
ther presupposing a commitment to the representational theory of mind (RTM),
nor attempting to offer a set of ingredients for naturalizing intentionality. As my
aims are horizontal, the recipe I offer is not intended as a constitutive analysis of
mental states, or as account of how intentional content can be fit into the natural
order. In other words, the ingredients I offer are for determining whether internal
representations posited in vision science are mental, not for whether mental states
posited by folk psychology are representational.
Second, the sorts of ingredients I offer are for a restricted class of mental repre-
sentations, which subsumes perceptual representations. The first restriction is that
a mental representation must be directed at the external world, or have a “mind-to-
world” direction of fit. This restriction excludes mental representations that have
a “world-to-mind” direction of fit, like those we might connect to desires, motiva-
tions, intentions, goals, and motor planning and action. The second restriction is
that the mental representation have some external referent. This restriction is nec-
42
essary because the Distal Object Thesis presumes some distal referent.13 In fact,
going forward, I will usually take “content” to simply specify the external referent
of a representation. Given this restriction, my recipe likely excludes many kinds of
mental representations, due to what they are about. For example, we think of love,
justice, and logic, with perhaps equal clarity and vigor, as we do fictional charac-
ters such as Sherlock Holmes (or to use a more current example, Harry Potter) or
non-existent things such as the planet Vulcan. Representations that underlie these
capacities may be perfectly mental, but they are not the sort of cases I want to
capture with my recipe because they lack a distal referent.
When operating within these restrictions, there is something of a consensus
as to the sorts of ingredients that are required for intentional content and men-
tal representation, whether one is talking about perception (Burge, 2010; Orlandi,
2014), or cognition (Ramsey, 2007), with similar ideas being expressed earlier by
Fodor (1986). The three “staples” I will focus on are objectivity, robustness, and
correctness conditions. Varieties of each provide important constitutive (mental)
ingredients for perceptual representation.
2.4.1 Objectivity
The first constitutive ingredient is related to the Distal Object Thesis: the
internal representation must be about some “objective” property instantiated in the
world. Described in this way, I take objectivity to be a property of the intentional
13The thesis, recall, states that: “the end-stage internal representations that underlie object
vision represent properties of entities in the distal world.”
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content of some mental representations.
Following Burge (2010, p.47) there are two notions of objectivity that are of
potential relevance. First, we might think of a subject matter as being objective
in the sense that it is mind-independent. Read narrowly, this notion precludes
anything that results from human artifice as being objective. Second, we might
think of a subject matter as being objective in the sense that it is constitutively
non-perspectival. The latter notion is broader, and is the one I will rely on. Nagel
(1980, p.77) provides a useful description of this sense of objectivity:
To acquire a more objective understanding of some aspect of the world,
we step back from our view of it and form a new conception which has
that view and its relation to the world as its object. In other words, we
place ourselves in the world that is to be understood. The old view then
comes to be regarded as an appearance, more subjective than the new
view, and correctable or confirmable by reference to it. The process can
be repeated, yielding a still more objective conception.
Under this conception of objectivity, while minds might themselves be per-
spectival, what they represent is not. Also, under this conception, objectivity also
comes in degrees. If we think of perspectives as pertaining to how we perceive,
then multi-modal internal representations that integrate information from multiple
sense modalities will be more objective than unimodal ones. In turn amodal internal
representations, such as concepts, are more objective still. For the subject matter
of what we see, or hear will likely be dependent on facts about how our sensory
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systems work in a manner that more abstract categorical representations are not.
The content of an internal representation will be what I will call perceptually
objective when it is non-perspectival with respect to a sensory system. For the visual
system, this means the representation transcends viewpoint, in that the content is
independent of particular vantage points by which something might appear to us:
the projected retinal size and position, its particular orientation in the picture- and
depth-planes, and its apparent illumination and distance from the viewer. In other
words perceptually objective content is maximally non-perspectival with respect
to the dimensions of perspective within the visual system. Going forward I will
take perceptual objectivity to be a constitutive mental ingredient for the intentional
content of perceptual representations.
Just because I think the representations of interest are about non-perspectival
properties or states of affairs does not mean I think they must be “veridical” in
the following sense: what we represent is what we think we represent. Sometimes
the very idea of mental representation is tied to the idea that our intuitions about
what we represent must by and large be correct (Akins, 1996). For example, one
might claim that when we perceive color, we cannot be mistaken about what we
think it is we perceive (Mendelovici, 2013). I think this view is itself mistaken. To
revisit our earlier discussion of theories of reference, it could be that many of our
explicit beliefs about what we represent are wrong, even if what we represent is
indeed some objective property of the world. So veridicality in this sense, I think,




The second ingredient I will emphasize relates to the fact that what a men-
tal representation is about can, in some sense, be “absent” (Orlandi, 2014; Pylyshyn,
1984). The connection between absence and intentionality was recognize by Brentano
(1874) who is largely credited with reintroducing the notion of intentionality to philo-
sophical scrutiny. Brentano pointed out that the objects of paradigmatic proposi-
tional attitudes, such as belief and desire, have an “intentional inexistence”. What
exactly Brentano meant by this phrase is not entirely clear (for some discussion
see: Crane, 1998; Rey, 2012). Plausibly, part of what he had in mind was that
the objects of our attitudes need not exist, as captured vividly by Chisholm (1952,
p.56-57):
[the propositional] attitudes can truly be said to have objects even though
the objects which they can be said to have do not exist. Even if there
weren’t any honest men, for example, it would be quite possible for Dio-
genes to look for one. Diogenes’ quest has an object, namely an honest
man, but, on our supposition, there aren’t any honest men. . . But mere
physical phenomena, on the other hand, cannot thus “intentionally con-
tain an object in themselves.” In order for Diogenes to sit in his tub, for
example, there must be a tub for him to sit in.14
14Diogenes of Sinope (412 - 323 BCE) was one of the founders of the cynic school of philosophy
in ancient Greece, and was known for living a simple life of unflinching moral principle. Legend
has it that he once wandered the streets of Athens with a lamp “looking” for an honest man.
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Chisholm’s example is for mental states that lack a referent, but a similar
point applies when there is some referent. For it is also the case that we sometimes
seem to see what is not there. Consider an example of representing gone wrong:
Raccoon. In a back alley on a dark night, I see a small four-legged animal
approach me, which I believe to be a cat. However, as the creature
approaches I realize that it is in fact a raccoon. Prior to my realization,
I tokened a concept cat, which continued to be about cats even though
it was caused by a raccoon.
Raccoon is a case of misrepresentation: a representation is erroneously to-
kened by something other than what it represents. Just as the lack of honest men
does not undermine Diogenes’ ability to look for one, likewise I can readily seem to
perceive a cat when only a raccoon is present. Like Diogenes and his tub, I need
a cat to pet one, but I don’t need a cat to represent one. The usual moral that
is drawn from the phenomenon of misrepresentation is that “allowing” for misrep-
resentation is an important ingredient for intentional content, or the representing
relation. Dretske (1988, p.65 emphasis in original) makes the point forcefully:
it is the power to misrepresent, the capacity to get things wrong, to say
things that are not true, that helps define the relation of interest. That
is why it is important to stress a system’s capacity for misrepresentation.
For only if a system has this capacity does it have, in its power to get
things right, something approximating meaning.
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Accounting for misrepresentation has typically even been taken to be the pri-
mary task of theories of intentional content (I return to this topic in Chapter 6).
However what is interesting about Chisholm’s example is not that Diogenes is some-
how in error when he looks for an honest man (though using a lamp was perhaps the
wrong method), but rather that the object of Diogenes’ attitudes does not need to
exist. Likewise, it has been argued that accounting for misrepresentation, or error, is
for a theory of representational function rather than a theory of intentional content
(Cummins, 1996; Fodor, 1990). I think that error is more a reflection of a sta-
ple ingredient for intentional content, what Fodor (1990, p.90-91) calls robustness:
intentional content is common across tokenings of a representation, however the
tokenings might be caused. Consider two more cases.
Mr.Muscles. My brother has a cat named Mr.Muscles. He is a handsome
tuxedo, with black and white fur, and a somewhat excitable personality.
As I sit here thinking of him, I token my concept cat.
Concussion. Late to get out the door, I rush down the stairs. Losing my
footing I trip and fall. At the bottom of the stairs I hit my head, striking
my right temple to the floor. The trauma results in me sustaining a mild
concussion. Bizarrely, the blow causes repeated tokenings of cat.
Like Raccoon, Mr.Muscles and Concussion are also examples where my con-
cept cat is tokened by things other than what it represents—they are what we may
call “wild” tokenings (Fodor, 1987). But there are important differences between
the cases. When I think of Mr.Muscles no error has occurred, and the tokening
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of cat is internally rather than externally caused. When I sustain the concussion,
the repeated tokenings of cat are externally-caused, but they are not obviously
erroneous for at no point do I make the mistake of thinking a cat is present (even
though I cannot get thoughts of them out of my head). In these other cases the
content of cat is robust in Fodor’s sense: the content of the concept is the same,
whether it is tokened by raccoons, thoughts of a particular cat, or knocks to the
head.
So examples of misrepresentation are, I think, relevant to intentional content
not because they are a convincing case of error, but rather because they are a
convincing illustrations of robustness. The connection to Chisholm’s example is
that even if the “object” of my representation exists, it need not be present when
I token the representation—and it is this fact that is captured by the notion of
robustness.15
The above examples also suggest different forms of robustness. First, inten-
tional content can be perceptually robust: the intentional content of a perceptual
representation is common to all tokenings of the representation despite variability in
the causes of the sensory inputs that activate the representation. The phenomenon of
misrepresentation is a reflection of perceptual robustness. For example, in Raccoon
15Must wild tokenings of a representation be actual, or can they just be counterfactual? That
is, must it be the case that wild tokenings of an internal representation have occurred in the actual
world for us to conclude that it is robust? Some insist that there must be actual instances (e.g.,
Orlandi, 2014), but it is not clear to me why the mere counterfactual possibility is not enough to
establish robustness (Fodor, 1990).
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my concept cat exhibits perceptual robustness. Second, intentional content can
be cognitively robust: the intentional content of a representation is common across
tokenings caused by other internal cognitive processes (Fodor, 990b). In Mr.Muscles
my concept cat exhibits cognitive robustness. Also, the mental states of Diogenes,
as he looked for an honest man through the streets of Athens, plausibly also ex-
hibit cognitive robustness. Lastly, I will say that intentional content is resilient to
reflect the fact that even when a representation is tokened (directly or indirectly)
by extra-psychological means, the content is unchanged (Rey, 1998). In Concussion
my concept cat exhibits resilience. Likewise, if the neural realization for cat was
localized and directly stimulated, the content of the concept would remain resilient.
It is plausible that, in general, intentional content is resilient, and depending on
the kind of representation, perceptually robust, cognitively robust, or both. Perhaps
some internal representations of the visual system cannot be tokened “off-line” in
working memory or mental simulation, in which case they are not cognitively robust,
since they are only activated by sensory inputs. For example, perhaps the concept
cat that I token when I see a raccoon is not the same as the one I token when I
think of Mr.Muscles. For this reason, going forward, I will minimally take perceptual
robustness and resilience as constitutive ingredients for perceptual representations
in the visual system.
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2.4.3 Correctness
In our discussion of robustness we already saw that a notion of error is of-
ten associated with mental representation, which points to to another important
mental ingredient: that they must have “correctness” conditions. Roughly, these
are whatever conditions or states of affairs are picked out by the content of the
representations (Burge, 2010, p.38).
I think an argument can be made that given the other ingredients I have
specified, a perceptual representation must also have correctness conditions. If the
content of an internal representation is perceptually objective, and the represen-
tation serves a stand-in function, then it will be correctly tokened whenever its
content (what it stands in for) is in fact the case, and has presumably caused the
representation to be tokened. When a token of the representation is otherwise
caused externally (i.e., wild tokenings), but it is still operating as a stand-in, then
the representation will be incorrect, or in error. For example, when I represented
the raccoon in the back alley as a cat, I tokened cat, but given what the concept
is about, and the role it plays in my psychology, the tokening would be correct if
a cat had in fact been present. Given this argument, if an internal representation
is both perceptually objective and robust, it follows that it will have correctness
conditions. Since this ingredient is implied by the other ingredients I have listed, I
will not emphasize it in what follows.
In summary, I think the following constitutive mental ingredients are necessary
for perceptual representation; that is, an internal state is a perceptual representation
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only if it:
(i) is a vehicle for original content that is perceptually objective, percep-
tually robust, and resilient ; and (ii) it functions as a perceptually robust
“stand-in” with respect to the internal operations of the system.
(i) highlights what I take to be the most important distinguishing ingredients
for intentional content relevant to perceptual representation, which, when coupled
with (ii), also entails that there are correctness conditions for the representation.
Let me say something about why it is important that the state type be a perceptually
robust stand-in.
As we saw earlier with the example of the compass, the fact that the needle
of a compass tracks magnetic North is not enough, by itself, to explain why it is a
representational device. For example, a magnetized needle on the leaf tracks mag-
netic North just as my compass does, but it is not a representation of magnetic
North, unless it has the function of indicating magnetic North. So in order to be a
representation, the content of the state of a system must somehow be relevant to the
functional role of the state within the system. And when it comes to mental repre-
sentation, it must be the case that the intentional nature of the content is somehow
relevant to the functional role of an internal representation within our psychology
(Ramsey, 2007). The most functionally salient of the intentional ingredients is that
of perceptual robustness. If the function of an internal representation is to serve
as a stand-in—regardless of what causes the representation to be tokened—then its
function is to provide a perceptually robust stand-in. Thus (ii) serves to connect
52
the function of a mental representation to its intentional content.
2.5 A Recipe for Perceptual Representation II: Some Special Ingre-
dients
We now have a sense of the mental ingredients necessary for perceptual repre-
sentation. Are they also sufficient? Operationally, it is tempting to take a perceptual
representation to be any internal representation that has all of the ingredients from
the last section. But I believe a few more should be included, which are also unique
to perceptual representation, and distinguishes it from other forms of mental repre-
sentation.
In this section I enumerate a few “special” ingredients for perceptual repre-
sentations, as a species of mental representation peculiar to sensory systems like
vision. As is commonly done, I contrast perceptual representations with sensory
registers, which have my ingredients for internal representation, but lack the mental
ingredients from the previous section. I then discuss some further ingredients for
perceptual content, some of which I think are entirely optional.
2.5.1 Internal Representations of Sensory Systems
Something left unspecified by the list of ingredients from the previous section
is that a perceptual representation must be an internal representation of a “sensory
system”.
There is some debate about what the constitutive conditions are for sensory
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systems, and how these systems are to be identified and individuated. For example,
it has been suggested that sensory systems must involve their own form of sensory
transduction (Keeley, 2002), or a distinct form of qualitative experience (Matthen,
2015). A separate issues concerns what kind of constitutive conditions should be
provided. For example, perhaps “sense modality” should be thought of as cluster-
concept (Picciuto and Carruthers, 2013).
These are interesting issues, but I do not think I need to offer a recipe for iden-
tifying sensory systems, as a prerequisite for my recipe for perceptual representation.
The reason is that vision is clearly a sense modality, if anything is. However, it is
important that I distinguish between two kinds of internal representations one can
find in a sensory system like vision: those that merely represent proximal properties
of sensory inputs, and those that represent the distal world. I mark the distinction,
as many others have, as that between a sensory register and a perceptual represen-
tation (Burge, 2010; Orlandi, 2014). Crucially, while sensory registers are a kind of
internal representation of a sensory system, they are non-mental.
First, sensory registers are not perceptually objective in the sense I spelled out
earlier. The reason is that if the content of an internal representation is perceptually
objective, then it is distal. However, by definition the content of a sensory register
is proximal. Second, while sensory registers are plausibly resilient, they are not
perceptually robust since (in the case of vision) they only track higher-order prop-
erties of the visual stimulus that can be extracted from the retinal image. So long
as the light in some part of the retinal produces the appropriate low-level features,
a sensory register is activated. For example, internal representations of orientation
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at a certain spatial frequency, in a particular portion of the visual field, will be a
sensory register.16
Finally, with respect to function, only perceptual representations provide per-
ceptually robust stand-ins for what they are about. For this reason I think only
perceptual representations have correctness conditions. One might try and mark
the distinction between sensory registration and perceptual representation by the
types of functions they carry out. For example, Burge (2010) argues that sensory
registers only serve biological and not representational functions, because he takes
correctness conditions to be a prerequisite for having a representational function
(for more discussion of this alternate recipe, see Chapter 4). In contrast, I think I
can distinguish between sensory registers and perceptual representations, without
having to deny that sensory registers can serve a representational stand-in function.
The importance of distinguishing sensory registers from perceptual representa-
tions is that in arguing for Conclusion 2, I will need to show why positing perceptual
representations, as opposed to mere sensory registers, is required to explain facts
about visual object recognition (as we shall see in Chapter 4 and 5).
2.5.2 (Optional) Ingredients for Perceptual Content
So far a perceptual representation is an internal representation of a sensory
system that also satisfies my mental ingredients. However it is often claimed that
perceptual content has other more particular ingredients, which distinguish it from
16Though even these internal representations may be perceptually or cognitively robust, if one
thinks that cognition penetrates deeply into perception.
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the content of other sorts of mental representations. Specifically, it is common
to think of perceptual representations as attributing properties to particulars in a
manner that is, in some sense, “perceptual” (Burge, 2010; Davies, 1991).
This description of perceptual content invites questions about the nature of
these properties and entities, which I do not propose to answer (Nanay, 2015). The
reason is that how one answers these questions does not make a difference as to
whether an internal representation of a sensory system has my mental ingredients.
So long as the entities are in the distal world, and the properties are attributed to
them, I am not concerned with whether more specific ingredients are also satisfied.
The representations I am interested in are perceptual in so long as they are internal
representations of a sensory system, like vision, which have the mental ingredients I
presented in the last section. And their content is perceptual so long as it involves
attributing a property to a particular. When we come to discuss object vision in
Chapter 5, I will have more to say what the relevant properties and particulars
might be. But in general I do not think I need to commit myself to anything more
specific. In particular, below are two issues I will not take stands on.
First, I am agnostic about the ontological status of the particulars or individ-
uals that vision attributes properties to. Of course they must be something that is
“out there” in the distal world (Davies, 1991). But I do not think I need to commit
myself, for example, to the view that perception attributes properties to ordinary
physical objects as some have been inclined to argue (Matthen, 2005; Pylyshyn,
2007). Part of the reason for why I am agnostic is that proponents of this view
sometimes take it for granted that we perceive objectively (e.g., Casati, 2015), and
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I do not think that the empirical evidence that might be marshaled to support the
view supports anything other than the claim that the object of perception is distal.
Second, I am also agnostic about whether the content is nonconceptual; that
is, whether the content of perceptual representations is independent of the con-
cepts that a perceiver possesses (Evans, 1982). Similarly I am noncommittal about
whether being a perceptual representation (as a kind of state) is dependent on cog-
nitive factors (Heck, 2000). The reason for my agnosticism is that my central case,
visual object recognition, is at the border of perception and cognition, and is a
central aspect of visual cognition. The representations that underlie the capacity
are categorical, and so could be consider either concepts in their own right, or not.
If they are not, whether their content or state-type are somehow determined by
cognitive factors will very likely depend on what position one adopts regarding the
degree to which the visual system is encapsulated from other sense modalities and
cognition. But whatever ones standpoint on these issues, they have no bearing on
what I wish to argue since whatever position one favors does not seem to have
any bearing on whether the representations in question are perceptual (given my
recipe). At most these issues would seem to relate to whether we categorize object
recognition as occurring at the end of vision or beginning of cognition. But it might
also be that object recognition, as a part of both object vision and visual cognition,
is simply a penumbra when it comes to arguing about nonconceptual content and
state-type individuation.
In summary, I will be relying on the following recipe for perceptual represen-
tation in arguing for Conclusions 2 (and hence 3):
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Perceptual Representation: any internal representation that: (i) is a
vehicle for original content that is perceptually objective, perceptually
robust, and resilient ; (ii) functions as a perceptually robust “stand-in”;
(iii) is internal to a sensory system; and (iv) attributes a property to a
distal particular.
(i) and (ii) are just the relevant mental ingredients from earlier, while (iii) and
(iv) are the special ingredients I added in this section. As we shall see, showing that
all aspects of (i) are satisfied will be the focal point of my arguments for Conclusion
2, as developed in Chapters 4 and 5.
2.6 Missing Ingredients? Some Anti-Representational Challenges
Given the way I have laid out my recipes for internal and perception represen-
tation, my arguments for Conclusion 1 and 2 can fail for two reasons:
(1) The representations posited in typical explanations of some visual
phenomenon of interest are missing ingredients for internal representa-
tion.
(2) The representations posited in typical explanations of some visual
phenomenon of interest are missing ingredients for perceptual represen-
tation.
If true of the information-processing framework in general, (1) Undermines
my first two conclusions, while if true of explanations of object recognition, (2) only
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undermines Conclusion 2. In this section I review three anti-representationalist
arguments. All of these arguments were developed to target the utility of mental
representations as a posit in cognitive science. However, in light of my recipes for
internal and perceptual representation, the first two arguments can be thought us
reasons for endorsing (1), while the third provides a reason to endorse (2). Thus I
treat them as general sorts of “challenges” that I will need to respond to.
2.6.1 The Informal Challenge
One way to undermine both arguments is to show that even some of my generic
ingredients are not satisfied by internal states of the visual system, as claimed by
Chomsky (1995, p.52):
There is no meaningful question about the “content” of the internal
representations of a person seeing a cube under the conditions of the
experiments . . . or about the content of a frog’s “representation of” a fly
or of a moving dot in the standard experimental studies of frog vision.
No notion like “content” or “representation of” figures within the theory.
Chomsky denies that there is any notion of representational content that is of
explanatory importance to vision science, and appears to reject the very idea that
representing is a kind of relation. In effect all one needs to posit in order to explain
how we see are ersatz representations. One motivation for Chomsky’s view is the
claim that any intentional idioms that are used in vision science are informal. A
vision scientist might:
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speak of “misperception” in the case of the person or frog in the exper-
iments, though perhaps not when a photoreceptor on a street light is
activated by a searchlight rather than the sun . . . But these usages are
on a par with an astronomer warning that a comet is aiming directly
toward the Earth, implying no animist, intentional physics.(Chomsky,
1995, p.53 my emphasis)
Intentional descriptions of representations are informal, and like informal in-
tentional descriptions of phenomena in other branches of science, such descriptions
are inessential, and hence dispensable, to explanations that posit some form of rep-
resentation.
Although directed at appeals to mental representation, the heart of the argu-
ments seems to be the denial that any notion of representational content is required
for explanations in cognitive science to succeed. So if Chomsky’s argument succeeds,
it undermines all of my conclusions in a fundamental way. The argument presents
what we may call the Informality Challenge: To meet it I must show that, mini-
mally, a content component is indeed required as part of the information-processing
framework in vision science. And this requires a convincing argument for why ref-
erence to representational content does not reflect a mere intentional gloss, as one
sometimes finds in other areas of science.
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2.6.2 The Instrumental Challenge
A different style of argument, which also presents a challenge to my argu-
ments, rests on the claim that the notion of representational content employed in
typical explanations of a psychological phenomena satisfy other ingredients, which
run counter to those I have offered. Egan (1992, 1995, 1999, 2010) has proposed a
particular explanatory function for representational content in computational mod-
els in cognitive science, according to which the content is derived. Egan (1995,
p.84-85) agrees with Chomsky that intentional descriptions are often used infor-
mally to describe visual processes, but such processes are also described in formal
terms, which requires an intentional description. On the one hand we have some
computational model, which can be described in purely formal terms; and on the
other, there is the phenomenon of interest. According to Egan, providing a distal
interpretation of the model links it to the phenomenon, which makes the model
explanatory.
The questions that antecedently define a psychological theory’s domain
are usually couched in intentional terms. For example, we want a the-
ory of vision to tell us, among other things, how the visual system can
detect three-dimensional distal structure from information contained in
two-dimensional images. A characterization of the postulated compu-
tational processes in terms of distal objects and properties enables the
theory to answer these questions . . . It is only under an interpretation of
some of the states of the system as representations of depth and surface
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orientation that the processes given a mathematical characterization by
a computational theory are revealed as vision. (Egan, 2010, p.256 my
emphasis; cf. Egan, 1995, p.189)
Egan acknowledges that intentional descriptions might point us toward a phe-
nomenon of interest, but she distinguishes between intentional content and what I
will call instrumental content.17 It is the latter that plays an important explanatory
role in explanations of visual phenomena, since it serves to link computational mod-
els to the phenomenon of interest, so that the models become an explanation of the
phenomenon (Egan, 1992, p.452); that is, attributing instrumental content provides
a “pragmatically motivated gloss” of a computational model (Egan, 2010, p.259).
The ingredients for instrumental content are quite different from those I spec-
ified for internal and perceptual representation. First, serving an explanatory role
for a theorist is an entirely different notion from a representational function for
the system of interest, and so it is no surprise that instrumental content is clearly
derived: it is only under an interpretation of a computational model of a system
that it has instrumental content, and interpretations are interest relative and con-
text sensitive with respect to our explanatory goals (Egan, 1999, p.186). Second,
instrumental content can be distal, and directed at property instantiations, but it
is a researcher’s explanatory interests that warrant the distal, rather than a proxi-
17My recipe for perceptual representation is close to the position she calls the “Essential Distal
Content View” (Egan, 2010), and “hyper representationalism” (Egan, 2012). However, Egan lumps
together my recipe with the requirement that intentional contents are essential to, and serve to
individuate, representational states. But I exclude the latter requirement as part of my recipe.
62
mal, interpretation (Egan, 1995, p.197). As Egan emphasizes, endorsing the idea of
instrumental content amounts to the rejection of the sort of ingredients that I have
in mind, which includes content being original (e.g. Egan, 2010, p.259). According
to Egan, ascribing instrumental content in the explanations of cognitive science has
the same function as interpretations utilized in other domains of natural science
that use computational models (Egan, 1992, p.444).
Egan’s position conflicts with my recipes for internal and perceptual repre-
sentation because she maintains that the only notion of representational content in
cognitive science, which does actual explanatory work, has derived, instrumental
content. Hence if her argument succeeds, she undermines Conclusions 1 - 2 (and
therefore 3). Thus her argument presents what I call the Instrumental Challenge.
In order to overcome it, I need to show that the sort of representational content
that is appealed to in the information-processing framework is not simply the in-
strumental content that is attached to computational models in order to make them
explanatory.
2.6.3 The Job Description Challenge
The two previous challenges in effect deny that researchers really have notions
of internal or perceptual representation in mind when it comes to the “represen-
tations” that they posit in their explanations. As we have seen, this is largely
because they reject the idea that intentional descriptions in the explanations of
cognitive science imply the positing of mental representations. A complementary
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form of argument grants that researchers might have something like a notion of
mental representation that they mean to employ in their explanations, but under
inspection, their posits fail to have the right ingredients. Specifically, purported
mental representations do not have any representational function tied to properties
of intentional content. And without such a function, the posits lack a necessary
ingredient of mental representations. Ramsey (2007, p.27) refers to the need for a
notion of representational function (which is tied to intentional content) as the “Job
Description Challenge”:
There needs to be some unique role or set of causal relations that war-
rants our saying some structure or state serves a representational func-
tion. These roles and relations should enable us to distinguish the rep-
resentational from the non-representational and should provide us with
conditions that delineate the sort of job representations perform, qua
representations, in the physical system. I’ll refer to the task of speci-
fying such a role as the “job description challenge.” What we want is
a job description that tells us what it is for something to function as a
representation in a physical system.
Absent a job description, that is, a description of the representational function
of an internal state that (purportedly) has intentional content, the posited internal
state is not a mental representation. Ramsey argues at length that while there are
some notions of representation in cognitive science that seem to meet his challenge,
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the notions that are popular in contemporary research do not.18
For example, one notion of representation sometimes found in vision science
is what Ramsey calls the “receptor” notion. This notion, which is very similar
to what I am calling sensory registers, fails the Job Description Challenge. The
receptor notion has its origin in early single-cell recording work on the retina of
various model organisms (e.g., Barlow, 1953; Lettvin et al., 1959), and similar views
have been defended by philosophers (e.g., Dretske, 1988). According to Ramsey
(2007, p.120) the core of the receptor notion is that: “because a given neural or
computational structure is regularly and reliably activated by some distal condition,
it should be regarded as having the role of representing (indicating, signaling, etc.)
that condition.” However the receptor notion is not obviously a notion of mental
representation, since it only requires that an internal state of my visual system is
reliably activated by a state of the world:
There are several non-representational internal states that must, in their
proper functioning, reliably respond to various states of the world. Our
immune system, to take one example, functions in part by consistently
reacting to infections and insults to our bodies, yet no one suggests that
any given immune system response (such as the production of antibodies)
18For replies to Ramsey’s arguments see Morgan (2014) and Shagrir (2012). For my part, I think
Ramsey offers an incomplete recipe for mental representation, and so even the cases that he thinks
meet his challenge might indeed fail. The reason, briefly, is that the only distinguishing ingredient
he offers for intentional content is its originality. But as we have seen above, this is better seen as
an ingredient for internal representation, and other ingredients need to be provided.
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has the functional role of representing these infections. (Ramsey, 2007,
p.125)
Having the function of reliably being caused by a state of the environment is
not sufficient to make an internal state of a system a mental representation, even if
it is a neural state. Hence, the receptor notion, as described, fails the job description
challenge. Ramsey’s style of argument could be equally successful at undermining
my argument for Conclusion 2. Meeting the job description challenge means showing
that the internal representations posited by some explanations of visual phenomena
have my ingredients for perceptual representation, and that includes a distinctive
representational function—in my case, they must function as a perceptually robust
stand-in.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I outlined my argumentative strategy for my main conclusions
about the roles of different notions of representation in explanations in vision science.
Carrying out the strategy required stocking up with a set of recipes for different
notions of representation. The cupboard is no longer bare. We now have at our
disposal notions of internal and perceptual representation. It is now time to put
these recipes to use.
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Chapter 3: The Contents of the Information-Processing Framework
in Vision Science
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I defend Conclusion 1: a notion of internal representation is
indispensable to explanations within the information-processing framework in vision
science. The notion of “internal representation” I introduced in the last chapter has
two key ingredients: that the content of the representation is original, and that the
representation has a “stand-in” function. Thus, to defend my first conclusion, I need
to show that representations in the information-processing framework have these
crucial ingredients, and compare my argument to the three anti-representationalist
challenges from the last chapter.
The most well-known characterization of the information-processing frame-
work is laid out in Marr’s classic Vision (Marr, 1982). What I propose to argue
in this chapter is that a notion of internal representation is indispensable to Marr’s
characterization of the framework, and in so far as his approach can be taken as
representative of the field at large, this provides an argument for my first main con-
clusion. One might worry that focusing so narrowly on the work of one individual
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substantially weakens my case. However there are three reasons why this focus is
warranted.
First, some of the anti-representationalist challenges from the previous chapter
have largely relied on Marr’s work as a case study (Chomsky, 1995, 2000; Egan,
1992, 1995, 1999, 2010). Thus, I can meet their challenges by showing that they
fail with respect to Marr’s work. Second, contemporary research on visual object
recognition was born from, and remains largely indebted to, Marr’s work on the
subject (Marr and Nishihara, 1978). Third and finally, Marr’s work continues to have
a substantial influences on vision science, and cognitive science more generally. This
is evinced by the recent special issues of the journals Perception (2012) and Topics
in Cognitive Science (2015) discussing his legacy. So for these three reasons, I think
it is reasonable to treat Marr’s approach, in the present context, as representative
of the commitments of the information-processing framework more generally.
Since it was first published, interpreting Marr (1982) has been something of
a cottage industry in philosophy, especially when it comes to the role that repre-
sentational content (of some sort) plays in his “philosophical” approach. Marr was
careful to emphasize two things in developing his approach: (i) the fundamental du-
ality in vision between “representation” and “process”; and (ii) that investigating
this duality required multiple levels of analysis. My own interpretative conclusion
is that with respect to (i) Marr clearly had in mind a notion with all my ingredi-
ents for internal representation, which alo can be characterized at multiple levels,
in accordance with (ii). The notion is constitutive of, and hence, indispensable to,
his approach. Attributing a content-component to Marr’s approach is surprisingly
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controversial. But as we shall see, I think it is in fact hard to resist.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Subsection 2, I make some
preliminary remarks about the information-processing framework in general, and al-
ternative frameworks in vision science. In Subsection 3, I review the core of Marr’s
information-processing framework: how he characterized the notions of “represen-
tation” and “process”, and his well-known three levels of analysis. In Subsection
4, in order to illustrate Marr’s approach in action, I review his work on edge de-
tection (Marr and Hildreth, 1980). In Subsection 5, I argue that Marr’s approach
requires a “content-component”, which I position (as others have) at the highest
of his three levels. Marr’s notion of representation, I argue, has the ingredients for
internal representation, and is indispensable to his approach. In Subsection 6, I eval-
uate the three anti-representationalist arguments with respect to Marr’s approach.
Subsection 7 concludes the chapter.
3.2 The Structure of the Framework and the Story of Vision
Before delving into the details of Marr’s approach, I want to address some
general issues relating to the information-processing framework in vision science. In
this section I offer some minimal characterizations of key notions employed in the
framework. I then briefly discuss alternative frameworks in vision science that are,
in one way or another, anti-representationalist.
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3.2.1 Clarifying some Aspects of the Information-Processing Narra-
tive
There are three aspects of the “information-processing” framework that are
rarely well-articulated by vision scientists: the notions of “information” and “com-
putation”, and the explanatory-style of the framework. This lack of clarity also
applies to Marr’s work. So before proceeding, I would like to stipulate characteriza-
tions of each of them that I think are fairly minimalist in their assumptions. These
will be the characterizations I will be assuming in the discussion to follow.
Information. When talking of “information” it is not uncommon for vision
scientists to reference communication theory (Shannon, 1948), and the formal no-
tion of information as the reduction of uncertainty (or entropy, depending on one’s
interpretation) about the state of some system. It is also common for them to
talk of the related notion of mutual information, which is a measure of the mutual
dependence between two random variables. Methodologically referencing these mea-
sures makes sense, since both are quite useful when it comes to statistical analysis
and computational modeling.1 However it is doubtful that this is the notion that
they have in mind when talking of “information-processing” by the visual system.
Rather, a more plausible assumption is that they have in mind the notion of natural
information.2 This is the sort of information that one event carries about another
1As just one example, mutual information is the standard measure that is used for motion
correction during fMRI preprocessing.
2The inspiration comes from Grice’s (1957) distinction between natural and non-natural mean-
ing (Piccinini and Scarantino, 2010).
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event that it reliably co-varies with. For example, it is this kind of information
that tree rings carry about the age of a tree, smoke carries about fire, the whistle
of a kettle carries about the temperature of the water it contains, the mercury in a
thermometer carries about ambient temperature, or the needle of a compass carries
about a magnetic pole. In each of these cases, due to the dependence of one event
on another event, the former is informative about the occurrence of the latter.
While there are a variety of ways to understand the notion of natural informa-
tion, the most familiar is simply that of causal covariation.3 Thus, going forward,
I will assume that all talk of “information-processing” is of natural information. In
other words, it is this sort of information that is carried by the retina, and that the
visual system “processes”.4
Computation. There are myriad notions of computation that can (and have)
been utilized in vision science, and cognitive science more generally.5 Others have
worked through the nuanced relationship between these different notions (see e.g.,
Maley, 2011; Piccinini and Scarantino, 2010). For present purposes, I want to assume
a broad notion that brings with it few substantive commitments. For this purpose,
3For example, it has been proposed that the relationship is probabilistic (Dretske, 1981;
Scarantino, 2015; Skyrms, 2010), nomic or law-like (Dretske, 1988; Fodor, 1990), or counterfactual
(Cohen and Meskin, 2006).
4At present this might seem like an innocuous point, but it will have a good deal of significance
when we come to discuss the Transformational Thesis again in Chapter 6.
5For example, there are various dichotomies that can be drawn such as abstract vs concrete,
digital vs. analog, discrete vs. continuous, and specific types that can be identified such as
algorithmic, symbolic, and neural.
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a notion of “generic” computation, which I owe to Piccinini and Scarantino (2010,
p.239), will do nicely:
We use ‘generic computation’ to designate any process whose function is
to manipulate medium-independent vehicles according to a rule defined
over the vehicles, where a medium-independent vehicle is such that all
that matters for its processing are the differences between the values
of different portions of the vehicle along a relevant dimension (as op-
posed to more specific physical properties, such as the vehicle’s material
composition).
I think this notion has sufficient generality to capture a good deal of what vision
scientists have in mind when they talk of computation. Crucially, as with the notion
of internal representation from the previous chapter, it involves no commitment
regarding what the computational architecture of the visual system is like, and
whether it is classic or connectionist/distributed. Defined in this broad sense, the
sort of information-processing exhibited by the visual system (i.e., the processing
of natural information) is minimally computational in that it qualifies as a form of
generic computation (Piccinini and Scarantino, 2010, p.243).
Explanation. The last aspect of the framework requiring clarification is the
issue of what sort of explanations it offers. The two most obvious alternatives are
that the explanations of the framework are functional (Cummins, 1983; Fodor, 1968)
or mechanistic (Bechtel, 2008).6 A good deal has been written about how these two
6How to characterize mechanisms, or mechanistic explanation, is itself a source of debate.
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forms of explanation do or do not feature in psychology and neuroscience. When it
comes to characterizing research in these fields, and in cognitive science, there are
in fact two issues first, are these two types of explanation distinct; and if so, which
one provides a superior characterization of the target explanations (e.g., in visual
neuroscience); And second, if they are not distinct, what is the relationship between
them? For example, one view is that functional analyses of different sorts are simply
incomplete forms of mechanistic explanation, or “sketches” (Piccinini and Craver,
2011).7
These are interesting issues in the philosophy of science, and the information-
processing framework in general, and Marr’s work in particular, provide fertile
ground for investigating them. However, I do not think I need to take a stand
on either issue. Addressing them requires determining how we should relate expla-
nations at multiple different levels in cognitive science, and the extent to which these
levels are distinct or autonomous from each other. This is also true when it comes
to interpreting Marr’s work. But all that is important for my purposes is that there
are these levels, and that at least within Marr’s work, a content-component is indis-
pensable to one of them. For example, I have no interest in evaluating whether or
not Marr’s levels of analysis are distinct, such that each offers a different perspective
One influential characterization is as follows: “Mechanisms are entities and activities organized
such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set up to finish or termination
conditions (Machamer et al., 2000, p.3). In which case, mechanistic explanations offer descriptions
of mechanisms, or “schemas”, consisting of various entities, activities, and their organization that
account for how the phenomenon of interest is produced.
7Another issue is whether some computation is itself always mechanistic (Piccinini, 2007).
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to understanding information-processing mechanisms (Bechtel and Shagrir, 2015),
or that some of the levels should be lumped together (Piccinini and Craver, 2011).
So in summary, I assume that minimally the framework (and Marr’s approach
to it) posits the processing of natural information, which is computational in a
generic sense, and that the explanations that are offered by the framework are
functional and/or mechanistic.
3.2.2 Tall Tales? Alternative Tellings of the Story
Although the information-processing framework is the dominant research pro-
gram in vision science, there are alternative tellings of the story of vision in which
representations do not appear. One might reasonable ask why have I have chosen
not to include them as challenges to my arguments. Let me say a little about these
alternative tales, and why I am not asking you to read about them.
Most famously Gibson (1950, 1979) held that visual perception requires no
internal representations because their are higher-order properties of retinal stimula-
tion that uniquely map onto properties in the distal world. In which case, there is
no need to posit internal representations and processes that try to extract and build
upon information latent in the retina. Instead the goal of vision science should be to
discover and characterize the higher-order properties of the visual input that allow
us direct access to the distal world. Although today this is a minority view among
vision scientists, there are still a devoted few who adopt some version of Gibson’s
direct realist/ecological psychology framework.8 Some of these views follow fairly
8A good number of them are affiliated with the Center for the Ecological Study of Perception
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directly in the footsteps of Gibson (e.g., Cutting, 1982; Turvey et al., 1981), while
others consider his ideas more of an inspiration. Two examples are sensorimotor
approaches, which characterize vision as an active exploration of the world that
is mediated by sensorimotor contingencies (O’Regan and Noë, 2001), and “embed-
ded” views, which hold that the visual system is organized in a manner that reflects
regularities in the environment without representing them (Orlandi, 2014). Both
approaches share commonalities with Gibson’s approach, and reject the need for
positing “representations” in any interesting sense.
While these approaches present important challenges to the information-processing
framework in vision science, I do not intend to evaluate their relative virtues. The
reason for this is that the focus of my project is on whether certain notions of rep-
resentation are indispensable to the explanations within the information-processing
framework that purport to posit them—not to determine which framework offers
the best explanation of various visual phenomena. Thus the challenges from the
previous chapter can all be seen as “internal” to the information-processing frame-
work, in contrast to the “external” challenges of alternative frameworks in vision
science. I consider these external challenges to be outside the scope of the present
project.9 Still, even if one is interested in adjudicating between research programs in
and Action, at the University of Connecticut.
9A seemingly more relevant challenge is provided by those within the information-processing
framework that have argued against the Distal Object Thesis, and perceptual objectivity (Mark
et al., 2010). However these views are largely motivated by considerations of whether perceptual
objectivity is fitness enhancing, and are not obviously targeted at a plausible form of objectivity
(Cohen, 2015). For this reason, I consider the issues they raise to be somewhat orthogonal to my
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vision science, addressing internal challenges has values. The reason is that getting
clear on internal issues about the role that different notions of representation must
play within the information-processing framework puts us in a better position for
evaluating its explanatory merits relative to competing frameworks in the field.
Having dispensed with these preliminaries, I now turn to the exposition of
Marr’s influential ideas.
3.3 Origins of the Framework: Marr’s Vision of Vision
The general form of the information-processing framework in vision science had
its first clear formulation in Marr (1982). For this reason it remains an important
touchstone for those interested in characterizing the representational commitments
of the framework. Marr (1982, p.3) begins with the question: “What does it mean,
to see?” The intuitive answer, “to know what is where by looking”, provides the
point of departure for Marr’s discussion:
In other words, vision is the process of discovering from images what is
present in the world, and where it is.
Vision is therefore, first and foremost, an information-processing task,
but we cannot think of it just as a process. For if we are capable of
knowing what is where in the world, our brains must somehow be capable
of representing this information—in all its profusion of color and form,
beauty, motion, and detail. The study of vision must therefore include
concerns.
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not only the study of how to extract from images the various aspects of
the world that are useful to us, but also an inquiry into the nature of the
internal representations by which we capture this information and thus
make it available as a basis for decisions about our thoughts and actions.
This duality—the representation and the processing of information—lies
at the heart of most information-processing tasks.(ibid)
According to Marr, the fact that vision is an information-processing task im-
plies it is both a process, and representational.10 Marr’s great theoretical insight was
the recognition that in order to understand how a system performs an information-
processing task, we must also understand the system at many levels: in terms of
what it is doing and why, but also how, and with what kind of architecture
For the subject of vision, there is no single equation or view that explains
everything. Each problem has to be addressed from several points of
view—as a problem in representing information, as a computation capa-
ble of deriving that representation, and as a problem in the architecture
of a computer capable of carrying out both things quickly and reliably.
(Marr, 1982, p.5)
In general, Marr held that understanding any complex system requires multiple
levels of analysis. For example, a developing embryo can also be analyzed at multiple
levels. But when the system is performing an information-processing task, one
10Marr never defines the notion of information he has in mind. As stated above, I am assuming
a notion of natural information.
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must also appeal to the notions of representation and process (Marr, 1982, p.20).
Thus Marr’s “philosophical” approach can be seen as having two core elements: (i)
the duality between representation and process; and (ii) levels of explanation, or
analysis. In this section I provide expositions of both (i) and (ii). Because of the
controversy in interpreting Marr, I make ample use of quotations in support of my
own characterization of his ideas.
3.3.1 The Central Duality: Representation and Process
Marr (1982, p.20-21 emphasis in original), emphasis in original) defines a rep-
resentation as follows:
A representation is a formal system for making explicit certain entities
or types of information, together with a specification of how the system
does this. And I shall call the result of using a representation to describe
a given entity a description of the entity in that representation (Marr
and Nishihara, 1978).
Marr illustrates his notion of a representation using numerals. Arabic, bi-
nary, and Roman numerals are all different representations for describing numbers.
Different numeric systems make more or less explicit different information about a
number. For example, Arabic numbers make it easier to determine whether a num-
ber is a power of 10, while binary makes it easier to determine whether a number is
a power of 2 (because the former is in base 10, and the latter base 2).
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A couple of ideas are invoked in Marr’s definition. First, by “formal scheme”
Marr means a set of symbols with rules for combining them: “To say that something
is a formal scheme means only that it is a set of symbols with rules for putting them
together—no more no less” (Marr, 1982, p.21). So for Marr ‘representation’ refers
to a formal scheme for constructing multiple instances of what I would call individ-
ually a “representation”. To disambiguate, I will subsequently use “representational
scheme” to refer to the sort of formal system of encoding (e.g., the arabic numerals),
which Marr calls a “representation”. Also required then are “symbols” with rules
for combining them. This use of ‘symbol’ also invites some ambiguity, since it is
also commonly used to refer to internal representations over which computational
operations are defined. Therefore, following some of Marr’s later terminology, I will
instead refer to these symbols as the primitives of a representational scheme (see
e.g., Marr, 1982, p.37 Table 1-1).
Second, Marr’s definition invokes the idea that a representational scheme
serves to “make explicit” information extracted from the retina, and a story is
needed of how this is done. Marr’s notion of making information explicit comes
from Marr and Nishihara (1978), who appeal to Marr’s earlier “principle of explicit
naming”, which is supposed to apply to symbolic (i.e., computational) processes
(Marr, 1976, p.485). The idea behind the principle is that when a data set is to be
manipulated it should first be given a name: “This forms the data into an entity
in its own right,. . . and allows other structures and processes to refer to it” (ibid).
With his principle Marr is clearly invoking the common notion in cognitive science
of a representation functioning as a “stand in”, which was introduced in the previous
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chapter as an ingredient for internal representation.
Third, a “description” in Marr’s sense appears to be equivalent to what is more
commonly now called an “encoding” of information. Thus an internal representation
functions as a stand in for some entity that it encodes information about, at least for
further systems that can “read out” the description, or “decode” the information.
For example, for someone who does not understand the Roman numeral system
then the string ‘LVII’ fails to stand in for the number fifty-seven—for them the
information about number conveyed by the string is implicit (Kirsh, 1992). Thus
by providing a set of primitives, and rules for combining them, a representational
scheme allows a system to construct descriptions of things, and in so doing, they
make explicit information that would otherwise be left implicit.
As Marr points out, his notion of a representational scheme is quite general.
It is the idea that we can: “capture some aspect of reality by making a description
of it” (Marr, 1982, p.21). Marr’s view was that stages of visual processing amount
to mappings from different representational schemes, each of which make different
information about the retinal image, or visible world, explicit. However, crucially
unlike the cash register, there is no reason to think Marr believes that the contents
of a representational scheme are derived (a point I return to later).
As with the notion of representational scheme, Marr (1982, p.22) also acknowl-
edges that the notion of a process is quite broad: performing addition is a process,
but so is making a cup of tea. Marr’s focus was the notion of a process in connec-
tion to a system performing an information-processing task, which Marr claimed
required an analysis at many different levels. At the most abstract level there is the
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computational theory of a process, which has two components: (i) a specification of
what operation is being performed by the device, and (ii) an account of why it is
that the device is performing the operation.11 Call these the “what”- and “why”-
components of the computational theory. For Marr, the why-component includes
specifying various constraints that uniquely specify the operation carried out by the
device in order to fulfill its information-processing task.12
Marr uses the example of a cash register to illustrate the idea of a compu-
tational theory. Cash registers perform arithmetic, and addition and subtraction.
This is the what-component of the computational theory for the cash register. But
the reason it performs arithmetic, as opposed to another mathematical operation,
is that it is designed to calculate the appropriate amount of money that needs to
be exchanged for a purchase. Certain rules seem fair and appropriate for combining
prices and determining the money owed by a consumer. For example: if I buy noth-
ing, I owe nothing; the order of goods does not impact the total sum; paying for
different items individually does not impact the total sum; and if I return an item, I
11Like with the notion of information referenced by “information-processing”, Marr never defines
the notion of computation he has in mind. The “what”-component of the computational theory
is seemingly just whatever operations or mathematical function an information-processing system
carries out. So it seems he has in mind the intuitive idea that when a system carries out a
mathematical operation, or logical operation, it “computes”. In general, I believe this comports
with my assumption of the notion of generic computation earlier.
12Some have claimed that the computational theory only specifies what is computed, but not why.
I agree with Shagrir (2010) that Marr’s actual writing leaves little doubt that the computational
theory includes both a what- and why-component.
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get a refund, paying nothing. It is a theorem that these constraints define addition,
and hence it is appropriate that a cash register computes addition. These rules for
transactions involving the exchanging of goods of predetermined monetary value
constitute constraints on the operations that should be carried out by a cash regis-
ter. These constraints in part constitute the why-component for the computational
theory of a cash register.
For Marr, the computational theory of a cash register is not a device, but really
a blueprint of what we want such a device to do, and why. Marr’s second level has
two components: a representational scheme for the inputs and outputs of the device,
and an algorithm for achieving the transformation from the input to output in line
with the what-component of the computational theory. For the cash register, the
input and output utilized the same representational scheme (strings of numerals
from the Arabic numeric system), but the two need not be the same. In general,
this second level specifies how the device carries out the operation specified by the
computational theory. The specifics can vary, as different representational schemes
can be used, and for a specific representational scheme, different algorithms might
be possible. Lastly, there is the hardware implementation, the physical substrate in
which the device is realized. While the same representational scheme and algorithm
can be implemented in different physical systems, it is also true that some algorithms
are better suited for certain physical systems.
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3.3.2 The Three Levels of Explanation
In summary, characterizing a device that performs an information-processing
task involves answering questions at three levels (after Marr, 1982, p.25 Fig.1-4):
Level 1: Computational Theory. What is the goal of the computation
performed by the device, why is it appropriate to the task, and what is
the logic of the strategy by which it can be achieved?
Level 2: Representation and Algorithm. How can the computational
theory be implemented? What is the representational scheme for the
inputs and outputs, and what is the algorithm for the transformation
from an input representation to an output representation?13
Level 3: Hardware Implementation. How can the representational scheme
and algorithm be physically realized?
It is important to see that Marr’s well-known three levels are a product of
how we understand information-processing tasks in particular, which constitutively
involves a representational scheme and process. While any device performing an
information-processing task can be understood at all three of these levels, particular
explanations might be directed at a particular level based on the phenomenon of
interest.
13Marr sometimes refers simply to the “algorithmic” level, and following this some authors fail
to associate a representational scheme with this level of explanation. But such an omission distorts
the structure of Marr’s framework.
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In articulating and applying his multi-level approach, Marr focused on what he
took to be the unappreciated importance of the computational theory. His criticism
of previous research was that it made little distinction between questions of what
a device is doing and how it is doing it. Marr makes the elegant comparison that
trying to understand vision by simply studying the behavior of individual neurons is
like trying to understand bird flight by only looking at feathers—we must also have
an understanding of the principles of aerodynamics, which put constraints on (for
example) what sorts of limbs could achieve lift, in order to understand why wings
and feathers can perform the task of flight.
3.4 Seeing Marr’s Vision in Action
In applying his approach Marr characterized vision as a process that starts
with retinal inputs, and extracts a description of the external world that is useful to
the observer. The nature of the input representational scheme is already given: it is
the retinal image itself, or rather the matrix of light intensity values as detected by
photoreceptors in the eyes. According to Marr, it makes sense to characterize the
retinal image as a representational scheme: what it represents (i.e., the information
it makes explicit) are the intensity values at each point in a retinotopic array, which
he denoted as I(x, y), for coordinate (x, y). Marr also made the further simplifying
assumption that we ignore color, and treat I as in effect a gray scale pixel array
(Marr, 1976).14
14Marr uses the label ’image’ to refer to I, though he clearly has in mind an abstract character-
ization of the intensity levels detected by the photoreceptor of the retina. I use the term “retinal
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While the input representational scheme is obvious, the output representa-
tional scheme—what vision is for—is less obvious. Marr (1982, p.36) himself was
convinced that the “chief” information-processing task of vision was to extract infor-
mation about the 3-D shape of objects in the distal environment for the purpose of
recognition. All other intermediary stages in the mapping from the input represen-
tational scheme, the retinal image, to the output representational scheme, one for
shape, were seen as important “service” tasks.15 Marr separated visual processing
into four stages.
1. The retinal image. A light intensity array, reflecting stimulation of
the photoreceptors.
2. The Primal Sketch. Represents information about the retinal image,
specifically changes in intensity values and their retinotopic position and
organization.
3. The 2 1/2 Sketch. A representation scheme for the orientation and
surface depth of visible surfaces in a viewer-centered coordinate frame.
4. The 3-D Model Representation. An object-centered representational
scheme for the 3-D structure and organization of visible objects.
In anticipation of later discussion, notice that for Marr, each of these represen-
tational schemes are partially characterized by what they represent: light intensity,
image”, since he also uses ‘image’ to refer to natural images, resulting in some ambiguous passages.
15the distinction between “chief” and ”service” tasks is from Shapiro (1997).
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intensity changes, visible surfaces, and the 3-D shape of visible objects. Figure 3.1
depicts the four stages of visual processing, and the purpose of each representational












about the image, mainly
intensity changes
Represents orientation
and rough depth of
the visible surfaces
Represents 3D shapes 
and their spatial 
organization
Figure 3.1: Stages of Vision for Deriving Shape Information.
Marr developed highly detailed proposals for each of these stages of visual
processing. As an illustration of how Marr applied his framework at a particular
stage, I will review his work on edge detection in the primal sketch (Marr and
Hildreth, 1980), since it has been widely discussed by philosophers. It has also been
relied on extensively by Egan (1992, 1995, 1999, 2010) in developing the Instrumental
Challenge.
3.4.1 Edge Detection
Marr (1976) separated the construction of the primal sketch into two parts.16
First, a description is built of the intensity changes found in the retinal image, using
16The notion of “sketch” for Marr is a result of his conviction that the visual system basically
functions to construct the equivalent of elaborate line drawings. For example, in Marr (1976),
where he introduces the notion of the primal sketch, he refers to different “drawings” made by the
visual system.
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a representational scheme of primitives such as “edge-segments”, “bars”, “blobs”,
and “terminations”. Tokens of these primitives occur at different retinotopic scales,
locations and orientations. Marr (1976) called this first representational scheme the
raw primal sketch. Second, larger scale geometric relations between the intensity
change primitives are grouped together forming the full primal sketch. For example,
in Figure 3.2 there are local bars, which we also perceive as grouping to form a
rough circle surrounded by a ring (after Marr, 1982, p.92 Figure 2-33a). Under
Marr’s account of early vision, the tokening of bar primitives at different locations
and orientations is achieved by the raw primal sketch, while the grouping of these
bar primitives into a circle and ring is achieved by the full primal sketch.
Figure 3.2: Grouping of Primitives.
Marr and Hildreth’s (1980) theory of edge detection was intended to provide
an account of the construction of the raw primal sketch. Among philosophers, their
theory is perhaps the most widely discussed example from Marr’s work, providing
a central case to illustrating elements of his approach in general, and the Level 1
computational theory in particular. Despite the frequent reference to the theory,
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I know of no case where a discussion of the theory by a philosopher includes a
detailed explication of how the theory is intended to work. Getting clear on the
mechanics of the theory will help to evaluate both my argument to follow and the
anti-representationalist challenges, some of which have been motivated using Marr
and Hildreth’s theory.
The construction of the raw primal sketch itself has two parts: (i) the detection
of intensity changes, and (ii) the representation and description of these intensity
changes via the tokening of different representational primitives (blobs, edges, etc.).
Marr and Hildreth’s account of how the retina detects intensity changes was mo-
tivated by two observations, the first of which relates to the demands of image
processing in computer science.
First, an issue when it comes to filtering natural images is that intensity
changes occur at widely different spatial frequency scales.17 For example, when
filtering a natural image (to remove noise or distortions) one must set the filter
to different scales. Marr and Hildreth suggested that the retina faces the same
challenge when detecting intensity changes in the retinal image I, which can also
be characterized, abstractly, as a pixel matrix. For the retina must “smooth” the
intensity values of the retinal image in order to detect changes at different spatial
frequency scales. Furthermore, the right filter should be spatially localized (much
like in image processing), since the objects in the world that give rise to intensity
17Spatial frequency is a measure of the units of periodicity for some measure of spatial distance.
In vision science, the measure of distance is usually defined either in terms of the pixels of an image,
or in terms of degrees of visual angle (which is determined by viewing distance of an observer).
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changes (such as changes in illumination, orientation, or surface reflectance proper-
ties), are spatially localized, and thus the intensity changes they produce will also be
retinotopically local. Thus filtering of the retinal image should arise from a smooth
average of nearby points in I.
The second important observation is that if we think of an intensity change in
an image as a sigmoid function (an “S” curve), then this gives rise to a zero-crossing
in the second derivative of the function for intensity across I at the very point where
there is a change in intensity (Figure 3.3). Thus a filter of a natural image showing
only the zero-crossings will do a good job of extracting the intensity changes in
the image; in fact, Marr and Hildreth (1980, p.192) proposed to define an intensity
change as a zero-crossing, so that the task of detecting an intensity change reduces














Figure 3.3: Intensity Change and Zero Crossing.
Together, these two observations were intended to provide constraints on any
adequate filter for detecting intensity changes in I: first, the operator should operate
at different spatial frequency scales; and second, it should be a differential operator.
As constraints these observations form part of the why-component for Marr and
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Hildreth’s computational theory of edge detection. Marr and Hildreth argued that
the best operator that satisfies these requirements is the filter∇2G, or the “Laplacian
of the Gaussian”. The Operator has two components, which I will describe in turn.
∇2 is the 2-D Laplacian operator, which is the sum of the second partial derivatives
for each argument of a two-place function f(x, y):







Where ∂ is the symbol for a partial derivative (the two fractions in Equation
1 are the second partial derivatives for the arguments x and y of f(x, y)). G stands
for the 2-D Gaussian function:
G(x, y) = e−
x2+y2
2σ2 (3.2)
Where σ is the standard deviation of the distribution.18 Each of these compo-
nents serve to address one of the two requirements for detecting intensity changes
in I, as can be illustrated by applying the operator to a gray-scale natural image.
First, G allows the filter to fulfill the requirement of operating at different
spatial frequency scales since it serves to blur an image based on the value of σ:
any features of the image at a spatial frequency less than σ are washed out. Thus,
a smaller the value of σ blurs out all but the most high-frequency features, while a
larger value of σ blurs out all but the coarsest spatial features. For example, Figure
3.4 depicts an image that has been filtered for different levels of σ. In this respect,
18When the exponent of G is given an appropriate base, it becomes a probability density function.
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G operates as a low-pass filter relative to the value of σ.19 As a filter G also has the
virtue of being smooth and localized both in terms of spatial position and spatial
frequency.
Figure 3.4: Application of Gaussian Filter.
Second, ∇2 is a differential operator, which was the other requirement on an
adequate filter, and it is also orientation independent. The virtue of the orientation
independence is that it allows the filter to detect a zero-crossing regardless of its
orientation in I. When convolved with G, one can see that ∇2G has a “Mexican-
hat” shape as depicted in Figure 3.5. Figure 3.5 also depicts the operator in 2D,
with gray values indicating 0 values in the matrix, white values indicating positive
values, and dark gray indicating negative values. Applying a ∇2G mask to a natural
image, for different value of σ (as in Figure 3.6), does indeed reveal many apparent
zero-crossings, that is, intensity changes, in the image.20
19In image processing, a Gaussian mask is applied to each individual pixel. The mask is a
matrix which approximates the form of the 2-D Gaussian distribution for some σ. When the mask
is applied to the pixel, the value of the pixel is determined by taking a weighted average of the
values in the matrix. The mask is centered on the target pixel, and that value receives the greatest
weight, with low values at the edge of the matrix. Changing σ changes the “spread” and hence
the relative weight of each point in the mask.
20Note the filtered images in Figure 3.6 only show the zero-crossings detected by ∇2G at different
spatial scales.
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Figure 3.5: The Shape of the ∇2G Filter.
Marr and Hildreth hypothesized, based on then contemporary results in psy-
chophysics and neurophysiology, that the retina contains channels with receptive
fields that approximate the form of ∇2G; in effect, the retina contains an array
of ∇2G filters at different scales. If one inverts ∇2G (an upside down hat), then
they reasoned that adjacent retinal cells with overlapping ON-center (hat up) and
OFF-center (hat down) receptive fields would serve to detected a zero-crossing.21
A layer of channels with overlapping receptive fields, and different space constants
(i.e., values of σ), would be the analog of the multiple filtered versions of the image
in Figure 3.6.
The first part of Marr and Hildreth’s theory provides an account of the opera-
tion carried out by the retina in order to detect raw intensity changes in the retinal
21Specifically, they had in mind certain classes of retinal ganglion cells (RGC) which are the
“output” cells from the retina. The receptive fields of the most well-known RGCs are known to
have a characteristic “center-surround” organization, so that whether a RGC fires is based on
the level of light intensity in the center or surrounding ring of the field. A RGC with a center-
ON receptive field only fires when light is present in the center region (or when there is no light
present in the surround region), while RGCs with center-OFF receptive fields have the reverse
firing behavior.
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Figure 3.6: Application of ∇2G Filter.
image. Thus, ∇2G forms part of the what-component of their computational theory.
However, this first part of the theory does not yet warrant appeal to primitives of
a representational scheme, such as an edges or bars. In describing the first part of
Marr and Hildreth’s theory, Marr (1982, p.68 emphasis in original) notes:
Up to now I have studiously avoided using the word edge, preferring in-
stead to discuss the detection of intensity changes and their representa-
tion by using using oriented zero-crossing segments. The reason for this
is that the term edge has a partly physical meaning—it makes us think of
a real physical boundary, for example—and all we have discussed so far
are the zero-values of a set of roughly band-pass second-order derivative
filters. We have no right to call these edges, or, if we do have a right,
then we must say so and why.
The distinction between an physical edge and a light intensity “edge” is central
to theorizing about vision: “because the true heart of visual perception is the infer-
ence from the structure of an image about the structure of the real world outside”
(ibid). Thus there is the issue of how to go from the detection of intensity changes
to the representational primitives (edge, blob, etc.) of the raw primal sketch. The
main difficulty is reflected in Figure 3.6 above: how and why does the visual system
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combine the information from ∇2G filters set to different scales? There is no a pri-
ori reason why the visual system should combine information about zero-crossings
detected at different scales. However, there is a an external physical reason for com-
bining the outputs of the equivalent channels in the retina. Marr and Hildreth took
it as a further constraint that the physical phenomena that cause intensity changes
are spatially, and hence, retinotopically localized—indeed, this was part of the mo-
tivation for the requirement of an image filter that is smooth in both the spatial
frequency and spatial location domains, as is the case with G. If a physical phe-
nomenon produces an intensity change at one scale, it is likely to produce a change
in the same position, in the same orientation, at other spatial frequency scales as
well. Thus, Marr and Hildreth (1980, p.202) theorized that the organization of the
visual system respects an important assumption about the source of zero-crossing
segments detected in I:
If a zero-crossing is present in a set of independent ∇2G channels over
a contiguous range of sizes and the segment has the same position and
orientation in each channel, then the set of such zero-crossing segments
may be taken to indicate the presence of an intensity change in the image
that is due to a single physical phenomenon (a change in reflectance,
illumination, dept, or surface orientation).
Marr and Hildreth called this the spatial coincidence assumption. According
to the assumption, if a zero-crossing is detected by a high-spatial frequency ∇2G
channel and a low-spatial frequency ∇2G channel, then they can be taken together.
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It is by combining the outputs of ∇2G channels in this way that Marr and Hildreth
hypothesized that the raw primal sketch is constructed, with labels for edges, blobs,
and bars assigned to groupings of zero-crossing segments localized to regions of I.
It is the raw primal sketch that constitutes the first representational scheme for
which the primitives: “have a high probability of reflecting physical reality directly”
(Marr, 1982, p.71).
Marr and Hildreth’s theory has had a greater influence on image processing
than on research on the function of the retina. For example, ∇2G is a staple filter
in image processing22, but there is no evidence that the receptive fields in neurons
in the retina approximate ∇2G.23 Still, the theory provides an elegant illustration
of Marr’s information-processing framework. The information-processing task to
which the raw primal sketch is suited is the detection and representation of intensity
changes in I. The process in question is the mapping from the retinal image I to
the raw primal sketch. What is the computational theory of the retina for the task
of detecting and representing intensity changes? Roughly, the what-component of
the computational theory is the combining of outputs from different ∇2G channels
in order to token different primitives for describing (i.e., representing) the intensity
changes in I. The why-component is provided by the various constraints identified
by Marr and Hildreth for the task of detecting and representing intensity changes:
22Though other filters—notably, that of Canny (1986)—are better at detecting edges in natural
images.
23Specifically, the form of center-surround receptive fields of RGCs do not approximate the form
of ∇2G. For some discussion, see citetTroy2002.
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(i) the filter for I must operate at different scales and be smooth; (ii) it must be a
second-order derivative operator (since detecting intensity changes is operationalized
as the task of detecting zero-crossings); and (iii) the combining of the outputs of
the filter channels must respect the fact that physical phenomena that produce
intensity changes are spatially localized. (i) and (ii) almost uniquely identify ∇2G
as the appropriate operator for the purpose of detecting intensity changes, and
(iii) motivates the spatial coincidence assumption. Marr and Hildreth’s theory was
also suggestive of the neural implementation (in the retina), and the nature of the
representational schemes (I and the raw primal sketch).
While many of Marr’s specific theoretical proposals have perhaps not aged well,
his approach has had a lasting influence on how researchers think about vision within
the information-processing framework. I now turn to discussion of the content-
commitments of Marr’s approach.
3.5 The Content-Component of the Level 1 Analysis
I think that there can be little doubt that Marr’s approach appeals to some
notion of representation with accompanying content. Marr is explicit that his frame-
work rests on the duality between representation and process, and part of how a
representational scheme is defined is by reference to what it represents; namely, the
information it makes explicit. A combination of tokened primitives from a represen-
tational scheme also serve to name, or stand in for, something in the target domain
of the representational scheme. For example, the primitives of the raw primal sketch
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function to make explicit information about intensity changes in the retinal image.
In order to make my argument for my first conclusion, three issues need to be
addressed: (1) if a notion of content is so crucial to his approach, then it should
have a clear place in Marr’s explanatory hierarchy; (2) we need to see more of
an argument for why the content is original; and (3) we need an argument for
why having the ingredients for internal representation are indispensable to the role
of representational schemes in Marr’s explanations of visual phenomena. In this
section, I take up each of these tasks in turn.
3.5.1 The Place of the Component
If content is so crucial to Marr’s approach, then we should be able to place it at
one of his three levels of analysis. The most appropriate position, I believe, is to place
it at the top. This comports with many other approaches to explanation in cognitive
science that refer to a “semantic” (Pylyshyn, 1984), or “knowledge” (Newell, 1982)
level as the top-most level of analysis. It is also common interpretation of Marr to
associate representational content with his Level 1 analysis (Burge, 1986; Peacocke,
1994).24 However this interpretation is usually paired with two unfortunate claims.
First, many have presumed that the content in question must be intentional
24Interestingly, this is the same interpretation adopted by some proponents of Bayesian ap-
proaches to perception and cognition (Griffiths et al., 2010). Roughly, the idea is that Bayesian
models characterize at Level 1 what is represented, and what inferences are made, but without
commitments regarding the other two levels. This connection to Bayesian modeling is discussed
by Bechtel and Shagrir (2015).
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(Burge, 1986). Second, since Marr appears to treat the computational theory as
coextensive with Level 1 in his hierarchy of explanation, this has resulted in many
claiming that some notion of content is part of the computational theory. Here is
how Shagrir (2010, p.494) describes this interpretation:
Most philosophers take it that the role of all computational-level theories
is to provide an information-processing description of the task, in terms
of the visual (representational) content of neural states.
This identification of the computational theory with representational content
has resulted in the bizarre assertion that Marr is somehow “wrong” to talk about
Level 1 as involving a “computational” theory (see e.g., Ramsey, 2007, p.41 n.3;
Sterelny, 1990, p.46). However, such a view is itself surely mistaken, given how
clearly Marr articulates his idea of a computational theory (Shagrir, 2010).
Fortunately one can maintain that representational content is a component of
the Level 1 analysis, while also avoiding a commitment to these two claims. First,
I do not think we need to (yet) burden Marr’s notion of representational scheme
with a commitment to intentional content as some have been want to do. And I
will return to this issue below when discussing the Job Description Challenge. Sec-
ond, I think that we should reject the common interpretative assumption that the
computational theory is co-extensive with the Level 1 analysis. Instead, I believe a
good case can be made that beyond the what- and why-components of the compu-
tational theory the representational content—the domain of entities or information
made explicit by a representational scheme—provides another distinct component,
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what I will call the content-component of Level 1 explanation. There is certainly a
position for this component to occupy, for Marr clearly intended the duality between
representation and process to manifest itself at all three levels of explanation. And
I think it is plausible that for the representational part of this duality, the content
of a representational scheme—what information it makes explicit—finds its station
at Level 1. Textual support for this interpretation can readily be found in Marr
(1982).
First, recall that for Marr a process is always from one representational scheme
to another representational scheme, and hence from one kind of information to
another kind of information:
At one extreme, the top level, is the abstract computational theory of
the device, in which the performance of the device is characterized as a
mapping from one kind of information to another, the abstract proper-
ties of this mapping are defined precisely, and its appropriateness and
adequacy for the task at hand are demonstrated. (Marr, 1982, p.24 my
emphasis)
In this passage Marr clearly associates what is represented—that is, the in-
formation that is being made explicit—as being part of the Level 1 analysis of an
information-processing system. If we allow that the computational theory is not
supposed to be co-extensive with the Level 1 analysis, then including a content-
component to the level coheres with the description that Marr provides.


























Figure 3.7: Relationships between representations and processes.
grounds. Figure 3.7 is a reproduction of Figure 6-1 in Marr (1982), with the following
modification: I have added hashed lines to distinguish where I think his three levels
map onto the diagram (I have also used the same label for my figure). Marr intended
the figure to summarize in broad outline how evidence in vision science relates
to his three level approach, and to depict the “duality” between representation
and process. Marr introduces his three levels within the context of explicating the
notion of a process, and in so doing makes reference to the representational scheme
at Level 2, and its implementation at Level 3. It makes clear sense to include
the representational content—the domain of entities, or information that is made
explicit—at Level 1 as illustrated by this figure, which positions it at the same stage
as the computational theory.
This interpretation, which is supported by the text, positions representational
100
content at the appropriate level in Marr’s framework, and does so without requiring
a mischaracterization of the computational theory. It also appears (literally) to be
what Marr had in mind.
3.5.2 The Originality of the Component
As mentioned earlier it is clear that Marr attributes a stand-in function to
representational schemes. Although he does not say so overtly, I think it is straight-
forward why the content-component is original, based on how he defines the notion
of representational scheme, and applies it to vision.
Recall that for Marr (1982, p.21) representational schemes serve to “capture
some aspect of reality by making a description of it using a symbol”. With respect
to vision the aspects of reality are ones that are accessible via the information latent
in the retinal image. And the purpose of each stage of visual processing is specified
by what information in the retina it make explicit (Marr, 1982, p.37). So it is
constitutive of the information-processing tasks (whether service tasks or the chief
task) that they have “informational” content of some kind. And there is no reason
to think this content is derived, since it is the result of the architecture of the visual
system, not the intentions or designs of some agent.
For example, as we have seen the function of the (raw) primal sketch is to
make explicit information about intensity changes, and we saw Marr and Hildreth’s
proposal for how this is done. According to their theory, it is able to represent
this information because it is organized in a fashion that meets certain constraints.
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The raw primal sketch constitutes a representational scheme for information about
intensity changes because of how it is built, and in that sense it is original. To
claim otherwise is, I believe, to radically mischaracterize both Marr’s philosophical
approach, and its application in explaining visual phenomena.
3.5.3 The Indispensability of the Component
I think it is also straightforward to see why the content-component, and hence
a notion of internal representation, is so indispensable to Marr’s framework. The
simple reason is that if the phenomenon of interest is some information-processing
task carried out by a device, then one’s explanation of the phenomenon must include
positing a content-component. This is clear from considering both Marr’s example
of the cash register as well as Marr and Hildreth’s theory of edge detection.
Consider the cash register first. The initial information is of the price for each
individual, and the information that the device is supposed to provide is that of the
money owed by the consumer. The information-processing task of the device is to
perform the transformation from the price of the items to the sum that is owed.
Notice that further constraints and conventions are important to understanding the
device. It is only because transactions are made by exchanging currency that the
cash register is adequate to the task, and the information that is made explicit is
prices and money-owed. Consider what we would lose in our description of the cash
register, if we did not acknowledge the content of the input and output strings. What
the numerals make explicit is not simply numbers, but prices in some currency. The
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constraints on the operation, such that addition is the appropriate function for the
cash register to perform, rest on the mapping to the price of the costumer’s items.
That the device performs addition of prices, as opposed to some other function,
depends on how we interpret the inputs and outputs of the device.
The argument applies equally well in the case of Marr and Hildreth’s theory.
The theory is supposed to explain a mapping from a representational scheme for
light intensity, the retinal image I, to one that represents intensity changes in I, the
raw primal sketch. What tokenings of primitives in the raw primal sketch represent
are intensity changes in I; that is, the content-component for the raw primal sketch
is information about intensity changes in I—it is what the representational scheme
makes explicit about the light intensity values in the retinal image. The constraints
identified by Marr and Hildreth are determined by the information-processing task in
question, the detection and representation of light intensity changes. To remove the
content-component from the explanation would undermine the justification that the
what-component receives from the why-component of the theory. And as we have
seen, Marr clearly attributes a stand-in function to his representational schemes,
and unlike the cash register, there is no reason to think the content-component of
these schemes is derived.
So the argument for the indispensability of internal representations to information-
processing explanations (as Marr characterized them) is straightforward:
(M1) An explanation of visual phenomena is an information-processing
explanation only if it posits representational schemes.
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(M2) A formal scheme is a representational scheme only if (i) its internal
states serve a stand-in function within the visual system and (ii) have
content that is original.
(M3) Therefore, an explanation is an information-processing explanation
only if it posits internal representations. [from (M2) and my recipe for
internal representation]
(M1) reflects how Marr characterizes the core of his information-processing
framework, as reflecting the duality between representation and process. (M2) fol-
lows, I believe, from how Marr defines a representational scheme. First, he explicitly
attributes a stand-in function to representational schemes. Second, although a cash
register might have derived content, there is no reason to think that the information
made explicit by the representational schemes of the visual system are anything
other than original. In which case, we can infer (M3), which entails my first main
conclusion: a notion of internal representation is indispensable to the information-
processing framework (under the proviso that Marr’s approach can be taken as
representative of the framework in general).
3.6 The Framework and the Anti-Representationalist Challenges
So far I have provided a summary of the core features of Marr’s approach,
which I illustrated with one of his theories. I further argued that a content-
component is located at the top-most level of the approach, and that his notion
of a representational scheme has all the ingredients for being a formal system of
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internal representation.
One of my reasons for discussing Marr’s work is that it has been used to de-
velop and support some of the anti-representationalist challenges I introduced in the
previous chapter. According to these arguments, reflection on Marr’s approach, and
its application to vision, shows that no notion of representation plays an indispens-
able role in the information-processing framework. If these arguments succeed, then
they undermine my first two main conclusions. However I believe these arguments
rest on misunderstandings of Marr’s ideas, at least when it comes to the notion of
internal representation.
3.6.1 Informality and the Content-Component
According to Chomsky (1995, 2000), one does not find any notion of represen-
tational content in Marr’s information-processing approach to vision:
[The] work is mostly concerned with operations carried out by the retina;
loosely put, the mapping of retinal images to the visual cortex. Marr’s fa-
mous three levels of analysis—computational, algorithmic, and implementation—
have to do with the ways of construing such mappings . . . the theory
applies to a brain in a vat exactly as it does to a person seeing an object
in motion. (Chomsky, 1995, p.52)
For Chomsky, any discussion of Marr’s that references representational schemes
does not bring with it a commitment to a notion of representational content:
No notion like “content”, or “representation of”, figures within the theory
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. . . when Marr writes that he is studying vision as “a mapping from one
representation to another, and in the case of human vision, the initial
representation is in no doubt—it consists of arrays of image intensity
values as detected by the photoreceptors in the retina” (Marr, 1982,
p.310)—where “representation” is not to be understood relationally, as
“representation of”. (Chomsky, 1995, p.52-53)
The reason that Marr’s use of ‘representation’ is not to be understood re-
lationally, according to the Informality Challenge, is that intentional descriptions
within Marr’s approach are purely informal. For example, the visual system no
more represents the distal environment than a comet “aims” at the Earth (to use
Chomsky’s example). While I think the argument from informality likely succeeds
when it comes to some explanations in cognitive science, the argument fails when
motivated by Marr’s framework.
As I argued in the previous section, a notion of internal representation is in-
deed indispensable to the information-processing framework—conclusion (M3) from
the last section. To deny this conclusion requires denying one of the premises of my
argument. Both premises are well supported by Marr’s own writing: it is hard to
deny the centrality of the notion of a representational scheme to Marr’s framework,
and with a representational scheme comes the ingredients for internal representa-
tion. The notion of a representational scheme, and its content-component are in
no obvious way a reflection of informal description. Consider again Marr’s work
on edge detection. The retinal image realizes a representational scheme for light
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intensity, and the raw primal sketch provides a representational scheme for changes
in light intensity. In both cases there is a clear sense in which they are understood
to have representational content: it is the information that these schemes make
explicit. The content-components in the explanation reflect the description of the
information-processing task: detecting and representing intensity changes. Nothing
equivalent to a content-component applies when describing a comet as aiming at
the Earth.
There is no reason to interpret attributions of content in Marr’s framework as
being informal, akin to the use of intentional idioms in other branches of science.
Thus so far my argument stands. Interestingly, Chomsky cites Egan (1995) as
providing an accurate account of Marr’s framework. Thus, I now turn to looking at
how Egan has used Marr’s framework to motivate the Instrumental Challenge.
3.6.2 Instrumental Content and the Computational Theory
Egan has relied extensively on Marr’s work—in particular, Marr and Hildreth’s
theory of edge detection—in developing what I have called the Instrumental Chal-
lenge. I believe that Marr’s work provides little support for her challenge, and hence,
I do not it provides good grounds for rejecting my argument.
To start, let me distinguish between two issues. When it comes to computa-
tional models, there is indeed an issue of how they are to be interpreted in relation
to a phenomenon of interest. A computational model at an abstract level, is simply
a formalism. For example, at an abstract level ∇2G is an operator, combined by
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convolving ∇2 and G. As it happens, a filter that approximates ∇2G meets certain
constraints for a good image filter. Thus, when employed in the computational the-
ory for an edge detecting device (the retina) the operator is interpreted in a certain
way—as characterizing the form of receptive fields. The general point is that for any
formal model, one must distinguish the model from its interpretation under some
application. But a separate issue is whether a system to which a computational
model is applied contains internal states that satisfy the recipe for some notion of
representation. The model, not the system to which it is applied, has instrumental
“content” because of how we interpret it. I believe that Egan’s argument rests on
a conflation of these two issues: the issue of (i) how computational models are in-
terpreted with (ii) the issue of whether a system to which a computational model is
applied is representational in some sense.
The gist of Egan’s challenge is that the core of an information-processing ex-
planation is the what-component of the computational theory, and it is only when
one interprets the mathematical function specified by the what-component, in line
with one’s explanatory interests, that the mathematical function provides an expla-
nation of the phenomenon in question. Thus, what “content” we attribute to the
internal states posited by an explanation are always relative to explanatory inter-
ests, and fail to have my ingredients for internal representation (i.e. the content is
derived). The main example used by Egan to maker her case is Marr and Hildreth’s
theory. (Egan, 1992, p.454) claims that Marr’s computational theory is: “a formal
characterization of the function(s) computed by various processing modules.” Thus
according to Egan, the computational theory consists solely of a specification of a
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mathematical function (c.f. Egan, 1995, p.187; Egan, 2010, p.255. Egan takes the
use of ∇2G in Marr and Hildreth’s theory to provide support for her view. In par-
ticular, Egan regularly cites the following passage from Marr in support of her idea
that the computational theory is just a specification of a mathematical function.
I have argued that from a computational point of view [the retina] signals
∇2 ∗ G . . . From a computational point of view, this is a precise char-
acterization of what the retinal does. Of course, it does a lot more—it
transduces the light, allows for a huge dynamic range, has a fovea with
interesting characteristics, can be moved around, and so forth. What
you accept as a reasonable description of what the retina does depends
on your point of view. I personally accept ∇2G as an adequate de-
scription, though I take an unashamedly information-processing point of
view.(Marr, 1982, p.337)
The conclusion that Egan draws from this passage is that the operator ∇2G
suffices for specifying the computational theory for edge detection. The only way
to connect the operator to the phenomenon of interest is by providing an interpre-
tation of the operator that connects it to detecting changes in light intensity. Egan
(1992, p.455) correctly observers that Marr avoids claiming that the primitives of the
raw primal sketch (e.g. “edges” and “bars”) represent properties of distal objects.
But what she appears to also deny is that the primitives are intended to represent
properties of intensity changes in I:
When the computational characterization is accompanied by an appro-
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priate cognitive interpretation, in terms of distal objects and properties,
we can see how the mechanism that computes a certain mathematical
function can, in a particular context, sub-serve a cognitive function such
as vision . . . . So when the input states of the [∇2G] filter are described
as representing light intensities and the output states changes of light
intensity over the image, we can see how this mechanism enables the
subject to detect significant boundaries in the scene. (Egan, 2010, p.256
emphasis in original)
Egan is right that the what-component of a computational theory, in isolation
from the why-component, might be characterized in purely formal terms, and so
has no intrinsic connection to the phenomenon of interest. In which case, an in-
terpretation of the what-component is required. But as I pointed out above, how
we interpret a computational model of a system is a separate issue from whether
the system is representational. For example, Marr and Hildreth propose ∇2G as
a filter because it meets certain constraints—the why-component of their compu-
tational theory. It is true that it is only when we interpret ∇2G in a certain way
(as characterizing the form of receptive fields of retinal cells) that we connect the
operator to vision, and see how the operator satisfies the constraints. However, the
constraints identified by Marr and Hildreth are themselves dependent on how the
information-processing task is characterized. Marr and Hildreth’s characterization
includes a content-component: the raw primal sketch represents intensity changes
in I. Since the identification of ∇2G as an ideal filter for detecting intensity changes
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is a result of the filter satisfying the appropriate constraints, and the selection of the
constraints is dependent on how the information-processing task is characterized,
the interpretation of the operator is also dependent on how the task is character-
ized. And it is the characterization of the information-processing task that in turn
determines the content-component. Thus, it is because of the content-component
that we are able to make sense of the constraints that make ∇2G the best filter for
detecting intensity changes. To summarize my point in Egan’s own terminology, the
“pragmatically motivated gloss” of ∇2G is a reflection of the content-component of
the computational theory. Therefore, it makes little sense to claim that the gloss is
itself the content-component as Egan seems to suggest. 25
The ∇2G filter, one part of Marr and Hildreth’s theory of edge detection, is
the primary example that Egan has used to develop the argument from instrumental
content. However, her notion of instrumental content does not match the notion of
content found in Marr’s framework, and seems to mischaracterize the significance
of the computational theory, and representational content, to his framework. In so
far as Egan’s challenge rests on her characterization of Marr’s framework, it fails to
undermine my argument.
25Thus, by claiming that the information-processing task for edge detection is the computation
of ∇2G—as opposed to detecting intensity changes in I—Egan (1999, p.192) appears to misun-
derstand the significance of the operator to Marr and Hildreth’s theory.
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3.6.3 Job Descriptions and Representational Schemes
Ramsey’s Job Description Challenge applies to any notion of internal repre-
sentation employed in cognitive science: in order for an internal state to be a mental
representation, it must have a representational function tied to the state having in-
tentional content. We further saw that intentional content requires ingredients of
perceptual objectivity and robustness, at least when it comes to perceptual rep-
resentations. So does Marr’s notion of a representational scheme meet Ramsey’s
challenge? Burge (1986, p.35) seems to think so:
the claim that [Marr’s work on vision] is intentional is sufficiently evident.
The top levels of the theory are explicitly formulated in intentional terms.
And their method of explanation is to show how the problem of arriving
at certain veridical representations is solved.
I agree with Burge that the Level 1 explanation includes a content-component,
as we have seen. But I believe that the correct answer to the question is that being
a representational scheme does not simpliciter satisfy the ingredients for being a
mental representation. For example, some of the representational schemes that
Marr posits in vision seem to fail the job description challenge, and merely describe
sensory registers.
First, the retinal image I is a good example of a sensory register, which makes
explicit information about the light intensity in the visual input. First, the content-
component is original, and it serves a stand-in function, so it is an internal repre-
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sentation. Second, it is a sensory register because it is an internal representation of
a sensory system that tracks (very simple) properties of the proximal stimulus. But
it lacks the other ingredients for perceptual representation: its content is neither
perceptually objective nor is it perceptually robust (though perhaps it is resilient).
Second, the raw primal sketch, which Marr (1982, p.71) describes as the first
representational scheme with primitives that “have a high probability of reflecting
physical reality directly”, also appears to be a sensory register. The raw primal
sketch represents intensity changes of different types (e.g., blobs, edges, and bars) of
different orientations, scales, and locations, but these are also not properties of the
distal world, but the retinal image itself (in this respect, the information that the
raw primal sketch makes explicit may indeed be “internal”; see e.g., Segal, 1989).
In a certain sense, the content of the raw primal sketch is perceptually robust,
since it represents intensity changes, regardless of how they are caused (changes in
illumination, orientation, or surface reflectance properties). But it does not represent
these varied causes.26
So neither the retinal image nor the raw primal sketch are plausibly percep-
tual representations. However, Marr’s own view about the content-components of
different representational schemes in the visual system is that as one moves deeper
into the visual system, subsequent representational schemes make explicit informa-
tion about more distal (and hence objective) properties of the environment. For
26I think it is mistaken to suggest that tokening of primitives in the raw primal sketch represent
a disjunction of distal properties, as suggested by Egan (1999, p.184). Marr states quite clearly
that what the raw primal sketch represents is intensity changes, not a disjunction of their causes.
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example, other simple organisms do not in fact represent distal properties at all,
even though they represent in Marr’s sense:
When does a specific configuration in the image imply a specific configu-
ration in the environment?. . . In a true sense, for example, the frog does
not detect flies—it detects small, moving, black spots of about the right
size. Similarly, the house fly does not really represent the visual world
about it. . . We, on the other hand, very definitely do compute explicit
properties of the real visible surfaces out there, and one interesting as-
pect of the evolution of visual systems is the gradual movement toward
the difficult task of representing progressively more objective aspects of
the visual world. (Marr, 1982, p.340)
It is clear from passages like this one that Marr believed that the human visual
system represents distal properties of the visual world. Thus it seems he in fact
endorsed the Distal Object Thesis. The notion of a representational scheme is broad
enough to include such apparent examples of genuine perceptual representations, as
well as cases of sensory registration. However, it is important to see that positing
perceptual representations in this way not something that Marr argued for, but
rather took for granted (Hoffman and Singh, 2012). This is make explicit by Marr
himself, who took RTM as a background assumption to his approach:
From a philosophical point of view, the approach that I describe is an
extension of what have sometimes been called representational theories
of mind. . . representational theories conceive of the mind as having access
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to systems of internal representations; mental states are characterized by
asserting what the internal representations currently specify, and mental
processes by how such internal representations are obtained and how
they interact. . . This scheme affords a comfortable framework for our
study of visual perception, and I am content to let it form the point of
departure for our inquiry. (Marr, 1982, p.6 my emphasis)
So it appears Marr may have taken the line that since RTM is true, some
internal representations are mental (cf. Pylyshyn, 1984). But we are not assum-
ing RTM as a metaphysical thesis27. So if we want an argument for my second
conclusion, which meets the Job Description Challenge, then we need to look else-
where. In particular, we need an argument for why an internal representation that is
posited to explain some visual phenomenon (in particular object recognition) must
be perceptually objective and robust.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I looked at Marr’s philosophical approach, which in part
spawned and popularized the information-processing framework in vision science.
I argued that a notion of internal representation was indispensable to Marr’s work,
and in so far as it is representative of the framework at large, this argument
amounted to a defense of my first main conclusion. I further showed that two
27It is also not even clear that assuming RTM is a plausible way to meet the Job Description
Challenge (Ramsey, 2007, 38-67)
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anti-representationalist challenges, which are motivated by Marr’s work, fail. At
the same time, Marr’s work takes a notion of mental representation for granted, and
so more must be done to provide an argument for Conclusion 2 that meets the Job
Description Challenge. In particular, we need to see an argument for why having my
mental ingredients of perceptual robustness and objectivity are indispensable to the
role that an internal representation plays in the explanation of a visual phenomenon.
I lay the groundwork for such an argument in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4: Inferring Content from Constancy
4.1 Introduction
Let me recap. My ultimate goal is to show that some theories of content—
in particular, informational theories—are relevant to some explanatory practices in
vision science—in particular, those aimed at explaining facts about visual object
recognition. My second way-point to this end, Conclusion 2, is to show that a
notion of perceptual representation is indeed indispensable to these practices.
In Chapter 2, I laid out a recipe for perceptual representation: a list of ingre-
dients for when an internal representation of a sensory system is a form of mental
representation, as opposed to a mere register of proximal stimulation. I also can-
vased some arguments for why these ingredients are missing from the internal states
posited in the explanations of visual phenomena. Focusing on Marr (1982), in Chap-
ter 3 I looked in detail at the information-processing framework in vision science—
which subsumes work on visual object recognition—in order to assess some of the
anti-representationalist challenges from Chapter 2. These arguments, I claimed, do
no justice to the structure of the framework. I also ended up with something of a
disjunctive conclusion: that the representational schemes central to the framework
could either be mere registers of sensory input or genuine perceptual representations.
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Ultimately, whether the key ingredients for perceptual representation—namely, per-
ceptual objectivity, and robustness—are present will depend on facts about the
phenomenon that is being explained. I believe that the internal representations
that underlie the human capacity for visually recognizing objects satisfy the two
crucial ingredients required for genuine perceptual representation. In this chapter,
I lay the groundwork for my argument to this conclusion.
Vision exhibits perceptual constancies: what we see appears relatively stable
despite changes in proximal stimulation. Historically, the fact that vision exhibits
perceptual constancies has been used as grounds for arguing that vision is percep-
tually objective (Boring, 1946; Brunswik, 1940; Cassirer, 1944; Thouless, 1931), and
perhaps even representational (Cooper and Hochberg, 1994; Dretske, 1981). Indeed,
recently Burge (2010) has made the same sort of argument in defending the indis-
pensability of perceptual representations as a posit for perceptual psychology at
large. I will call this argumentative strategy, which moves from facts about percep-
tual constancies to conclusions about perceptual objectivity and representation, the
argument from constancy.
In this chapter I assess the prospects of the argument from constancy. I present
three prima facie challenges for the argument, which I refer to as the Dependence
Challenges. The upshot of my discussion of these challenges is that if an argument
from constancy is to succeed, it should be narrowly focused on object constancy (or
“invariance”) in vision—which is the primary subject matter of research on visual
object recognition. In contrast, Burge (2010) offers a very broad argument from
constancy, which he runs for virtually all forms of perceptual constancy in vision. I
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argue that Burge does not have the resources for meeting the dependence challenges.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Subsection 2, I spell out the
background of the argument from constancy, and how perceptual constancies feature
in the story of vision. In Subsection 3, I provide a (re)construction of the argument
from constancy using my recipe for perceptual representation. In Subsection 4, I
lay out the Dependence Challenges, which suggest a need for a narrower argument
from constancy focused on object constancy. In Subsection 5, I summarize the basis
for the broad argument from constancy offered by Burge (2010). In Subsection 6, I
argue that Burge’s version of the argument falls prey to the Dependence Challenges.
Finally, in Subsection 7, I conclude the chapter.
4.2 Perceptual Constancies and the Story of Vision
Let me say a bit more about what perceptual constancies are like. In general
terms, a perceptual constancy is the fact that some form of perception remains
unchanged in the presence of certain kinds of changes to the sensory input. The
most familiar forms of perceptual constancy come from vision. To illustrate, consider
again my brother’s cat, Mr.Muscles, who I observe first sitting by the window, and
then jumping to the floor and walking through a pool of sunlight. My perception of
the cat on his trip across the room exhibits the main kinds of perceptual constancy
found in vision:
Shape constancy : The perceived shape of an object appears constant
across changes in retinotopic shape. Example: I perceive the cat as
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having the same overall shape, despite changes in the shape of his retinal
projection as he moves across the room.
Size constancy : The perceived size of an object appears constant across
changes in retinotopic size or perceived distance. Example: I perceive
the cat as having the same size despite changes in distance as he moves
from the window across the floor.
Color constancy : The perceived color of an object appears constant
across changes in illumination. Example: I perceive the color of the
cat’s coat as unchanged despite variation in spectral illumination of his
fur as he walks across the room into the pool of light.
Object constancy : The perception of an object as an object, and its
identity, appears constant across changes of view-point (e.g., changes
in retinotopic size and shape, illumination, orientation, and occlusions).
Example: despite the many changes in the retinal input, and partial oc-
clusion of his own body (e.g., of his legs while walking) I do not perceive
a change in objecthood, or identify, as Mr.Muscles traverses the room.
Based on these examples, it is easy to see (literally) that virtually all of our
visual experience of the world exhibit some kind of perceptual constancy. Histor-
ically, constancies have been central to how psychologists characterize perception
in general, and vision in particular. They are fundamental to the story that vision
science tells about the nature of vision, and the relationships between the distal
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world, proximal stimulation, and perception (Epstein, 1977; Ittelson, 1951). This
role of constancies in perceptual theory provides the background and basis for the
argument from constancy.
In this section, I first review a kind of main narrative in vision science regard-
ing the relationship between the distal world and the proximal stimulus, and why
whatever it is we perceive visually, it is not simply the proximal stimulus. Next, I
outline how perceptual constancies have been central to whether one adopts what
I will call “objective” or “subjective”’ readings of this narrative. It is the objective
reading of the narrative that is at the heart of the argument from constancy.
4.2.1 Some Problems in the Main Narrative
The extent to which we see the world as a coherent whole may seem like a plat-
itude. However this mundane fact about our visual experience becomes remarkable
when we consider the relationship between proximal visual inputs and the distal
world. In particular, two facts about the mapping from the distal world to the
proximal stimulation of the retina are typically characterized as “problems” that
the visual system must overcome in order to afford us a coherent perception of the
world. These problems also provide the traditional grounds for thinking that the
objects of perception are distinct from the events of proximal retinal stimulation
(Epstein, 1977).
The Underdetermination Problem. We are accustomed to seeing the world as
a single unambiguous whole. However, for any given retinal stimulation, there are
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infinitely many possible states of the distal world that could have caused the very
same stimulation. This is known as the underdetermination problem, which can be
illustrated using the perception of size and color.
Consider a retinal projection of a simple 3D cube at some distance from the
viewer. Isolated from the inputs to the rest of the visual field, there are infinitely
many possible states of affairs in the distal world that could have caused the very
same retinal projection: squares of different sizes at different distances, but also
parallelograms at different orientations, also varying in size and viewing distance,
and with appropriate variation in light source (Kersten and Yuille, 2003). Thus the
retinal projection is underdetermining of the size (and shape) of the distal object that
caused the retinal projection. Similarly, consider that with three cone receptors in
the human retina, the spectral distribution of light that reaches the eye is reduced to
three values, even though a spectrum requires an infinite number of values to specify
its energy at each wavelength. This has the consequence that there are an infinite
number of spectra that, given our trichromatic vision, are treated as equivalent.
Such equivalence is illustrated by the phenomenon of metamers: distinct spectral
reflectance distributions that are perceived as being equivalent.
Although we are normally unaware of the underdetermining quality of input
to the eyes it is readily revealed by visual illusions, and multi-stable figures such
as the Necker Cube and Face-Vase (Figure 4.1), in which the visual system can
alternate between multiple percepts, or “interpretations”. In the case of the Necker
Cube, we see the circled vertex as either in the foreground or background, resulting
in a change in the perceived 3D orientation of the cube. In the case of the Face-
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Vase, we can see either the black or white portions of the image as the figure or
ground, resulting in a change in percept between two symmetrical faces in profile,
or a centrally positioned vase.
Figure 4.1: The Necker Cube and Face-Vase.
What does the underdetermination problem teach us about visual perception?
One textbook lesson is that the object of perception has greater specificity than
what can be extracted from the proximal stimulus alone. So the object of perception
is not a property of the incidental proximal stimulation itself. Instead our visual
system constructs a percept using more information than is made available just in
the retinal input. The existence of visual illusions and multi-stable figures tells us
that some kind of process is required, as Marr asserted. For example, it has been
suggested that visual processing involves “taking-into-account” separate information
not available in the retinal image (Epstein, 1973); requires some kind of “unconscious
inference”, as Helmholtz and many others have believed (e.g., Rock, 1983; for a
historically oriented review, see Hatfield, 2002); or depends on the internalization of
environmental constraints (Marr, 1982; Shepard, 1984). While each of these ideas
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remains fashionable today (in one form or another), Bayesian approaches to vision
have also provided useful abstract characterizations of visual processing in terms of
probabilistic inference (Kersten and Yuille, 2003). Despite differing in the details,
all of these approaches have in common the objective of explaining how the visual
system constructs a percept, or rather, constructs a representation, that goes beyond
the underdetermining information found in the retinal image.1
The Variation Problem. Just as we are accustomed to seeing the world unam-
biguously, we are also used to seeing the world as stable. However, no distal event or
object ever produces the same retinal input twice due to differences in viewing condi-
tions. Call this the variation problem. Consider again the examples of perceived size
and color. As mentioned earlier, perceived size is generally constant across changes
in viewing distance, while perceived color is constant with respect to changes in
surface illumination. However, there are infinitely many possible distances at which
we might view an object, resulting in differences in the projected retinal size of an
object. Likewise, illumination conditions are never quite the same when we view
an object. Normally we are unaware of the inherent variability in retinal inputs;
however, this property of our visual input becomes salient when one wears inversion
goggles, which use prisms to invert the light entering the lenses so that wearers
perceive the world as upside down. When worn for the first time, visual percepts
can be incredibly disorienting, though with training and experience individuals can
become quite adept at navigating the world while wearing the goggles.
1Not everyone believes that the underdetermination problem warrants the claim that vision is
an inferential process. For a recent argument against this common view see Orlandi (2014).
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Overcoming the variation problem requires the visual system to make gen-
eralizations and predictions across input conditions, which might reflect innate or
learned aspects of visual processing. The problem also reveals why the objects of vi-
sual perception cannot be specific to the proximal input, since our perception of the
world is constant despite the substantial changes in retinal stimulation. In general,
all research on perceptual constancies in vision can be seen as attempts to explain
how the visual system overcomes the variation problem with respect to different
dimensions of visual input.2
These two problems constitute received facts in mainstream vision science re-
garding the mapping between the distal world and proximal stimulation. Providing
an explanation of how the visual system overcomes these problems, as they arise
for different aspects of visual perception, remains a primary objective for research
within the information-processing framework (see e.g., Rust and Stocker, 2010).3
Given that these problems exist, yet we see the world as we do—as an unambiguous
and stable whole—tells us that the objects of visual perception do not reduce to
the transient proximal inputs themselves. But what about the mapping between
perception and the distal world? In answering this question, perceptual constancies
have traditionally taken center stage.
2A fact also true of research on visual object recognition, as we shall see in the next Chapter.
3Notoriously, Gibson (1950, 1979) rejected the existence of both problems, endorsing instead
a “one-to-one-to-one” mapping between the distal world, proximal stimulation, and perception.
However even to some of his followers in ecological psychology, rejecting the existence of these
problems is considered empirically untenable (Withagen and Chemero, 2009).
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4.2.2 Objective and Subjective Readings
Traditionally there have been two kinds of “readings” of perceptual constan-
cies with respect to where we should locate the objects of perception.4 According
to what I will call objective readings, perceptual constancies reveal the respects
in which vision is indeed objective: the objects of perception are non-perspectival
properties of objects and events in the distal world. According to what I will call
subjective readings, the object of perception is not something distal, but a higher-
order property extracted or constructed from some function of the retinal image.
For example, a classic proposal is that, in line with principles of Euclidean geometry,
if visual angle is known, then perceived size and perceived distance vary proportion-
ately (Epstein et al., 1961; Kilpatrick and Ittelson, 1953). Were this generalization
true, a possible subjective reading would be that perceived size is a function of visual
angle and visual cues for perceived distance.
These two sorts of readings are in large part motivated by focusing on one of
two phenomena related to perceptual constancies (Ittelson, 1951). The first is con-
stancy achievement, the fact that we appear to have largely accurate perception of
the world across transformations of the visual input. The second is the mechanisms
that underlie constancies, which are operational both during apparently veridical
and illusory perception.5
4The expression “object of perception” is common in early work on perceptual psychology. In
plane terms, it is simply what we perceive.
5The use of “mechanism” here is from Ittelson (1951), and should not be taken to presume a
form of mechanistic explanation in the sense familiar from philosophy of science (Machamer et al.,
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Objective readings are generally motivated by reflection on the achievement
of constancy. For example, in early work on size constancy, Brunswik (1940) was
convinced of an objective reading by the fact that judgments of size correlated more
with distal properties of his stimuli than perceived retinal size, and likewise Thouless
(1931) believed his work on shape perception showed that vision involves a “regres-
sion to the real object”. Here is the approximately contemporaneous philosopher,
Cassirer (1944, p.34-35 emphasis in original), explicitly making the argument from
the achievement of perceptual constancy, to an objective reading:
In modern psychology it appears clearly that there exists a peculiar
function to which perception owes its objectivity. The “true” shape, the
“true” size of an object are by no means that which is given in any partic-
ular impression, nor need they be the “sum” of these impressions. . . The
constitutive factor . . . manifests itself in the possibility of forming invari-
ants. Owing to this possibility, there exist for us a “perspective of illumi-
nation” and a spatial perspective and thus the perception of “objective”
reality.. . . If there were no [perceptual] constancy, we would, as it were,
abandon ourselves to every change in external conditions; it would be
impossible to segregate “things” and “properties” from the stream of be-
coming. To use Heraclitus’ metaphor, we should be unable to “step down
twice into the same river”. . . Thus [modern] psychology. . . dismisses the
dogma of the strict one-to-one correspondence between physical stimuli
and perceptions. It is, on the contrary, the “transformed” impression,
2000).
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i.e., the impression as modified with respect to various phenomena of
constancy, which is regarded as the “true” impression, since we can on
these grounds construct knowledge of reality.
The core of Cassirer’s argument is that since it is the “real object” that remains
constant across transformations of the retinal input, it follows that the object of
perception is something in the distal world. Hints of the same argument are present
in the information-processing framework. For example, it is suggested by the very
idea that vision is hierarchical: that at progressive stages of visual processing (and
brain regions), there is increased invariance, and greater specificity of vision to the
distal world (e.g., Rust and DiCarlo, 2010). Likewise, the same sort of reasoning is
seemingly tacit in Marr’s discussion of why internal representations of 3D shape, as
opposed to earlier stages such as the 2D sketch, are directed at distal properties of
the world.
In contrast, subjective readings have typically been motivated by focusing on
the mechanisms of perceptual constancy. Illusions are of interest to vision scientists
because they afford a means of investigating the mechanisms that appear to afford
accurate perception of the world under normal viewing conditions (Coren and Gir-
gus, 1977; Gillam, 1998). However if the same mechanisms are employed for both
“veridical” and illusory perception, then one can argue that the same objects of
perception are present under both conditions. Along these lines, here is Epstein
(1977, p.7) defending a subjective reading:
Most investigations of the constancies are interested more in constancy
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mechanisms or processes than in constancy as product. Nowhere is this
more evident than in the frequent attempts to confirm hypotheses about
the basis of constancy through experiments on illusions. The general
opinion is that although constancy and veridicality may be distinguished
from illusion on the basis of extra-perceptual criteria, that is, conven-
tional assessments of correspondence between reports and physical mea-
surement, veridicality and illusion differ neither in the character of the
experience nor in the underlying process. . . Thus it is plain that it is
constancy and not veridicality that is the focus of concern and it is the
mechanism and not the achievement that commands interest.
Since the object of perception is that which remains constant with respect to
sensory transformations, and there is nothing to distinguish—by perception alone—
between veridical and illusory percepts, it follows that whatever the object of per-
ception is, it is some function of the sensory signal, and not a property of the distal
world. This subjective reading can be found historically in Gestalt Psychology (Kof-
fka, 1935), but also in the information-processing framework as well. Recent work
within the framework rebelling against objectivity in perception tend to focus on
the same sort of reasoning as Epstein (e.g., Mark et al., 2010).
How then, are we to decide between the two readings? Needless to say, vision
science provides no universally agreed on answer. Both readings are motivated
by facts that cannot be discounted (Ittelson, 1951), so matters will depend (among
other things) on which offers the best explanation of particular constancies in vision.
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What I wish to now spell out is how an objective reading underlies the argument
from constancy.
4.3 (Re)constructing the Argument from Constancy
Not all research carried out within the information-processing framework in
vision science is focused on explaining perceptual constancies (although a great deal
is; Palmer, 1999). Nonetheless, constancies are still fundamental to how researchers
think of the visual system. This is most salient, again, with respect to the very
idea that vision is hierarchical, or that at successive stages of visual processing, the
representational schemes transition from tracking properties of the retinal image, or
sensory signal, to properties of objects in the distal world—the very narrative within
the story of vision that we began with in Chapter 1. In fact, the sort of considerations
regarding perceptual constancies that historically motivated an objective reading,
have also been the basis for positing mental representation in the visual system. For
example, Cooper and Hochberg (1994, pp.224-225 emphasis in original) make this
very claim:
Most of the purposive behavior of which we are aware is directed toward
the still and moving objects around us, or at the layout of surfaces within
which we move. We must assume that evolutionary endowment and
individual learning provide an accuracy of perceiving and remembering
the objects of our behaviors, that is, at least at the level required for
survival. Thus, our reports of objects’ surface reflectance and shapes are
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often in better correspondence with the objects in the world than one
might expect from local measures of their retinal images. In experimental
research, on the object constancies, for example, observers’ reports of
such attributes as object shape, size, and lightness remain relatively
invariant over changes in the retinal image due (respectively) to changes
in orientation or slant, distance, or illumination on the object’s surfaces.
Indeed, the very conception of mental representations was introduced as
an essential component of perceptual theory in order to explain how such
object constancy can hold, despite changes in the sensory information
impinging on the receptor surface.
So arguably, perceptual constancies have always provided a primary basis
(even if only tacitly) for positing perceptual representations in the visual system.6
Despite the apparent historical connection between perceptual constancies and per-
ceptual representation, lacking is an explicit statement of how an argument from the
one to the other is supposed to go. In this section I try to address this shortcoming
by providing an explicit reconstruction of the argument from constancy.
6Although the paper this passage comes from is not well-known, I consider the opinion ex-
pressed to be rather illuminating, given the historical bend, and significance, of Hochberg’s work.
For example, he organized an early symposium (Hochberg, 1957) on the influence of the Gestalt
movement in psychology (at which Brunswik, Gibson, and Kohler were participants); and edited
a retrospective volume on experimental psychology in the 20th Century (Hochberg, 1998). Some
of his work (spanning five decades) is collected in Peterson et al. (2006).
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In the last chapter we left off with a disjunctive conclusion: either the rep-
resentational schemes of the visual system are collections of sensory registers or
perceptual representations. The missing special ingredients for selecting the second
disjunct were perceptual objectivity and perceptual robustness. I believe an argu-
ment can be constructed from facts about perceptual constancies, and aspects of the
story of vision, to the claim that a system of internal representations that explains
these constancies must have these special ingredients. In this section, I first spell
out more fully why perceptual constancies might allow an inference to perceptual
objectivity. Next, I connect the problems faced by the visual system (the under-
determination and variation problems) to perceptual robustness. I then provide a
breakdown of the structure of the argument from constancy.
4.3.1 A Boring Principle and its Application
Underlying both the objective and subjective readings is a kind of principle
that I would like to make overt. As has been long observed, it is not mere change
in stimulation that is important to thinking about perceptual constancies, rather it
is continuous change (Ittelson, 1951; Koffka, 1935). Furthermore, it is because they
are often continuous that constancies are typically characterized as reflecting a kind
of invariance.
The notion of invariance comes from mathematics, where an invariant is a
feature of a group or class of mathematical objects, which remains unchanged under
certain transformations. For example, the angles of a triangle are invariant with
132
respect to transformations of scale or rotation in a geometric space. Since perceptual
constancies came to prominence in thinking about the nature of perception, it has
been common to understand them as a kind of invariance: stability in perception in
the face of transformations of the input.7 What does the notion of invariance get
us beyond the intuitive idea of a constancy? In part, the import of the notion was
that it helped to focus inquiry on the investigation of invariance in perception under
continuous, or parametric, transformations of stimuli. Introducing the notion was
important because it provided a way of characterizing the sorts of generalizations
that experimental psychology should hope to capture. Indeed, according to Stevens
(1951), it was the investigation of invariance that made perceptual psychology a
science.
Inspired by Dewey (1896), Gibson (1950), and Stevens (1951), it was Boring
(1952) who first explicitly recognized the significance of the notion of invariance for
discovering the objects of perception. In discussing size constancy, Boring reasoned
as follows:
If we could find a function, φ, that would be invariant when perceived
size is invariant. . . then we could say even better what it is that is being
perceived (invariant). In short, if perceived size is invariant when this
function, φ, is invariant, then in judging size, you are perceiving not
object size, not retinal size, but φ. To discover the object of perception,
you have to discover what function of the parameters of the stimulus is
7Of course, the notion of invariance in perception is not the same as the mathematical notion,
since the former is relative, while the latter is absolute. For discussion, see Cutting (1983).
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invariant when perception is invariant. (Boring, 1952, p.146)
For Boring, the object of perception is whatever is recoverable from the stim-
ulus that remains invariant when perception is invariant. Let us call this the Boring
Principle. It is clear that the principle is at work in the arguments we saw for both
objective and subjective readings of perceptual constancies. For what is invariant,
under the objective reading, is a property of something in the distal world, while
under the subjective reading, it is a higher-order property extracted from proximal
inputs. In both cases, we identify the specificity of the object with a function of
the input that is invariant when perception is invariant. So crucially the Boring
principle makes the object of perception contingent on what we discover to be an
invariant function of the stimulus.
It is the Boring Principle that I wish to harness in laying out the argument
from constancy. A first step to doing so is to consider how perceptual constancies
are characterized by explanations within the information-processing framework. The
Boring Principle tells us how to determine the relative specificity of what we per-
ceive, based on invariance in perception. Thus, we must ask what is specific and
invariant in perception from the perspective of representation and process in vision.
Both are clearly tied to the contents of perception (cf. Yilmaz, 1967), in which
case it is natural to consider them properties of representational content within the
information-processing framework—or what I termed, in Chapter 3, the “content-
component” of the Marr’s computational level. In other words, when explaining
specificity and invariance in perception, research within the information-processing
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framework posits an internal representation, which has content that exhibits the
relevant levels of specificity and invariance.
If invariance and specificity are supposed to be explained as properties of rep-
resentational content, then it is straightforward to see how we can use constancies
to establish that the content of an internal representation is perceptually objective.
Consider a representational scheme in some stage of processing in the visual sys-
tem, which exhibits some level of invariance with respect to transformations visual
inputs. In line with my argument from the last chapter, I will assume that many
of the staple and special ingredients for perceptual representation (enumerated in
Chapter 2) are satisfied by the representational content of the scheme: for exam-
ple, the content is original (as opposed to derived), and internal states within the
scheme functions as “stand-ins” of what they are about for the purpose of mental
processing. If the content of some internal representation is invariant with respect
to transformations that are sufficient for making the content distally specific—in
line with an objective reading of the empirical facts about the constancy—then the
content is non-perspectival. And since the notion of objectivity we are working with
from Chapter 2 is that of being non-perspectival, then the content is perceptually
objective. Or put differently, if the invariance that is supposed to be explained by
a set of representations obtains with respect to viewpoint, or perspective, then the
content is perceptually objective.
In summary, when the Boring Principle is imbedded within the information-
processing framework, the content of an internal representation is whatever is in-
variant in the stimulus when tokening of the representation is invariant. If the
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invariance that is exhibited is with respect to viewpoint or perspective, then the
content is perceptually objective. Now let us see how we can use this conclusion to
show that the content is also perceptually robust.
4.3.2 Underdetermination, Variability, and Perceptual Robustness
If the content of an internal representation is perceptually objective, and the
sensory input that activates the representation are both underdetermining and vari-
able with respect to their distal causes, then this entails that wild tokenings of the
representation are possible. And if wild tokenings are possible, then the content
of the representation must be perceptually robust. My argument here is best illus-
trated by adapting a classic model from signal detection theory (Green and Swets,
1966; Figure 4.2).





















Figure 4.2: Adapted Model from Signal Detection Theory
To simplify matters, imagine an abstract characterization of how a simple
sensory system enters into one of two possible internal states, Rn and Rs, depending
on a proximal stimulation, x, caused by one of two distal states of the world: a
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“noise” state, N , and a “signal” state S. Suppose that each x is a value on a
single dimension X, along which are positioned two probability density functions,
fn(x) and fs(x), which reflect the probability of N and S causing some value x
along the dimension. Also along the dimension is a threshold or boundary, λ, which
determines the dependency between values along X and the internal states Rn and
Rs. For example, in Figure 4.2, the mapping is such that when x < λ the system
enters into Rn and when x > λ it enters into Rs.
Now suppose that Rs is a state within the representational scheme of our
system, with S as its distal content, and that this content is (by hypothesis) per-
ceptually objective, since tokening of Rs is invariant with respect to values along
X. It follows that the content of Rs is also perceptually robust, under this simple
picture. The reason is that the mapping between S and X exhibits both features of
the mapping from the distal to the proximal that are central to the main narrative
in vision science. First, the variation problem is captured in the fact that both distal
states can cause a range of sensory inputs, as reflected by the probability distribu-
tions along X. Second, the underdetermination problem is captured in the fact that
the two distributions overlap to a significant degree.8 Thus, for given a value of X
there is no exclusive mapping back to states of the distal world. This entails that,
given any partitioning of X, wild tokenings of Rs will be possible—they will occur
whenever N causes x > λ (i.e., a “false alarm”). Likewise, there will be conditions
when the signal will fail to cause Rs to be tokened, when S causes x < λ (i.e., a
8Indeed, under the usual assumption of two Gaussian distributions, they both span the full
length of X.
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“miss”). Thus given perceptual objectivity, and assuming the underdetermination
problem and variation problem hold, the content of Rs will be perceptually robust.
This picture is simple and idealized, but it reflects something basic about the
relationship between perceptual objectivity and perceptual robustness in the visual
system. Of course, sensory inputs are not uni-dimensional, but the same argument
can be made using multidimensional extensions of signal detection theory (e.g.,
Ashby and Townsend, 1986). And it is not unusual to characterize both the under-
determining and variable nature of the mapping between the distal and proximal
using probability distributions; indeed, this is the standard practice with probabilis-
tic models of vision. Nor is it unusual to use a decision threshold along a dimension
unusual as a means for characterizing the mapping from proximal stimulation to the
tokening of an internal representation (Feldman, 2012; Godfrey-Smith, 1991).
So while this picture is idealized, the conclusion it leads to is quite concrete:
if perceptual objectivity can be established, and the underdetermination problem
and variation problem are assumed, then it follows that the content of the inter-
nal representation will be perceptually robust. Hence, if an objective reading for
some constancy phenomenon in vision is warranted, then the internal representa-
tion posited to explain the constancy will have—indeed must have—all the crucial
ingredients for being perceptual.
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4.3.3 The Structure of the Argument
Putting the two strands together, we get the following argument from con-
stancy, for some set of internal states of a representational scheme in the visual
system (i.e., a set of internal representations), and some set of transformations of
sensory inputs that cause tokenings of these representations.
(I1) The contents of the internal representations are invariant with re-
spect to the transformations.
(I2) If the contents of the internal representations are invariant with
respect to the transformations, then the contents are perceptually ob-
jective.
(I3) Therefore, the contents of the internal representations are percep-
tually objective. [from (I1) and (I2)]
(I4) The visual inputs that cause tokenings of the internal representations
are underdetermining and variable.
(I5) If the contents of the internal representations are perceptually ob-
jective, and the visual inputs that cause tokenings of the internal repre-
sentations are underdetermining and variable, then the content is per-
ceptually robust.
(I6) Therefore, the contents of the internal representations is perceptu-
ally robust. [from (I3), (I4), and (I5)]
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(I7) If the contents of the internal representations are perceptually ob-
jective and robust, then they are perceptual representations. [from (I6)
and background assumptions]
(I8) Therefore, the internal representations are perceptual representa-
tions.
Let me unpack these premises. Premise (I1) of the argument is empirical: it
simply references some constancy phenomenon, and the set of transformations with
respect to which perception is invariant. Premise (I2) is the crucial premise, since it
corresponds to the objective reading of the facts in (I1), and allows for a conclusion
about perceptual objectivity (I3). Premise (I4) is just the (empirical) assumption
that the underdetermination problem and variation problem obtain. Premise (I5) is
the upshot of my argument illustrated using signal detection theory, which allows an
inference to perceptual robustness (I6). (I7) rests on the assumption that the other
staple and special ingredients are already satisfied by the representational scheme
in question; thus, it follows that its internal states are perceptual representations
(I8).
If an argument from constancy succeeds, then we have all that we need for de-
fending the claim that perceptual representations are indispensable to explanations
of perceptual constancy from within the information-processing framework—in line
with Steps 1 - 4 of my argumentative strategy in Chapter 2.
First, we already had on hand the requisite recipe for perceptual represen-
tation. Second, we have some idea of explanatory role. Within the framework,
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internal representations are posited to explain perceptual constancies. Theories and
models are also offered to explain how it is that these internal representations can
exhibit invariance with respect to certain transformations of the visual input, given
that the visual system must “overcome” the underdetermination and variation prob-
lems. These constancy-explaining internal representations have the sort of “dual”
explanatory role that I mentioned in Chapter 2: they are posited to explain a phe-
nomenon, but their structure and functional organization are also something to be
explained. Third, in order to play this role, these posits must be an internal repre-
sentation with content that is invariant to the relevant transformations, and which
overcomes the underdetermination and variation problems. But fourth, as we have
just seen, these requirements entail the key mental ingredients for my recipe for
perceptual representation. Put differently, to posit internal representations to ex-
plain the invariance and specificity exhibited by a constancy phenomenon is to posit
perceptual representations. For this reason, a notion of perceptual representation is
indispensable.
All of the above trades, however, on whether an objective reading is warranted
for the constancy phenomenon in question (and as we shall see in the next chap-
ter, something must still be said to address the Job Description Challenge). One
possibility is that any perceptual constancy exhibited by vision is sufficient for run-
ning the argument; that is, all forms of perceptual constancy in vision warrant an
objective reading. Under this broad version of the argument, so long as invariance
is exhibited with respect to some collection of transformations of visual input, it is
distally specific—premise (I2) is true. An alternative possibility is that only some
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perceptual constancies are sufficient for running the argument. Perhaps an objec-
tive reading is warranted for some constancies in vision, and a subjective reading for
others. Under this narrow version of the argument, only invariance with respect to
some sorts of transformations are enough to establish distal specificity. Of course,
a third possibility is that the argument never works, because an objective reading
of perceptual constancies is never warranted.
So we have an explicit construction of the argument from constancy. Now let
us look at why the argument might fail.
4.4 Cautionary Tales? Three Dependence Challenges for the Argu-
ment From Constancy
The argument from constancy holds some temptation for philosophers. For
example, Dretske (1981, p.165 emphasis in original) appears to use the argument to
show that representational content is distally specific:
It is the fact of constancy. . . that accounts for the fact that our sensory
experience gives primary representation to the properties of distal objects
and not to the properties of those more proximal events on which it
(causally) depends. It is this fact that explains why we see physical
objects and not the effects that these objects have on our perceptual
systems.
The temptation, exemplified by this quote from Dretske, is that the mere
fact that there are perceptual constancies, and that internal representations are
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posited to explain them, warrants concluding that they must therefore be perceptual
representations.
We should view such arguments with caution. In this section I introduce three
prima facie challenges for any argument from constancy one might make. I refer to
these as “Dependence Challenges”, since they each raise questions about whether
perceptual constancies in some way depend on facts that undermine their suitability
for running an argument from constancy; that is, each gives us a reason for doubting
that it is necessary to posit perceptual representations in order to explain constancy
phenomena. While not decisive, I do think these challenges give us grounds for
thinking that a narrow version of the argument, focused on object constancy, is the
one most likely to succeed.
4.4.1 The Stimulus-Dependence Challenge
The first challenge is straightforward. The argument from constancy begins
with (I1), the factual premise that some aspect of visual perception—the perception
of object size, shape, color, or identity—remains invariant with respect to some set
of transformations of the sensory input. If the premise is false, then the argument
does not go through. And in general, it is not obvious that the factual premise is
true. Indeed, the very possibility (and plausibility) of subjective readings suggests
this is so. Consider two examples, color constancy and size constancy.
Perceived color depends on both spectral reflectance properties and illumina-
tion of surfaces. As generally understood, color constancy is supposed to obtain
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with respect to surface illumination: under transformations of the illumination of
a surface or object, the perceived color of the surface remains invariant. However
the available psychophysical data does not provide strong evidence that perceived
(absolute) color is invariant with respect to transformations of illumination. For
example, the main paradigms for investigating color constancy—color naming and
surface color matching—do not provide clear evidence of color invariance with re-
spect to changes in illumination (Foster, 2003). Color, one might think, is a special
case, since it is debatable whether colors are even real properties of surfaces.9 How-
ever the same moral applies when it comes to the facts about size constancy. A great
deal of the early work on perceptual constancies was focused on size constancy with
respect to changes in perceived distance. Indeed, it was this research that was inter-
preted by some as warranting an objective reading of size constancy (Boring, 1946;
Brunswik, 1940; Thouless, 1931). In particular, the “Size-Distance Invariance Hy-
pothesis”, which states that the apparent size of an object is uniquely determined
by the relationship between the visual angle of a stimulus and its apparent distance,
was the subject of a considerable amount of research in the first half of the 20th
Century. The classic version of this hypothesis has little to recommend it (Ross and
Plug, 1998, p.521). For example, in an early review Epstein et al. (1961) already
acknowledged that the hypothesis, which was motivated by principles of Euclidean
geometry, is false.
9Arguments from constancy are popular amongst color realists in the philosophy of perception
(Hilbert and Byrne, 2003; Tye, 2000). Cohen (2008) has argued against this approach in a manner
similar to the Dependency Challenges I enumerate here.
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The above does not show of course that there is not some degree of size con-
stancy (or color constancy). After all, when Mr.Muscles walks towards me, his size
appears constant, as does the color of his coat. The point is simply that claims
about constancy in perception are empirical, and the intuitive fact that various
types of constancy occur (to some degree) is not sufficient evidence for thinking the
first premise of an argument from constancy is true. For if perception only exhibits
a limited amount of invariance, then by the Boring Principle, a subjective reading
might offer a better account of the available data. In which case, one need not posit
perceptual representations to explain the phenomenon.
Visual illusions, which were relied on as evidence for a subjective reading of
a perceptual constancy, also raise the “Stimulus-Dependence Challenge”. For if
perception remains invariant across both veridical and illusory perception, then this
fact suggests that the object of perception is a higher-order property of the sensory
signal, and not a property of something in the distal world. Indeed, at this point,
one might even ask why illusions are not decisive in undermining the argument from
constancy. The reason they are not decisive is that applying the Boring Principle
to visual illusions does not obviously entail a subjective reading. Let me explain.
First, visual illusions are heavily reliant on constrained viewing conditions,
or perspective. Many visual illusions, such as classic geometric illusions such as
the Muller-Lyer Illusion or the Ebbinghaus illusion, as well as many color illusions,
disappear under changes of viewing context. Consider the classic Ames room, which
results in distorted perception of relative size of objects in a room.10 The illusion
10These rooms are constructed so that the wall furthest from the viewer is unequal in size and
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is not invariant with respect to transformations of perspective. As I will discuss
at greater length in the next chapter, if one is allowed to navigate the room, or
observe objects in the room interacting, the illusion fades (Kilpatrick, 1954). Under
the Boring Principle, the object of perception is a function of the stimulus that is
invariant when perception is invariant. A continuous transformation into or out
of illusion inducing viewing conditions will result in a change in perception, which
would suggest that there is in fact a change in the object of perception, under the
principle. So even though perception in some “veridical” and illusory conditions
might be the same, the application of the Boring Principle to illusory cases does not
(at least straightforwardly) warrant a subjective reading.
Second, some apparent illusions are highly invariant, but are not obviously
illusions. For example, consider the “bent-stick” effect, which occurs when we look
at an object partially immersed in water. One might wonder whether in such a case
we are genuinely having an illusory perception of object shape, or largely accurate
perception of how an object looks during immersion. In other cases, the illusion is
invariant, but we might consider it an anomalous case. Consider our perception of
the Moon. On the one hand, the Moon Illusion, in which it appears larger near the
horizon than when high in the sky (despite actually being farther from the viewer
when it is at the horizon), is quite invariant with respect to viewing conditions. On
viewing distance, but in a manner to hide geometric cues of the room that might betray this fact.
For observers in the appropriate position, the wall is perceived as equidistant at all points, and
when objects are placed at different positions in front of the wall, the perception of relative size is
distorted.
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the other hand, the perceived size of the moon is, in general, closer to its retinal
size, than its actual size (Holway and Boring, 1941). So whatever the perceived size
of the Moon is, it is does not appear closely related to its actual size. However it
is not implausible that celestial bodies are anomalous cases, which should not be
considered representative of size constancy more generally.11 So just as constancy
achievement is not obviously decisive in supporting an objective reading, and hence
an argument from constancy, neither is it obvious that facts about visual illusions
are decisive in support of a subjective reading.
The upshot of the Stimulus-Dependence Challenge, then, is that the first
premise of the argument from constancy cannot be taken for granted. Matters will
depend on the empirical details about the extent and conditions of the invariance
in question.
4.4.2 The Dimension-Dependence Challenge
Suppose we grant that the Stimulus-Dependence Challenge can be met, and
that (I1) is true. With the empirical facts in, certain constancy phenomena exhibit
complete invariance with respect to certain transformations of the visual stimulus:
perceived color is wholly invariant with respect to some transformations of surface
illumination; perceived size is wholly invariant with respect to some changes in
viewing distance or retinal size. Even supposing this were true, we would still have
grounds for doubting an objective reading. The reason is that many perceptual
11In this respect, the perception of celestial bodies might be “monster” anomalies, which can be
quarantined from our theories regarding the objects of perception (Darden, 1991; Elliott, 2004).
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constancies are relative to some dimension of the visual stimulus, and it is not
obvious that invariance with respect to these dimensions suffices for making the
object of perception non-perspectival. As discussed in Chapter 2, perspective is
multi-dimensional: for vision a perspective, or viewpoint, involves conditions of
illumination, viewing distance, retinal location, relative position or orientation, and
the like. However, many constancies are relative to one of these dimensions. The
Dimension-Dependence Challenge shows that we cannot simply plug in perceptual
constancies into the argument from constancy, without consideration of what sort of
constancy phenomena might actual exhibit invariance with respect to perspective—
even granting premise (I1), we can still question premise (I2). The challenge gives
strong reason to question whether a broad version of the argument from constancy
is likely to succeed. For if the constancy is not with respect to visual perspective
(which is multi-dimensional), it is not clear why we need to posit a perceptual
representation to explain it.
One might counter that it is well-known that visual constancies are context-
dependent. Consider again the examples of color and size constancy. If I illuminate
a color patch in an otherwise dark room, without any other colored surfaces for
comparison, color constancy will easily breakdown when I adjust the spectral prop-
erties of the illuminating light. Likewise, without cues to distance, perceived size
will breakdown. Thus, while color constancy and size constancy pertain to a single
dimension, our perception of these dimensions depends on our perception of the over-
all visual scene. However, this rejoinder is only on point if the context-dependence
entails that the constancies are in fact invariant with respect to perspective, or view-
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point. In fact, pointing out the context-dependence of perceptual constancies points
toward an even more serious challenge for the argument from constancy.
4.4.3 The Object-Dependence Challenge
In Chapter 2 I stated that perceptual content involves attributing a property to
a particular, and constancy phenomena seem to arise with respect to the perceived
properties of particulars: it is the object in front of me, my brother’s cat, who
I perceive as constant in size, shape, color, and identity, as he walks across the
room. Described in this way, I assume that the particular is indeed something
distal, an object in the world. But this is to in large part beg the question against
a subjective reading. Constancy phenomena are always with respect to a perceived
particular—there must be something that I am perceiving a certain way (Davies,
1991). Either the particular is itself a function of the sensory signal (a subjective
reading), or something in the distal world (an objective reading). If the former, then
an argument from constancy cannot succeed, for it is hard to see how we can have a
subjective reading for particulars, but an objective reading of their constancies. If
the latter, then we need an argument for why the objective reading for particulars is
warranted. The Object-Dependence Challenge, then, is to provide an account of the
particulars in vision consistent with an objective reading of perceptual constancies.
Meeting the challenge may seem tantamount to answering the question: what
is a “visual object”? This is the sort of question vision scientists do not like to answer
(or ask). For example, when broaching the subject Marr (1982, p.270) adopted the
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pessimistic conclusion that “anything” in the visual scene can qualify as an object.
Such pessimism is not necessarily warranted, since there is sufficient psychophysical
evidence to suggest that the visual system is so non-committal—as revealed, for
example, by research on object-based attention, as discussed in the next chapter
(Scholl, 2001). However, it is not guaranteed that a more systematic account will
save the argument from constancy. For example, Feldman (2003) has argued that
we should identify visual objects as a certain kind of “joint” in the tree-structure
organization of complex visual features. If Feldman’s proposal is on the right track,
then visual objects are no more than a higher-order property of the sensory signal,
and we end up with a subjective reading of perceptual constancies.
I think the Object-Dependence Challenge shows why a broad version of the
argument from constancy is not going to work. One first needs to establish that the
particulars to which our visual system attributes size, shape, color, and identity are
indeed entities in the distal world. If such a fact is established, then one already has
grounds for thinking that, at least to some extent, the relevant aspect of vision is
perceptually objective. So we need an argument for why object vision is perceptually
objective, and here a narrow argument from constancy might be useful, so long as




The Dependence Challenges show that it is not enough to simply point to
the fact that there are perceptual constancies, assume that objectivity follows,
and that positing perceptual representations is required to explain them. First,
the Stimulus-Dependence Challenge calls into question factual premise (I1), and
whether some aspect of visual perception is indeed invariant with respect to certain
transformations of the visual input. Second, even assuming premise (I1) is true,
the Dimension-Dependence Challenge calls into question premise (I2), and whether
the form of invariance on offer is with respect to perspective. Third and finally, the
Object-Dependence Challenge raises a problem for the strategy in general, since all
perceptual constancies depend in part on object vision, and thus matters rest on
whether object vision itself demands a kind of objective reading.
What I think this all shows is that a broad version of the argument, for which
any constancy will do, is unlikely to succeed. One strategy is to run an argument
from object constancy, in order to address the Object-Dependence Challenge head
on. Indeed, this is the approach I adopt in the next chapter. In contrast, Burge
(2010) has recently defended a broad form of the argument from constancy. So let
us see now see how his argument fairs with respect to the challenges I have laid out.
4.5 Burge On Objectivity in Perception
Recently, Burge (2010) has argued that perception affords the most primitive
form of objectivity in the mind. Burge’s argument is inspired by empirical research
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in perceptual psychology, for which he thinks a notion of perceptual representation
is indeed indispensable. At its core, Burge’s argument takes the form of a rather
broad argument from constancy. Burge is not the first philosopher to make such an
argument. For example, as mentioned earlier, Dretske (1981) points to an objective
reading of perceptual constancies as the basis for his claim that the content of per-
ceptual representations are entities in the distal world. However, Burge’s approach is
similar to (and indeed provides some of the inspiration for) my own. Thus it is worth
assessing his argument in light of the dependency challenges I have enumerated and
seeing, ultimately, why it fails.
In this section, I first summarize Burge’s own recipe for perceptual representa-
tion. I then turn to the details of his argument from constancy. Before continuing,
it is worth mentioning that Burge’s views of intentional content, mental representa-
tion, and perception, are rather complex. Here I only discuss those details relevant
to evaluating his argument from constancy.
4.5.1 An Alternative Recipe for Perceptual Representation
Burge is careful to articulate a conception of perceptual representation that he
takes to be “non-deflationary”.12. For Burge, the two crucial constitutive ingredients
for perceptual representation are their objectivity, and representational function. It
12Burge thinks that theories of intentional content are deflationary because they entail some
kind of reductionism that is incompatible with the explanatory practices of perceptual psychology.
Such considerations are the motivation for his rejection of the explanatory relevance of theories of
content to cognitive science (Burge, 2010, p.292)
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is these ingredients that allow for a contrast between perceptual representation of
the distal world and sensory registration of proximal stimuli.
When it comes to perceptual representations, Burge takes their content to
be objective in the two senses I articulated in Chapter 2: they attribute non-
perspectival, mind-independent properties to the distal world. He refers to such
perceptual objectivity as being the “product of objectification”:
Objectification is formation of a state with a representational content
that is as of a subject matter beyond idiosyncratic, proximal, or sub-
jective features of the individual. The relevant subject matter is subject
matter that is objective in one or both of the senses laid out. . . the sub-
ject matter is mind independent, or it is constitutively non-perspectival.
Basically, the subject matter is comprised of entities in the physical en-
vironment. Objectification, then, is the formation of a representational
state that represents the physical environment, beyond the individual’s
local, idiosyncratic, or subjective features. (p.396, emphasis in original)
13
According to Burge (p.309),14 the representational function of the internal
states of perceptual systems is to veridically represent the distal world. Thus by
achieving objectification internal states of a perceptual system are able to veridi-
cally represent the distal world, given the limitations of the system (p.312). While
13The “as of” locution utilized by Burge is his preferred expression for conveying the idea that
the relevant subject matter need not exist.
14Page numbers, when presented alone, are for (Burge, 2010).
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representational function is thus tied to a notion of success, it is not to be associated
with biological function. Rather the notion of representational function is supposed
to be grounded in the explanatory needs of perceptual psychology, including vision
science:
The roles for both biological and representational functions are constitu-
tively associated with success, and such functions ground explanations of
success. Biological function grounds explanation of fitness, or successful
survival for mating. Representational function grounds a distinctive sort
of explanation: explanations of approximately veridical perception—and
of failures of approximate veridicality—of the environment. (p.310)
Even though these notions of function are distinct, the representational func-
tions of perceptual systems still operate in the service of the biological functions of
organisms (Burge, 2003, p.510). Although veridical perception is not necessary for
improving fitness, it can be sufficient.
These two constitutive ingredients help to mark the distinction between per-
ceptual representation and sensory registration. For example, Burge thinks it is
clear that the internal states of the sensory systems of simple organisms do not have
these constitutive ingredients:
Organisms like bacteria, amoebae, paramecia, worms, molluscs, clams
are differentially sensitive to various attributes in the physical environ-
ment. They discriminate those attributes. Their sensory capacities carry
information. They function to respond in certain ways, given this infor-
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mation. These organisms can discriminate light, heat, magnetic force,
and so on. Responses to such discriminations function to enable them to
live, move, and reproduce in their environmental niches. These sensory
capacities are not perceptual. (p.315-316)
The internal states of these simple organisms do “functionally carry informa-
tion” about their environment in the following sense:
Some states that carry information that correlates with other states,
and are causally dependent on them, have a function that capitalizes on
such dependence. Broadly speaking, such states have such a function by
virtue of having been selected through evolution, or perhaps designed as
artifacts, partly because of the causal roles they play given the informa-
tion that they carry. (p.317)
However, functionally carrying information is insufficient for perceptual repre-
sentation, since it is insufficient for either objectification or representational function.
First, the discriminative capacities do not suffice for objectification because:
. . . nothing in the individual’s capacities. . . distinguishes (a) environmen-
tal causes that figure functionally in the individual’s basic needs and ac-
tivities from (b) sensory registration (or functional encoding) of proximal
causes—from the surface effects of the environmental causes. (p.317)
Since these organisms cannot discriminate the proximal and the distal, they
therefore cannot have objective, non-perspectival perception of the distal world.
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Such sensory registrations amounts to mere “statistical, nomic, counterfactual, or
causal relations” (p.400) between the sensory states and states of the environment,
but does not involve attributing properties to particulars in the world.
Second, since there is no constitutive relationship between biological function
and representational function—perceptual success need not be biological success—
the sort of sensory discrimination of these organisms, which contributes to biological
success, does not warrant a (non-vacuous) appeal to veridicality conditions necessary
for representational function; that is, biological explanation of functional sensitivity
to environmental conditions is not psychological explanation in terms of veridicality
conditions.
To illustrate, consider the example of the Australian Jewel Beetle. The male
jewel beetle can identify combinations of visual features that are indicative of the
fitness of females of the species, but which make stubby beer bottles look immensely
attractive. In the wild, the beetles will attempt to copulate with the bottles, since
they appear as highly desirable mates (Gwynne and Rentz, 1983). So the visual
system of the jewel beetle can detect certain feature combinations, and this serves
a biological function, but it is incapable of discriminating between the property of
being a female jewel beetle and being a brown dimpled object. In Burge’s terms, the
discriminative capacities of the jewel beetle are likely insufficient for objectification,
and any appeal to veridicality conditions to explain its behavior would be vacuous.
The visual system of the jewel beetle does not contain perceptual representations of
mates per se.15
15This, at any rate, is a gloss one could give of the case in line with Burge’s recipe. One might
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In summary, given the ingredients for perceptual representation Burge identi-
fies, they do not reduce to simply “carrying information, or any other sort of sensory
discrimination, together with biological function” (p.316). In this way Burge draws
a distinction between perceptual representation on the one hand, and sensory reg-
istration coupled with biological function on the other.
4.5.2 A Broad Argument from Constancy
In contrast to biological explanations of the sensory systems of simple organ-
isms, Burge believes that perceptual psychology, and vision science in particular,
make non-trivial appeals to perceptual representations (p.87-92). Burge bases his
argument on themes in the main narrative in vision science, which he thinks demand
an objective reading of perceptual constancies.
Burge identifies the main challenge in vision science as that of explaining
how the visual system overcomes the underdetermination problem, and allows us to
perceive the world:
The primary problem for the psychology of visual perception is to explain
how perceptual states that are of and as of the environment are formed
from the immediate effects of proximal stimulation—principally from
registration and spectral properties of the eyes.(p.89)
The visual system overcomes the underdetermination problem via processes
wonder whether, assuming the beetle is in fact attributing a property to a distal particular, why
the content of its internal representation is not at least objective. It may well be, but then one
needs to show the attribution is in fact to a distal particular.
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of unconscious inference and what Burge terms “formation principles”, which is
his term for the idea of internalizing constraints (like Marr and Hildreth’s spatial
coincidence assumption):
The transformations operate under certain principles that describe psy-
chological laws or law-like patterns. These laws or law-like processes
serve to privilege certain among the possible environmental causes over
others. The net effect of the privileging is to make the predetermin-
ing proximal stimulation trigger a perceptual state that represents the
distal cause to be, in most cases, exactly one of the many possible dis-
tal causes that are compatible with (but not determined by) the given
proximal stimulation. I call psychological principles that describe, in an
explanatory way, these laws or law-like patterns formation principles.
(p.92, emphasis in original)
It is due to such formation principles that the visual system is able to dis-
tinguish the distal and the proximal, and achieve objectification (p.395). While
acknowledging that vision science aims to explain both illusory and veridical per-
ception (p.342), ultimately Burge thinks that appeal to perceptual representations
are indispensable to the explanatory practices of the science; that is, perception is
veridical enough of the time to warrant explanation in terms of representations with
veridicality conditions:
. . . [vision science assumes] that individual’s perceptions are approxi-
mately accurate with respect to some environmental particulars and at-
158
tributes enough of the time to ground a form of explanation that takes
states with veridicality conditions to be the product and participants
in the law-like formation patterns being explained. (p.88, emphasis in
original)
So it should be clear that Burge wholeheartedly endorses much the same nar-
rative about vision that I described earlier in this chapter. According to Burge, a
distinction between sensory registration and perceptual representation is indispens-
able to the general explanatory practices of vision science. The reason is that unlike
in the cases of the simple organisms described earlier, these practices make fruitful,
and non-trivial appeal to perceptual representations in the explanation of visual
phenomena. For Burge, the explanatory difference maker is perceptual constancies.
Burge describes perceptual constancies as follows:
Perceptual constancies are capacities [sic] systematically to represent a
particular or an attribute as the same despite significant variations in reg-
istration of proximal stimulation. . . these capacities cannot be explained
simply as generalized weightings of registration of proximal stimulation
They must involve principles for forming representation of specific en-
vironmental particulars and attributes. . . The intuitive idea of the con-
stancies is that under different perspectives, a perceiver can represent a
given particular or attribute as the same.(p.408)
Burge does not intend this as a definition, since it involves overt reference
to representations, which (he thinks) would make the definition circular. Despite
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such overt reference, he still thinks that perceptual constancies provide the basis
by which vision science makes non-trivial appeal to perceptual representations. For
Burge, perceptual constancies are the “central instances of perceptual objectifica-
tion” (p.397; also p.409). The reason is the same one we encountered before, which
is that perceptual constancies show that perception is non-perspectival, and so per-
ceptually objective:
Perceptual constancies give empirical point to a distinction between per-
spective and subject matter. . . Representational content or mode of pre-
sentation is to be distinguished from subject matter. Any perceivable
particular, property, relation, or kind can be perceptually represented
in many ways, constituting different perceptual perspectives on the rep-
resentatum. In all cases of perceptual constancies, this multiplicity of
perspectives on a given subject matter emerges. . . A given perceptual
representatum (kind, property, relation, or particular) is represented as
that representatum, even as it is presented in different ways, from differ-
ent perceptual perspectives. These differences in perspective and repre-
sentational content, or perceptual mode of presentation, are caused by
variations in sensory registration of proximal stimulation.(p.411)
Burge is clearly making an argument from constancy. Furthermore, he holds
that the argument works for the main forms of perceptual constancy in vision,
including color, size, shape, and object identity (p.409-410). Thus he offers a very
broad argument from constancy in defense of objectivity in perception. Now, how
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does his view fair with respect to the Dependence Challenges?
4.6 Burge’s Difficulties with Dependence
While I am very sympathetic to Burge’s approach, I do not think his broad
argument from constancy succeeds. In this section I first outline why his argument
appears to run afoul of the Dependence Challenges. I then look at how he tries to
account for visual illusions, via the notion “relevant representational alternatives”.
However, far from providing a means to address the Dependence Challenges, this no-
tion either makes his account internally inconsistent, or leaves the object-dependence
challenge unanswered.
4.6.1 Taking Perceptual Constancies for Granted
In developing his argument from constancy, Burge seems to take an objective
reading for granted, and does not even acknowledge the presence of subjective read-
ings in the literature (e.g., Epstein, 1977). Thus, it should come as little surprise
that he does not appear to have resources for addressing the Dependence Challenges
to arguments from constancy. Let us go through each of the challenges in turn.
Consider the Stimulus-Dependence Challenge first. Burge does offer some
machinery for addressing visual illusions, and I will turn to a discussion of this
machinery shortly. For now, it is worth noting that although Burge extensively
cites the empirical literature in vision science on various constancy phenomena, his
arguments are to a large extent divorced from the actual empirical details regarding
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these phenomena. In fairness, Burge (p.413) does appear to acknowledge that mere
appeal to perceptual constancies is not enough to make his argument go through:
Perceptual constancies are paradigmatic marks of objectification. I think
that their presence in a sensory system is necessary and sufficient for the
system’s being a perceptual system. Their presence is certainly suffi-
cient for perception and objectivity. . . I conjecture that they are also
necessary. Since they are not characterized independently of the notions
representation and perception, one cannot use the notion perceptual con-
stancy as an independent ‘criterion’ to determine when one has a case
of genuine perceptual representation and when one has a case of non-
representational sensory registration. Empirical theory must draw the
distinction and identify cases of perceptual constancy. (p.413)
So Burge seems to hold that to the extent perceptual constancies allow us
to identify genuine perceptual representation, matters will depend on the empirical
details. However he does not delve into these details. We have already seen that
there are reasons to worry that perceptual constancies are stimulus-dependent, thus
without further argument, Burge has at best pointed out that if an objective reading
of perceptual constancies is warranted—premise (I2)—then we have an argument
for the indispensability of perceptual representations. In fact, one criticism of Burge
has been that the empirical facts are not obviously in his favor (Ganson et al., 2014;
Olin, 2014). So it would seem Burge may be lacking a convincing defense of the
factual first premise that is required to get an argument from constancy off the
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ground.16
Next, regarding the Dimension-Dependence Challenge, Burge appears to take
for granted that any perceptual constancy suffices for establishing perception as
being non-perspectival. But as we have seen, many forms of perceptual constancy
pertain to particular dimensions of visual perception, and one must provide an
argument for why constancy with respect to only one (or some) of these dimensions
suffices for establishing that the content of the internal representations in question
are non-perspectival. Burge does not provide such an argument.
Finally, regarding the object-dependence challenge, I believe Burge does not
realize there is a problem. Burge does discuss object constancy at length (p.437-465),
rejecting arguments to the effect that object representations are solely the domain
of central cognition. I will not get into the details of his discussion for two reasons.
First, there are reasons to worry that object constancy is stimulus-dependent, which
is an issue I address head on in the next chapter, when making my own argument.17
Second, Burge’s account of object constancy depends on his approach to addressing
16Whether he has or not, in general, provided such a defense is not something I propose to discuss
here, for two reasons. First, since he has not addressed the more pressing issue of the Object-
Dependence Challenge, that is enough to already call his more general argumentative strategy into
question. And second, for object constancy (which is the case that interests us), many of the same
sorts of facts he references are discussed in the next chapter.
17Burge regularly cites the same literature on visual object recognition I discuss in the next
chapter, but fails to acknowledge that one of the central debates in the field has been the de-
gree to which the representational schemes that underlie object recognition are indeed viewpoint
dependent.
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worries about illusions. This approach, I will now argue, either makes his view
inconsistent, or does not address the Object-Dependence Challenge.
4.6.2 The Dubious Relevance of Relevant Representational Alterna-
tives
Burge is aware of the sort of threat that illusory perception seems to present
for his broad argument from constancy. If we acknowledge that the same constancy
mechanisms are at play in instances of illusory perception, then one can make the
claim that whatever the object of perception is, it is present in illusory perception.
As I argued earlier, to the extent illusions present a challenge to an objective reading,
matters will again depend on the character and extent of the illusion effects in
question. Still, it is worth looking at the details of Burge’s proposal, to see if it
offers any help with the Dependence Challenges more generally. I will argue that it
does not.
To avoid issues that might arise from illusions, and other possible counterex-
amples, Burge proposes the following “Principle of Relevant Representational Al-
ternatives” in his discussion of object vision:
(RRA) For an individual to perceptually indicate and attribute an at-
tribute (kind, property, relation), the individual, or something in the
individual’s psychology, must be capable of distinguishing instances of
that attribute from relevant representational alternatives. That is, the
individual or psychology must be able to distinguish instances of that
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attribute from instances of other attributes that the individual can dis-
criminate and that also ground explanation (in fact, these biological
explanations) of the individual’s needs and activities in its normal envi-
ronment.(p.466)
Under Burge’s view: “given that (RRA) is met, having perceptual constancies
with respect to an attribute suffices to have a capacity to represent the attribute
perceptually” (p.466). Thus, so long as constancy is achieved across conditions
such that our visual system distinguishes between RRAs, then the internal states
of the system that exhibit these constancies will be perceptually objective. Since
circumstances that give rise to visual illusions are purportedly not RRAs, they do
not present problematic cases for his argument. The background motivation for
(RRA), which I quote at length, can be found in Burge’s discussion of perceptual
constancies:
The representational contents of perceptual states are partly determined
by patterns of causal interrelations, usually in evolutionary history, with
attributes in the environment. These causal relations ground explana-
tions of individuals’ basic biological functions, principally activities. . . The
causal relations supplement the individual’s discriminatory abilities to
make perceptual content of the perceiver’s states specific to attributes in
the environment. . . Thus objectification in perception is partly beholden
to environmental “context” for the nature of its representations and for
what it can and does represent.
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To put the point differently: individuals’ discriminatory abilities operate
in a restricted context of environmental alternatives. . . It is enough that
the individual have perceptual capacities that discriminate environmen-
tal attributes within ranges that have figured causally in the formation
of the states and that are relevant to biological needs and activities.
Thus perceiving an instance of a shape as that shape requires an objec-
tifying capacity. It requires a capacity to discriminate one shape from
another. It further requires discriminating shapes from other relevant el-
ements in the environment—such as colors, edges, textures. Perceiving
bodies as bodies requires discriminating them from events and proper-
ties, including the shapes of the bodies. These are relevant alternatives in
perceptual explanations because they also figure in explanations of indi-
viduals’ biologically basic functions in fulfilling needs and activities, and
because they are relevant to the individuation and formation of percep-
tual states. The perceiver need not be able to discriminate bodies from
illusions, proximal stimulation, sensations, abstract kinds, undetached
entity parts. . . [T]hey do not figure in natural biological explanations of
functional individual needs and activity. The perceiver’s objectifying
discriminatory abilities determine the nature of his perceptual abilities
only within this larger environmental and ethological framework. (p.407,
emphasis in original)
So Burge’s view (in the details) seems to be that exhibiting perceptual con-
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stancy across a range of circumstances, where these circumstances are individuated
in relation to certain biological functions, are what accounts for objectification in
perception. I do not believe the addition of (RRA) saves Burge’s broad argument
from constancy. The problem is that Burge faces a dilemma: either the relevant
discriminative capacities referenced in (RRA) pertain to the distal world, or they
do not. Neither alternative saves Burge’s argument.
First, suppose that they do. It follows that Burge’s argument begs the ques-
tion. I have presumed that Burge is providing an argument for why we should believe
that the objective reading for perceptual constancies is warranted. If (RRA) per-
tains to attributes of particulars in the distal environment, then it simply amounts
to a statement of the desired conclusion: that the system in question perceptu-
ally represents the distal world. More specifically, under this first interpretation
of (RRA), Burge begs the question with respect to the Object-Dependence Chal-
lenge; he presumes that the visual system can discriminate between particulars in
the distal world.
Second, suppose that they do not. Then the discriminative capacities are
simply those of sensory registration. Burge’s argument no longer begs the question,
but then it no longer leads to the desired conclusion. It is hard to square such an
interpretation with his explicit rejection of the idea that sensory discrimination along
with biological function suffices for perceptual representation. Indeed, if (RRA) only
pertains to sensory discrimination, then he has dissolved the distinction between
sensory registration and perceptual representation. No doubt simple organisms, such
as the jewel beetle, exhibit some level of perceptual constancy with respect to their
167
own environmental contexts. Thus, these organisms would seem to meet Burge’s
sufficient conditions for perceptual representation after all. This is not an outcome
that I think Burge would welcome. Far from vindicating the explanatory practices
of vision science, and perceptual psychology more broadly, this second interpretation
of (RRA) risks rendering vacuous their appeal to perceptual representations.
So in short, I do not see any obvious way of interpreting (RRA) that does
not wholly undermine Burge’s argument from constancy. Thus it provides little
help in addressing the Dependence Challenges. Burge aims to explicate why ap-
peals to perceptual representations are indispensable to the explanatory practices of
mainstream vision science. In order to realize this aim, Burge makes a very broad
argument from constancy. I do not believe the argument succeeds.
4.7 Conclusion
Historically, perceptual constancies took center stage within debates regarding
the objectivity of perception. I looked at how one might argue that perceptual
representations are indispensable to the explanation of these constancies. Having
reconstructed what I have referred to as the “argument from constancy”, I then
enumerated some Dependence Challenges for the argument. I went on to argue
that Burge’s (2010) version of the argument from constancy cannot overcome these
challenges.
A reoccurring theme throughout my discussion has been that a broad version
of the argument is unlikely to succeed—or at least, not without first determining
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whether the argument will succeed when it comes to object constancy. This was
the upshot of the Object-Dependence Challenge. Thus, in the next chapter, based
on research on visual object recognition (and object vision more generally), I de-
velop an argument from object constancy that I believe overcomes the Dependence
Challenges.
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Chapter 5: Representing and Recognizing Objects
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I argue that a notion of perceptual representation is indispens-
able to those practices in vision science that are aimed at explaining facts about
visual object recognition. In other words, I provide an argument for why the Distal
Object Thesis is indispensable to explanations of object recognition. My argument is
an argument from constancy, which relies on facts about object constancy—namely,
the viewpoint invariance of object recognition—to show that visual object represen-
tations are both perceptually objective and robust. As we saw in the last chapter,
there are a number of Dependence Challenges that this sort of argument faces. In
making my argument I believe I can meet these challenges.
The rest of the chapter is largely structured around the Dependence Challenges
I have enumerated. In Subsection 2, I illustrate the central importance of viewpoint
invariance and object specificity to research on visual object recognition, and lay
out my argument from object constancy. I also spell out why, in virtue of resting
on facts about viewpoint invariance, my argument is able to avoid the Dimension-
Dependence Challenge. In Subsection 3, I look at how we should conceive of the
“object” of object recognition. By incorporating research on object persistence and
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object-based attention, I show that my argument also meets the Object-Dependence
Challenge. In Subsection 4, I discuss the substantial body of evidence showing that
the representational schemes that underlie object recognition are in fact viewpoint
dependent. I show that this viewpoint dependence is compatible with my argument,
given the role of perceptual learning in recognition. Thus my argument also meets
the Stimulus-Dependence Challenge. In Subsection 5, I discuss some of the less
central ingredients for perceptual representation I listed in Chapter 2. Finally, In
Subsection 6, I conclude the chapter.
5.2 Recognizing a Narrow Argument from Constancy
Like perceptual constancies, object recognition is one of the ever present facets
of visual perception. The world we see is a world of objects, and generally speaking,
we always see these objects as something. When I look at Mr.Muscles, I do not
simply see a thing: I categorize him as a kind of thing (a cat), and I also identify him
as a particular individual (my brother’s cat). Most research on object recognition
in vision science aims to explain how it is that we are able to both categorize and
identify objects visually (Riesenhuber and Poggio, 2000). Marr (1982) believed
that the representation and recognition of objects (or rather, their shape) was the
chief function of the visual system. Attaching such functional significance to object
recognition remains common today.1 For example, Peissig and Tarr (2007, p.76)
open their review of the previous 20 years of work in the field as follows:
1At least, amongst those who do research on the topic. For a critique of this consensus, see
Cox (2014)
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At a functional level, visual object recognition is at the center of under-
standing how we think about what we see. [It] is a primary end state
of visual processing and a critical precursor to interacting with and rea-
soning about the world.
The functional significance of object recognition derives from the fact that it
affords objective perception of the world (Boring, 1946, p.107). It is at this sort of
end stage of visual processing that the Distal Object Thesis finds a place: vision
goes beyond the proximal stimulation, and reaches into the distal world. I believe
that this connection between perceptual objectivity and object recognition is well-
founded, and can be used to ground an argument from object constancy.
In this section, I first provide some evidence that viewpoint invariance and
object specificity are considered the main explananda for research on object recog-
nition. Since viewpoint invariance is invariance with respect to perspective, I use
these facts about object recognition to develop an argument from constancy that
readily avoids the Dimension-Dependence Challenge.
5.2.1 Viewpoint Invariance and Object Specificity
The central explananda for explanations of object recognition are of the typical
sort for perceptual constancies: explaining some level of invariance and specificity
in visual perception. In the case of research on object recognition, the central ques-
tion is how recognition can be object specific to things in the distal world, while
also being invariant with respect to transformations of viewpoint: changes in reti-
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nal size, position, illumination, orientation (rotation in both the picture-plane and
depth-plane), and perceived distance. To explain these facts, internal representa-
tions for object identity and category membership—what I will call more simply
object representations—are posited, and theories and models are developed to ex-
plain how these object representations can exhibit both viewpoint invariance, and
object specificity. And it is the positing of this distal specificity that amounts to a
commitment to the Distal Object Thesis.
That these are the central explananda in the field, and that object represen-
tations are posited to explain them, has remained fairly consistent over time. For
example, much the same explananda for object recognition were acknowledged by
Marr and Nishihara (1978, p.270-272), who pioneered research on object recogni-
tion. For Marr and Nishihara, any adequate explanation of recognition must explain
how a representational scheme (in the sense from Chapter 3) for object shape can be
constructed using the information available in the retinal image. Crucially, among
other features, the content of the internal representations in the scheme must have
appropriate uniqueness to objects of different shape (i.e., object specificity), but
also stability given changes in orientation (i.e., invariance). Both explananda were
also identified by Biederman (1987, p.117), in another landmark paper, as among
the basic phenomena of object recognition.
More recently, researchers in the field have come to explicitly acknowledge
that viewpoint invariance and object specificity provide the two most fundamental
facts about object recognition that cry out for explanation in terms of internal
representation. For it is not enough that object recognition exhibit either of these
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features. Rather it is their conjunction which is in demand of explanation, given
that the variability problem is at its worst when it comes to changes in viewpoint:
The main computational difficulty is the problem of variability. A vision
system needs to generalize across huge variations in the appearance of
an object such as a face, due for instance to viewpoint, illumination, or
occlusion. At the same time, the system needs to maintain specificity.
(Riesenhuber and Poggio, 2000, p.1199)
The crux of the object recognition problem lies in the ability to produce
a representation that can selectively identify individual objects in a man-
ner that is essentially tolerant (”invariant”) to changes in position, size,
and context. . . From a computational perspective, constructing a repre-
sentation that is either highly selective or highly tolerant is trivial; the
challenge is to build a system that can produce a representation that is
simultaneously selective and tolerant. (Rust and DiCarlo, 2010, p.12978)
While another branch of research on object recognition also focuses on the
underdetermination problem for object vision (e.g., Kersten and Yuille, 2003), un-
derstanding how the brain constructs object representations given the high vari-
ability in input is perhaps the central question in the field—a field that includes
the psychophysics and cognitive neuroscience of object recognition in humans and
primates, as well as attempts to build computational models that mimic human
performance, and which are constrained by neural architecture. The reason for this
broad interest is that overcoming variability with respect to viewpoint makes object
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recognition an exceptionally computationally demanding task, as clearly stated by
DiCarlo and Cox (2007, p.333):
Object recognition is computationally difficult for many reasons, but the
most fundamental is that any individual object can produce an infinite
set of different images on the retina, due to variation in object position,
scale, pose and illumination, and the presence of visual clutter.. . . Indeed,
although we typically see an object many times, we effectively never see
the same exact image on our retina twice. Although several computa-
tional efforts have attacked this so-called ‘invariance problem’,. . . a ro-
bust, real-world machine solution still evades us and we lack a satisfying
understanding of how the problem is solved by the brain.
DiCarlo and Cox do not overstate the difficulty of “solving” object recogni-
tion. To illustrate, consider the performance of some common and state-of-the-art
computational models of object recognition.
HMAX (for “hierarchical model and X”) is a commonly used brain-inspired
computational model of the stages of visual processing (Riesenhuber and Poggio,
1999; Serre et al., 2007). The end stage of HMAX is a neural network layer designed
to mimic aspects of the functional organization of inferior temporal cortex (IT),
the brain region most commonly associated with object recognition in humans and
other primates (DiCarlo et al., 2012). While widely used as a proxy model of object
representations in human IT, the model easily deviates from human performance.
Recently, Stojanoski and Cusack (2014) introduced a method for image scrambling
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that preserves the low-level properties of an image (such as spatial frequency), while
rendering the object in the image unrecognizable (e.g. the scrambled beaver is
not recognizable, when introduced in isolation). Crucially, Stojanoski and Cusack
found that the “object representation” layer of the HMAX model showed the same
activity to both the intact and scrambled image, despite the fact that psychophysical
evidence showed a clear difference between the recognizability of the two images.
So while it is inspired by the neurophysiology of the human brain, HMAX largely
deviates from human performance.
More recently so-called “deep neural networks” have been recruited to inves-
tigate object recognition in the brain. In one recent study, Cadieu et al. (2014)
compared an implementation of recent deep neural network models (Krizhevsky
et al., 2012) to the organization of human IT. When trained to classify object ex-
emplars that included variation of viewpoint, these models performed similarly to
humans, and developed an internal organization that closely matched some of the
large-scale organization of human IT. The results of Cadieu et al. are impressive,
in that these state-of-the-art computational models both achieve human-like levels
of object recognition performance, and also contain an organization that is highly
similar to human IT. As impressive as these results are, deep neural networks have
puzzling properties, and it is still unclear what it is they learn when they are trained
to categorize natural images. For example, using genetic algorithms images can be
evolved that would be characterized by deep neural networks as objects of particular
categories, with a confidence level > 99% even though they are visually unintelligible
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to human viewers (Nguyen et al., 2014).2
These two computational approaches are not the toys of computer scientists
who, ignorant of vision science, have attempted to solve a real-world problem of
which they have little understanding. Both reflect years of research by experts
in the field who have a detailed understanding of both the psychology and neu-
roscience of object recognition, as well as state-of-the-art methods from computer
science. This understanding is built into the guts of these brain-inspired models.
I believe the modest success of these models illustrates the impressive challenge of
explaining the core facts of object recognition. By way of comparison, consider that
the human brain is able to recognize objects as quickly as < 150 ms after stimulus
onset (Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006; Thorpe et al., 1996). The speed of such“ultra-
rapid” recognition is only slightly longer than the time it takes visual signals to
travel along the neuronal pathways from the retina to IT cortex.
Research on visual object recognition aims to explain how the brain constructs
representations of objects that are both viewpoint invariant, and object specific,
given the extreme computational challenge of the variation problem. This much,
I believe, is widely accepted in the field. What is less commonly acknowledged is
how these features of object recognition relate to the main narrative in the story
of vision.3 It is clear that researchers have in mind an objective reading when it
2For a video discussing how these stimuli were generated go to:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M2IebCN9Ht4.
3Indeed, I know of no one in the literature—with perhaps the exception of Burge (2010)—who
has explicitly connected the very contemporary interest in the visual object recognition literature,
with the very traditional issues regarding objectivity in perception in the last chapter.
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comes to the object specificity of recognition, but what has not been noticed is that,
through an argument from constancy, viewpoint invariance provides the basis for
thinking that object representations are distally specific. I will now elaborate on
this point.
5.2.2 The Argument from Object Constancy
viewpoint invariance of object recognition is the somewhat technical descrip-
tion for the fact of object constancy.4 This kind of constancy, with respect to changes
in viewing conditions and hence states of the retinal image, is the closest vision gets
to being wholly non-perspectival. Thus, if object recognition is indeed viewpoint
invariant, then we have a strong foundation for an argument from constancy.
In the last chapter we saw that if an objective reading of a perceptual constancy
is warranted, then the content of the representations that are posited to explain the
constancy will be perceptually objective, but then also perceptually robust. The
reasoning to the first conclusion followed straightforwardly from the truth of an ob-
jective reading of a constancy. The second conclusion followed from the fact that,
if (1) the content of some set of representations in vision is perceptual objectivity,
and (2) the underdetermination and variability problems hold, then (3) wild token-
ings will be possible, so the content must also be perceptually robust. This kind of
argument looks promising, when we start with facts about object recognition.
Given their viewpoint invariance, the contents of object representations in the
4For example, in Walsh and Kulikowski (1998), a volume on perceptual constancy, the chapters
on object constancy are primarily discussions of research on object recognition.
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visual system are non-perspectival, and hence perceptually objective. Since this in-
variance results from overcoming both the variability and underdetermination prob-
lems, it also follows that the content is perceptually robust. Thus, assuming that
they satisfy the other staple and special ingredients for perceptual representations,
the content of the object representations that are posited to explain the central facts
of object recognition have all the ingredients for genuine perceptual representations.
Breaking the argument down explicitly, we get the following argument from object
constancy, for the set of internal states of the representational scheme for objects in
the visual system (i.e. object representations), and the transformations of viewpoint
over which which their content is invariant:
(O1) The contents of object representations are invariant with respect
to transformations of viewpoint.
(O2) If the contents of object representations are invariant with respect
to transformations of viewpoint, then the contents are perceptually ob-
jective.
(O3) Therefore, the contents of object representations are perceptually
objective.
(O4) The visual inputs that cause tokenings of object representations
are underdetermining and variable.
(O5) If the contents of object representations are perceptually objective,
and the visual inputs that cause tokenings of the object representations
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are underdetermining and variable, then the contents are perceptually
robust.
(O6) Therefore, the contents of object representations are perceptually
robust.
(O7) If the contents of object representations are perceptually objective
and perceptually robust, then the representations are perceptual repre-
sentations.
(O8) Therefore, object representations are perceptual representations.
This argument already avoids one of the Dependence Challenges from the pre-
vious chapter. Viewpoint invariance is invariance with respect to visual perspective:
we recognize objects across transformations of orientation (such as rotation in plane
and depth), spectral illumination, and retinal size and position (and hence position
in the visual field and viewing distance). Thus the Dimension-Dependence Chal-
lenge is not a difficulty for my argument, since viewpoint invariance is invariance
with respect to all dimensions of visual perspective—in other words, premise (O2) is
true. However, arguably the Dimension-Dependence Challenge is the least daunting
of the difficulties I have introduced, for it simply requires that an argument from
constancy rest on invariance with respect to perspective (a reasonable demand, given
how I have defined perceptual objectivity). So while a promising start, more work
needs to be done to show that my argument from object constancy also avoids the
other two dependence challenges.
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5.3 Object Recognition and Object-Dependence
Part of my motivation for looking to object recognition as the foundation for
an argument from constancy was to meet the Object-Dependence Challenge head
on. The issue, recall, is that perceptual constancies typically pertain to attributes
of some particular, which raises the question as to the ontological status of these
entities. Are they a complex of visual features, or an entity in the distal world? If
the former, then objective readings of perceptual constancies in vision may never be
warranted, and perceptual representations need not be posited to explain them. If
the latter, then we need an argument for why such an objective reading is appropri-
ate. I suggested in the last chapter that an argument from constancy pertaining to
object constancy might avoid the Object-Dependence Challenge. I have since pro-
posed just such an argument. Now we need to see if it indeed meets the challenge.
In this section I begin by outlining why the organization of the recognition
process (as it is typically characterized) does not straightforwardly provide a means
of avoiding the Object-Dependence Challenge—indeed it seems to put the problem
in starker relief. However as I go on to argue, once we consider explanations of object
vision more generally, and appeal to work on object persistence and object-based
attention, my argument from object constancy can indeed meet the challenge.
5.3.1 What is the “Object” of Recognition?
When vision scientists explain how we identify or categorize something in a
visual scene, there is still the issue of what kind of “object” they presume to be
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speaking of: a combination of visual features, or a particular in the world? For all I
have said so far, we have yet to see any reason to believe my argument can overcome
the Object-Dependence Challenge. And when we consider how object recognition
is characterized and explained as an information-processing task, it is clear that the
challenge persists.
As I have already mentioned, the legacy of Marr looms large in the field of
object recognition. The history of the field traces to (Marr and Nishihara, 1978,
p.269), who applied Marr’s information-processing approach to: “the problem of
representing three-dimensional shapes for the purpose of recognition”. While their
proposal was aimed specifically at recognizing objects based on 3D shape, their
approach was the catalyst for all subsequent research on object recognition. Fol-
lowing Marr and Nishihara, the process of recognition is typically characterized as
a matching of some sort of internal representation that has been constructed online
with some stored object representation of an individual identity or category (Figure
5.1; compare Liu et al., 1995, Fig.1). While differing in the details, both of the two
main theoretical approaches in the field explain recognition as resulting from this












Figure 5.1: Object Recognition as an Information-Processing Task.
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First, object-centered approaches originated with Marr and Nishihara, but have
been most fully developed by Biederman (1987) in his “recognition-by-components”
(RBC) theory (see also Hoffman and Richards (1984); Stankiewicz (2002)). What
all object-centered approaches have in common is the idea that the representational
schemes for recognition utilize an object-centered frame of reference that stores
representations of the overall shape of objects. When we recognize an object from
some viewpoint, a representation of the shape of the object is constructed from a set
of volumetric primitives, which is then matched to the stored shape representations
for different objects. Object-centered approaches can be understood as applying
primarily, or even exclusively, to categories that can be recognized by shape alone,
replying on structure relations between image features, and do not include a role for
surface features, such as color or texture, in recognition.
Second, view-centered approaches largely developed as a reaction against the
object-centered approaches of the 1980s (Bülthoff and Edelman, 1992; DiCarlo et al.,
2012; Riesenhuber and Poggio, 1999; Tarr, 1995). What all view-centered approaches
have in common is the idea that the representational scheme for recognition consists
of stored representations that are in some sense “view-based”: a view-specific rep-
resentation of an object is matched to stored representations of images for different
individual object categories using (for example) an interpolation process. View-
centered approaches readily incorporate all information in an image, including color
and texture, but typically at the expense of ignoring information about the struc-
tural relationship between image features (a point that often goes unappreciated;
Barenholtz and Tarr, 2006). Sometimes they also focus on only on stored “frag-
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ments” of an image (Ullman, 2007).
At present, view-centered approaches are something of the received view in
research on visual object recognition (for discussion, see: Hayward, 2003, 2012;
Stankiewicz, 2003). Whether this reception is warranted, what is important for
present purposes is that both approaches, at their core, offer the same sort of ex-
planation of the recognition process: that of matching a representation of an object
that is constructed online, with those for identity and category that are housed in
a long-term memory store in the visual system.5
For both kinds of approach, we can ask what they assume to be the particular
that is being identified or categorized. Furthermore, both theoretical approaches
appear compatible with either an objective or subjective reading. If the particular
is identified with the content of the representation that is constructed online and
5As some have noted, it is not even entirely obvious that object-centered and view-centered
approaches are even in direct competition (Hayward, 2003; Peissig and Tarr, 2007). For example,
object-centered approaches were developed to explain recognition of objects based on 3D shape ab-
sent information from surface color or texture. In contrast, view-centered approaches have at least
aspired to provide a general account of recognition, where all information from the retinal image
is utilized—though often they tend to ignore or downplay the importance of structural relations
between features of an image (Barenholtz and Tarr, 2006). Thus it is possible that rather than
providing competing theories of object recognition, they reflect different ways in which (perhaps)
diverse object representations are recruited given different task demands (Schyns, 1998). How I
have differentiated between object-centered and view-centered views might also be an inaccurate
way of characterizing the theoretical space. For example, Hayward (2012) considers Biederman’s
RBC theory to be a view-centered theory. A similar opinion is expressed by Stankiewicz (2003),
who is sympathetic to RBC theory.
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matched, then either it is itself distal, or it is not. If the latter, then it is unclear
how we get viewpoint invariance, when the object is non-distal. If the former, then
we again need an argument.
In summary, although the object representations that are posited to explain
recognition are seemingly perceptual, and so involve attributing a property to a
distal particular, the explanations offered of the recognition process do not seem to
posit this sort of attribution. So if my argument from object constancy is to succeed,
I need to a direct answer to the question: what is the object (i.e., particular) of object
vision?
5.3.2 The Persistent Need for Object Indexes
Unfortunately the field of object recognition is not primarily concerned with
the particulars of object vision. Fortunately, other areas of research on object vision
are. And once we get clearer on the different aspects of object vision, I think the
Object-Dependence Challenge can be met.
So far I have highlighted recognition as one aspect of object vision. A second
aspect is what I will call object discrimination: the grouping together of features
in the visual image into a single unit. Discrimination involves the processes of
figure-ground segmentation, and the representation of 2D shape. Representations
of visual objects in this sense are clearly perspectival. Feldman’s (2003) proposal
that we think of visual objects as a node in a visual feature hierarchy is a way to
think of the “objects” of discrimination. A third aspect is what I will term object
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individuation: the visual perception of an individual, or particular, object in the
visual scene. When we recognize (i.e., identify or categorize) objects we attribute
a property to a particular individual. With respect to my argument from object
constancy, the Object-Dependence Challenge amounts to the following question: is
the particular of object individuation considered to be simply that of discrimination,
or is it hypothesized to be something non-perspectival?
Most research on object individuation has been pursued under the labels
“object persistence” and “object-based attention” (Scholl, 2001). This research
is largely carried out independently of work on object recognition, even though the
latter presupposes a notion of object “tokens” that can be “typed” as having a par-
ticular identity, or membership in some category (Treisman and Kanwisher, 1998).
I believe that how researchers try to explain object persistence provides a means of
meeting the Object-Dependence Challenge.
On the one hand, a good deal of evidence suggests that rather than being
directed toward visual features, or regions of the visual field, much of visual attention
is object-directed (Scholl, 2001). On the other, being able to attend to an object
over time requires an ability to track it over time, despite changes in both spatial
position, and visual features. Here is how Kahneman et al. (1992, p.177) describe
the phenomenon:
Imagine watching a strange man approaching down the street. As he
reaches you and stops to greet you he suddenly becomes recognizable
as a familiar friend who you had not expected to meet in this context.
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Throughout the episode, there was no doubt that a single individual was
present; he preserved his unity (in the sense that he remained the same
individual), although neither his retinal size, his shape, or his mental
label remained constant.”
Here our ability to track the stranger, as a single entity in our environment—
to represent object persistence—reflects the fact that the brain somehow “solves”
the correspondence problem (Ullman, 1979). A main focus of research on object
persistence is explaining how the visual system overcomes the this problem, as noted
by Flombaum et al. (2009, p.136):
our visual system must constantly decide whether current stimulation
reflects a novel object, or whether it corresponds to an object that was
already encountered a moment ago. . . If we couldn’t solve this type of
problem, visual experience would be incoherent. This is a problem in
part due to the sheer information load involved, and in part because a
previously experienced object may be reencountered—even a moment
later—in a different location. . . and/or with different visual surface fea-
tures. How are these challenges overcome? How do we readily see objects
as the same enduring individuals from moment to moment?
All explanations of how the brain overcomes this problem involve positing
some form of object indexes, which have a few distinguishing features (Leslie et al.,
1998, p.11):
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I. They are token internal representations that function as “pointers” to
objects.
II. They do not inherently represent any property or feature of the ob-
jects.
III. Indexing an object is a process for selectively focusing attention, and
is therefore resource-limited.
IV. Indexes are assigned primarily based on perceived location in a visual
scene.
While varying in the details, all theories of object indexes posit token internal
representations that minimally have properties I-VI. For example, this is true of the
most influential theories of object indexes, which posit “FINSTs” indexes (Pylyshyn,
1989), or “object file” indexes (Kahneman et al., 1992).6 (I) and (II) are inspired by
the idea of pointers in computer programming languages, which indicate a position
in a data structure where some variable is stored. A crucial implication of (II) is
that object indexes are something of a “blank slate”. They are an abstract internal
representation of a particular, and so are not intrinsically tied to any visual features,
or spatial or temporal properties of an object. Rather, when an index is recruited,
these properties are to be bound up with the representation. (III) reflects the fact
that object indexes play a crucial role in object-based attention, the idea being that
6For present purposes, the details of these theories are not important. “FINST” is for “Fingers
of INSTantiation”, which is so-named because physically pointing at something with your finger
is also somewhat analogous to the idea of an object index (Pylyshyn, 1989).
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we can only keep a limited number of indexes online at once. (IV) specifies that
indexes are applied to objects in locations, but not to locations themselves.
Leslie et al. (1998) also suggest some principles for index assignment: distinct
objects can only have one index; once assigned, an index tracks an object through
space; distinct indexes can be assigned to distinct objects iff they occupy distinct
locations in space; and since they are a finite-resource, indexes must be reusable.
For example, if attention must track a novel object, and all indexes are in use, then
an old index must be recycled and applied to the new object.
Object indexes are the central posit in explanations of object persistence. If
some change in the visual input is perceived (either because of external changes in
the environment, or eye moment) the visual objects that are discriminated in the
scene must be matched to already recruited object indexes, or new ones must be put
into service. In order to maintain a stable representation of attended-to objects in
the visual scene, and to solve the correspondence problem, the visual system must
continuously carry out the following sorts of operations (Kahneman et al., 1992,
p.179):
V. A correspondence operation that determines whether a discriminated
object is novel, or the target of an index that has moved to a new loca-
tion.
VI. A review operation that retrieves information about the target of an
index based on its prior manifestation in the visual field.
VII. A completion operation that uses the current representation and
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reviewed information to produce a perception of change or motion linking
the prior and current representations of the object.
Of most interest for our purposes is the the correspondence operation, and
the information it relies on. Object indexes are abstract pointers to objects, and so
are not intrinsically tied to information about an object. Nonetheless carrying out
the operation requires matching stored information bound up with the index to the
present visual input. The two available sources of information from the visual scene
are spatiotemporal information, and featural information. As a crude comparison,
these two sources of information amount to tracking based on where something is
versus what it looks like. The dominant view in research on object persistence is that
spatiotemporal information is the primary, if not exclusive, source of information for
updating indexes (Flombaum et al., 2009; Mitroff and Alvarez, 2007). At the same
time there is a good deal of research challenging this received view, suggesting that
in many cases surface features can play an important, or dominant role in index
updating (see e.g., Hein and Moore, 2012). This is very much a topic of ongoing
research, and I of course will not take a stand one way or the other. Minimally, it is
plausible that both sources of information are considered to play a role in achieving
correspondence (Hollingworth and Franconeri, 2009; Moore et al., 2010), although
spatiotemporal information may be more dominant (Leslie et al., 1998).
So far I have described the architecture that is posited to explain object persis-
tence in vision, but without saying anything about how it is investigated. So before
relating the architecture to explanations of recognition and the Object-Dependence
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Challenge, I would like to give a sense of the sort of paradigms that have been
used as the basis for positing, and investigating, object indexes. Here I will briefly




























Figure 5.2: The Ternus Display and Multi-Object Tracking.
First, in a typical Ternus Display (Ternus, 1926) three black dots are presented
7Figure 5.2A is after Hein and Moore (2012, Fig 2), and Figure 5.2B is after Scholl (2009, Fig
2.1).
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on a screen at time t1, and then three black dots are presented at t2 shifted to the
side (Figure 5.2A). Depending on the length of delay between presentation times
t1 and t2 subjects either perceive the left most element, A, as shifting to the right
side of the string (Percept 1, shorter delays), or all three elements as shifting to
the right while maintaining their order (Percept 2, longer delays).8 Second, in the
multi-object tracking paradigm (Figure 5.2B) multiple identical items are presented
on the screen, and subjects are instructed to track a subset of them. The items
then move across the screen, and after they have stopped, subjects must indicate
which were the items they were supposed to attend to (Pylyshyn and Storm, 1988).
While there are many variations of these paradigms to be found in the literature
(see e.g., Hein and Moore, 2012; Scholl et al., 2001), each seems to involve object
indexing. In the Ternus Display differences in the temporal properties of stimulus
result in two different outcomes to the correspondence operation. In multi-object
tracking indexes appear to be applied concurrently to multiple items which can only
be differentiated by spatiotemporal information9
Now with a bit of a sense of the sorts of methods and phenomena used to
investigate object persistence, let us see how object indexes might help meet the
Object-Dependence Challenge.
8The first percept is an instance of apparent motion, another common paradigm used in the
literature.
9Or so it seems. While indexes might be applied in parallel, it is not obvious that we are able
to differentiate which individual item is which, as claimed by Pylyshyn (2004). For some critical
discussion regarding how to interpret multi-object tracking results, see Scholl (2009).
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5.3.3 The Particulars of Object Indexes
I have suggested that the Object-Dependence Challenge is really an issue about
how vision science explains object individuation. Recall that although perceptual
representations are posited to explain viewpoint invariance and object specificity,
explanations of the recognition process are silent about matters of individuation.
In other words, these explanations leave it unclear how properties of identity and
category are attributed to distal particulars during recognition. In contrast, research
on object persistence has a clear story to tell about individuation, which requires
positing object indexes. And this research points to how I can address the Object-
Dependence Challenge.
I think the right response to the Object-Dependence Challenge is as follows:
from the perspective of object vision more generally, the particulars to which prop-
erties are attributed are the contents of object indexes. Object indexes are a type of
internal representation that is manifestly viewpoint independent. All they tell us is
that there is something in the visual scene. So the internal representations that are
indispensable to explanations of object individuation–namely, object indexes—are
about distal particulars. This would seem to further suggest that they must be a
kind of perceptual representation. And since the Object-Dependence Challenge is
really an issue about the content of the internal representations that are posited to
explain object individuation, I think the challenge can be met.
An immediate objection one might have is that there has been something of
a bait and switch. My argument from object constancy is driven by how vision
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scientists explain the viewpoint invariance of object recognition. And as I pointed
out, explanations of the recognition process are silent about how vision represents
the particulars that properties of identity and category are attributed to. Granting
that object indexes are viewpoint independent, to meet the challenge I would need
to show that object indexes are posited in explanations of the recognition process.
But I have not done this. I have simply shown that different lines of research
on object vision posit internal representations of the right sort—of particulars and
properties—but I have given no evidence that in order to explain object recognition
one must posit both object representations and object indexes.
I have two replies to this objection. First, I would reiterate that the Depen-
dence Challenges are supposed to be prima facie difficulties for arguments from
constancy. And by that measure I think I have met the challenge. What I have
shown is that explaining how the visual system individuates objects requires positing
a type of internal representation, object indexes, which point to distal entities. It
seems likely that they must be a kind of perceptual representation, and at minimum
are constructed from a viewpoint independent representational scheme. Meeting the
Object-Dependence challenge required a supplemental type of argument regarding
object individuation, and I have provided one.
Second, I would point out that the relationship between object recognition and
object persistence is simply an under-explored area of research (even the specialized
field of object vision lacks unity). So I cannot rest my argument on evaluating a
kind of explanation that largely does not exist. The sort of connection this objection
demands has in fact been suggested in the literature. For example, Kahneman et al.
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(1992, p.179) propose the following relationship between object indexes and the
process of identification:
Explicit recognition occurs at the level of which object files are currently
set up. To mediate recognition, the sensory description in the object
file is compared to stored representations of known objects. If and when
a match is found, the identification of the object is entered in the file,
together with information predicting other characteristics. . .
Under Kahneman, Treisman, and Gibbs’ proposal, although featural proper-
ties that are bound to indexes might drive recognition, it is the target of the index
to which the property is attributed. Under this story, stored object representations
of identity and category are matched to those properties that are bound up with an
object index—and this might include properties of momentary visual objects in a
scene—but the attribution of identity or category membership is not to the momen-
tary visual object. Rather, we can think of the attribute as a new property bound
up to the object index. In which case, the property is attributed the target of the
index.
This seems to be the sort of explanation the objection demands. Recall that
object indexes are a kind of abstract pointer, which are assigned based on visual
objects that are discriminated in a visual scene. But they are not constructed from
these momentary, view-based representations. Instead they are a kind of blank slate,
which are intrinsically viewpoint independent. When an index is assigned, we might
construct a representation of surface properties, or 3D shape, but minimally an index
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simply tells us that there is something in the scene, and whatever it is, it is not some
higher-order function of the stimulus. For while it is true that various higher-order
properties might be bound to an index to help resolve the correspondence problem
form moment-to-moment, this does not change the fact that these properties are
not themselves the entities that indexes are directed toward.
An enticing story, but it is not one that is commonly found in research on object
vision (however sensible it might be). There are object recognition results showing
that spatio-temporal information plays a role (Cox et al., 2005; Tian and Grill-
Spector, 2015; Vuong and Tarr, 2004; Wallis et al., 2009; Wallis and Bülthoff, 2001),
and explaining these findings probably requires positing object indexes. Similarly,
a different line of evidence comes from experiments on object persistence showing
that object indexes can be bound with viewpoint or feature-invariant representa-
tions in long-term memory (Blaser et al., 2000; Coltheart et al., 2005; Feldman and
Tremoulet, 2006; Schurgin et al., 2013) So it might be that what vision scientists
should say is that object indexes represent the particulars for the recognition pro-
cess. But, as I was careful to point out in Chapter 2, my arguments do not rest
on engaging in the explanatory practices of vision science myself, but in critically
evaluating them. So I will simply acknowledge that the objection points to an un-
derdeveloped area of research in vision science, and reiterate my first reply: I have
met the Object-Dependence Challenge, at least when considered as a prima facie
objection.
If these replies are satisfactory, then I think it is safe to say that the Object-
Dependence Challenge has been met. Now we can get to the heart of the matter,
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and assess whether object recognition is indeed viewpoint invariant.
5.4 Viewpoint Invariance and Stimulus-Dependence
We have seen that if object recognition is viewpoint invariant, then an argu-
ment from constancy would seem to succeed at establishing that object represen-
tations in vision are indeed perceptual representations. Such an argument easily
meets the Dimension-Dependence Challenge, and as we have just seen, also meets
the Object-Dependence Challenge (if we are allowed to look to research on other
aspects of object vision). The question then is whether there is good evidence that
object recognition is indeed viewpoint invariant. As it happens, a great deal of the
research on the psychophysics of visual object recognition has been concerned with
determining the extent of the viewpoint dependence of the representational schemes
that underlie our capacity for object recognition.10 Thus, I need a story for why
these sort of dependency facts do not undermine my argument.
This section has two parts. First, I review some of the evidence that has been
taken to show that the representational schemes that underlie recognition must
be viewpoint dependent. Second, I make the case that, given the role of percep-
tual learning in forming and updating object representations, one must actually
posit viewpoint invariant object representations in order to explain the evidence of
viewpoint dependence. So such evidence does not make the Stimulus-Dependence
Challenge a threat to my argument.
10A good deal of the neuroscience also provides evidence of this dependence, but I will not
discuss it here (DiCarlo et al., 2012).
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5.4.1 How Viewpoint Dependent is Object Recognition?
Object-centered theories of object recognition were initially developed in the
absence of any psychophysical evidence for the viewpoint invariance of shape recog-
nition (e.g., Hoffman and Richards, 1984; Marr and Nishihara, 1978). Since then, a
wealth of evidence has been accrued showing that the representational schemes for
objects in the visual system must be (to some extent) viewpoint dependent. Here I
will review some illustrative findings.
The rationale of psychophysical experiments investigating the viewpoint de-
pendence of object recognition is straightforward: if a representational scheme for
objects is viewpoint independent, then transformations of viewpoint should have
no effect on choice accuracy or reaction time (RT) when subjects perform object
categorization or identification tasks. However, if transformations of viewpoint (ori-
entation, retinal size or position, illumination) result in a change in choice and/or
RTs, such that accuracy is higher and RTs are faster for some viewpoints relative
to others, then this suggests that the representational scheme for objects that is be-
ing utilized for recognition is viewpoint dependent. Thus if performance is variant
with respect to transformation of viewpoint, then we have evidence in favor of the
viewpoint dependence of the representational schemes.
In an important study that heavily influenced subsequent research, Tarr and
Pinker (1989) reasoned that the important test of viewpoint dependence was how
subjects recognized novel objects when viewpoint was restricted during learning.
In their study, subjects learned to recognize letter-like characters from a restricted
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number of viewpoints, and then tested them on viewpoints that involved transfor-
mations of orientation (picture-plane rotation). Tarr and Pinker found that both
error-rate and RTs increased with difference from the training viewpoints. The same
sort of pattern of results was also observed when subjects were trained to recognize
3D objects using a variety of stimuli, when novel viewpoints involve a rotation in the
depth-plane (Bülthoff and Edelman, 1992; Tarr, 1995), or changes in illumination
(Tarr et al., 1998a). Similar results have also been obtained for novel exemplars of
familiar categories, like faces. Wallis et al. (2009) presented subjects with sequences
of face stimuli that morphed between two target faces, while also undergoing trans-
formations of viewpoint: picture-plane rotation, depth-rotation, and illumination
direction. Due to the temporal association between views of the two faces, Wallis
et al. found that subjects failed to notice the change in face identity. Their results
suggest that object representations are constructed from associations between view-
points that are correlated in time, and this fact can be exploited to cause errors in
object identification.
Viewpoint dependence has also been observed with respect to retinotopic
position. In a review of psychophysical research on the position-dependence of
object recognition, Kravitz et al. (2008) observed that across multiple behavioral
paradigms, performance accuracy decreased with transformations of viewpoint for
even small translations of visual angle in the visual field. In one elegant study,
Cox et al. (2005) had subjects saccade toward a target object in the periphery,
while changing the target identity mid saccade11 This manipulation resulted in an
11Saccadic eye-movements are ballistic, meaning that once an eye-movement is initiated, we lack
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interesting position dependence of the subjects’ representations of object identity.
The result of the study was that for object stimuli that were swapped in a position-
dependent manner, subjects were more likely to confuse different objects at different
retinal positions as the same object, and the same object at different positions as dif-
ferent objects. In another striking (and puzzling) example of position-dependence,
Afraz et al. (2010) observed a position-dependence of face gender discrimination,
with distinct and stable patterns of position-dependence between subjects. They
also observed that gender neutral faces took on a different appearance when pre-
sented within the gender biased regions of the visual field.
Recall that the Boring Principle entails that the content of a representation
is that which remains invariant when its tokening is invariant. But the substantial
evidence for variability in recognition performance suggests that whether and how
we token object representations varies considerably with viewpoint. This would also
seem to imply that the content of object representations is not object-specific. For
example, there is some evidence that for both novel and familiar objects observers
have preferred “canonical views”: viewpoints that most readily come to mind when
imagining an object, are the “best” for photographing an object, or for which ob-
servers have lowest choice error and RTs (Blanz et al., 1999). One interpretation of
the viewpoint dependence of recognition is that the content of object representations
is specific to visual features of canonical views (cf. Cutzu and Edelman, 1994).
While there is considerable evidence in favor of viewpoint dependence, some
the ability of changing movement trajectory. During the period of a saccade, no visual input reaches
the cortex. Thus we are effectively blind—a fact that was cleverly exploited by this experiment.
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have argued that there is invariant performance for object recognition under ap-
propriately defined circumstances. Experiments investigating dependence with re-
spect to rotations of 3D objects in the depth-plane were in part motivated to
test predictions of object-centered theories like Biederman’s RBC (Recognition-by-
Components). Under RBC, object representations are built using collections of
volumetric primitives (“geons”) are that are combined into unique geon structural
descriptions (GSD) of objects, and stored in long-term memory. Under Biederman’s
theory, one would only expect to see viewpoint invariance if three conditions are met
(Biederman and Gerhardstein, 1993): (i) the shape of an object must be decom-
posable into GSD; (ii) the object has a unique GSD; and (iii) the same GSD is
constructed for the different viewpoints. For example, a coffee cup provides a good
example of an object for which (i)-(iii) should apply. It is decomposable into two
geons (a cylinder and “macaroni”), has a unique GSD (though not with respect to
other coffee cups), and so long as a viewpoint of the cup does not involve (self)
occlusion of the handle, the same GSD will be extracted from the 2D retinal image.
While there has been some results suggesting that when (i)-(iii) are satisfied
recognition performance is invariant in accuracy and RTs (Biederman and Bar,
1999; Biederman et al., 1999) other results have suggested the opposite conclusion
(Hayward and Tarr, 1997; Hayward and Williams, 2000; Tarr et al., 1997, 1998b).
However, even granting that there is complete performance invariance when (i)-(iii)
are satisfied, such a fact cannot ground the sort of viewpoint invariance necessary
for my argument from object constancy.
First, (i)-(iii) defines a limited set of possible transformations which only apply
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with respect to rotations in the depth-plane. To consider how limited the conditions
are, consider how many objects we recognize on a regular basis involve self occlusion
of parts (as a home experiment, simply look at all the things in the room in which
you are currently sitting, and observe how many of them involve some level of self-
occlusion). Thus, it is at best a kind of dimension-dependent invariance. Second,
this sort of invariance only applies to a very restricted set of objects: they must be
both identifiable in terms of GSDs, and have a unique GSD. Thus any subordinate
categories that might rest on color, texture, or non-GSD shape properties are outside
the scope of this invariance generalization (again, what seems like an intuitively
expansive class of objects).
Perhaps the most important reason for why this sort of invariance is insufficient
is that (iii) entails that the same shape feature of objects must always be visible
across viewpoints. As Biederman (2000) acknowledges, one could thus take his
view to specify the sort of shape features that must be present in canonical views of
objects. By way of example, consider a point made by Tarr and Bülthoff (1995) that
one could construct analogs of Biederman and Gerhardstein’s view as a theory of
color-based object recognition. Imagine an experiment where one must discriminate
object categories that each have a uniquely colored feature. As Tarr and Bulthoff
point out, so long as the features are visible, color provides a perfect diagnostic
feature for recognizing the objects, and one would expect recognition performance
to be invariant (for empirical proof of this obvious result, see Hayward and Williams,
2000). However, just as we might readily wonder whether we are doing anything but
perceiving the colors (as opposed to the objects), we might likewise wonder whether
202
(i)-(iii) really entail invariance, since the diagnostic feature must always be visible.
So I do not think that the sort of limited performance invariance that has been
argued for in the literature provides any evidence against the general viewpoint
dependence of object recognition. Indeed, even proponents of GSDs themselves
acknowledge that recognition, under anyone’s view, must be viewpoint dependent
(Biederman, 2000; Stankiewicz, 2002). Thus it is something of a consensus that
object recognition is stimulus dependent with respects to transformations of orien-
tation (Hayward, 2003), as well as other dimensions of viewpoint.
If theories and models of object recognition posit representational schemes
that must be viewpoint dependent, then this raises the question of why we should
think the contents of object representations that they posit are viewpoint invari-
ant. Indeed, some researchers have gravitated towards talk of the “tolerance” of
object recognition to some transformations in viewpoint (e.g., Rust and Stocker,
2010), instead of invariance. But simply showing that recognition is tolerant to
transformations of viewpoint fails to give us reason for thinking that the posited
internal representations are object-specific. Thus, if my argument from constancy
is to succeed, I need to show why the viewpoint dependence of the representational
schemes for objects does not entail that the content of object representations is
stimulus-dependence.
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5.4.2 Perceptual Learning and Stimulus-Dependence
We have seen that whatever the precise representational scheme that the brain
utilizes in object recognition, all theories consider it to be viewpoint dependent. At
the same time, my argument depends on the content of object representations being
viewpoint invariant. If viewpoint dependence entails stimulus-dependence, then
my argument from object constancy fails: one cannot posit representations that
are invariant with respect to viewpoint, when they are part of an representational
scheme that is viewpoint dependent.
In this section, I argue that theoretically you can have viewpoint invariant
content in a viewpoint dependent representational scheme. It is worth noting that
this is not a novel position. Explaining how the apparent viewpoint invariant rep-
resentations come from view-dependent representational schemes is at the heart of
contemporary research that adopts some form of view-centered approach to ob-
ject recognition (DiCarlo et al., 2012). However it is generally taken for granted
that viewpoint invariance of content and viewpoint dependence of representational
schemes are in fact compatible. Here I provide an argument for this assumption.
Recall that whether an argument from constancy falls prey to the Stimulus-
Dependence Challenge depends on showing that, in line with the Boring Principle,
the transformations across which perception are invariant involve stability in prop-
erties of the sensory input, but variability in the state of the distal world. It was
for this reason that illusions do not provide conclusive evidence against an objective
reading of perceptual constancies. On the one hand, the existence of an illusion
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suggests a lack of invariance (with respect to the distal world) across some transfor-
mations. On the other hand, if illusions are themselves perspectival (as many are),
then it is still possible that an objective reading provides the best explanation of
some constancy phenomenon. In short, when it comes to the Stimulus-Dependence
Challenge, and objective and subjective readings of constancy phenomena, the Bor-
ing Principle cuts both ways.
The same lessons hold with respect to the viewpoint dependence and object
recognition. Part of the reason visual illusions provide a prima facie basis for a
subjective reading is their relative stability. For example, no matter how many times
I look at a Necker Cube it does not result in me resolving the ambiguity so that I
only ever adopt one of the two possible 3D interpretations of the image. In contrast,
a lack of stability in response across multiple presentations would speak against an
subjective reading. In particular, evidence of perceptual learning would require an
objective reading of the constancy in question. Let me lay out my reasoning to this
conclusion.
In his discussion of how to reconcile research on constancy achievement and
constancy mechanisms, Ittelson (1951) emphasized that it is only by consideration
of how perception allows us to effectively interact with the world that it makes sense
to talk about objectivity in perception: “Reference to veridical distal relationships
means nothing unless it means that perception and manipulation have been mutu-
ally consistent” (p.289). What I believe Ittelson recognized is that if perception is
sensitive to feedback signals from the world, then this supports an objective read-
ing. Generally the processes that underlie perceptual illusions are encapsulated from
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such signals: failure to perceive the illusions under slight parametric variation of the
stimulus does not result in a generalization of illusory or non-illusory perception.
In contrast when there is refinement of internal representations based on feedback
signals—when stimulus-dependence is not stable given such feedback—then this sug-
gests that whatever is represented, it not simply a property of the sensory stimulus.
Perceptual learning is the most straightforward example of how feedback can inform
vision, whether learning is supervised or unsupervised. When learning is supervised,
an observer might be trained and tested to discriminate between different stimuli,
and receive explicit feedback on performance. In the case of unsupervised learning,
feedback is engrained in the predictive nature of visual processing. The upshot is
that if apparent stimulus-dependence is modulated by perceptual learning, then this
provides evidence against a subjective reading, since it suggests that whatever the
object of perception is, it goes beyond the sensory signal.12
To illustrate, consider an early study on how perceptual learning can influence
visual perception of the Ames room by Kilpatrick (1954). Kilpatrick distinguished
between two kinds of perceptual learning, which he termed reorganizational and for-
mative learning. In the case of reorganizational learning, there is increased discrim-
ination between familiar viewing conditions, while in the case of formative learning,
there is generalization to novel viewing conditions. Or as put by Kilpatrick (1954,
p.363):
Reorganizational learning shakes up and rearranges the marbles in the
12Incidentally, very similar reasoning is used by Dretske (1986) to argue that his informational
theory of content overcomes the “distality problem”, which I discuss in the next chapter.
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bag; formative learning puts new marbles in the bag, and. . . explains how
most, if not all, of the marbles got in the bag in the first place.
Both kinds of learning tell us that what we are perceiving does not reduce to
something sensory, since the one involves subtracting a viewpoint from among those
that map to a representation, while the other involves adding (or generalizing) to
novel viewing conditions. In Kilpatrick’s study, subjects we allowed to view three
rooms, two of which had been distorted to look identical to the rectangular third
room. Initially, under monocular viewing, participants could not visually discrimi-
nate between the three rooms. During the learning phase of the experiment, sub-
jects were positioned to observe interactions inside the rooms such as balls bouncing
against the walls of the room, or lights being traced across the rooms’ surfaces. Dur-
ing subsequent viewing, subjects were now able to reliably discriminate between the
three rooms. It is clear that both kinds of perceptual learning were exhibited by the
participants in the study. First, in the learning phase subjects made generalizations
to novel (interactive) viewings of the target rooms. Second, this resulted in reorga-
nizational learning, as exhibited by their subsequent ability to visually discriminate
the rooms under monocular viewing.
Under the Boring Principle the object of perception is that which is invariant
when perception is invariant. If some constancy mechanism admits of both reorga-
nizational and formative learning, this tells us that the content must be something
beyond the sensory input. The fact that perceptual learning altered the perception
of Kilpatrick’s distorted rooms suggests that the illusory perception of such rooms
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does not necessarily constitute evidence against an objective reading of constancies
involved with perceiving shape (with respect to the spaces).
Object representations are also heavily influenced by both reorganizational and
formative learning. For one, virtually all of the experiments testing for viewpoint
dependence utilize formative learning paradigms, since they involve training and
then testing on novel viewpoints. In some of these studies, learning effects are clearly
observed, like reduction in RTs with repeated presentations of novel viewpoints
(Edelman and Bülthoff, 1992). For example, Tarr and Gauthier (1998) found that
observers could generalize to novel viewpoints of an object when they had observed
previously observed members of the same category from that viewpoint. And, as
one would expect, when subjects were trained to become “experts” at recognizing
novel objects, both error rates and RTs decreased with experience.
In short, viewpoint dependence is not stable across presentations, in which case
it cannot provide evidence against the viewpoint invariance of object representations
in vision. So I do not think the viewpoint dependence of object recognition perfor-
mance presents a problem for my argument from object constancy. In contrast, the
fact that observers can generalize to novel viewpoints, and make increasingly fine
discrimination between familiar viewpoints, gives another reason for thinking that
the contents of object representations must be viewpoint invariant, even if the rep-
resentational schemes are themselves viewpoint dependent. In which case, research
on viewpoint dependence provides further reason for thinking that one must posit
perceptual representations to explain viewpoint invariance, and actually strengthens
my argument from object constancy.
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Before continuing, it is also worth considering that the extent of viewpoint
dependence in recognition is likely overstated, due to the poor ecological validity
of typical object recognition experiments that include manipulations of viewpoint.
Under natural viewing conditions, we do not perceive objects via singular and brief
snapshots from stable vantage points. Rather, transformations of viewpoint are
continuous as we navigate and interact with the world. Thus one might legitimately
wonder whether some of the evidence for viewpoint dependence tells us more about
the demands of a task subjects are asked to perform, than the structure of the
representational schemes that underlie object recognition (Schyns, 1998).
To illustrate this last point, consider an experiment by Tian and Grill-Spector
(2015) that investigated the influence of unsupervised learning on object recogni-
tion. In the experiments, subjects were tasked with recognizing novel objects across
transformations of orientation. During a learning phase, subjects passively viewed
either sequential or random series of images of the objects. The sequential condi-
tion was akin to seeing snap shots of an object rotating in space, while the random
condition involved the same snap shots randomly ordered. When presented with
24 views of the objects, subjects showed massive improvement in recognition across
transformations of orientation in both the depth and picture planes. This improve-
ment was observed after learning in both the sequential and random conditions.
When reduced to just 7 views during learning, high level of improvement was still
observed for the sequential condition. Tian and Grill-Spector’s stimuli more closely
mimic how we learn to recognize objects, via the presentation of (and continuous
transformation between) series of viewpoints. Were the experiment replicated using
209
some of the stimuli from early studies reporting viewpoint dependence effects of
choice and RT, we would likely observe similar results.
5.5 Taking Stock of the Other Ingredients
In Chapter 2 I specified a number of staple and special ingredients for percep-
tual representation. I have been operating under the assumption that ingredients
required for internal representation are satisfied, in general, by the representational
schemes posited by research within the information-processing framework in vision
science (as I argued in Chapter 3). The elusive ingredients for perceptual repre-
sentation were perceptual objectivity and robustness. Based on the argument from
object constancy that I have defended in this chapter, I think that they are pos-
sessed by the internal representations that are posited to explain how we visually
recognize objects. Given my argument from object constancy, one might now won-
der whether one should have granted that the other ingredients are indeed satisfied.
Hence, in this section, I will look at some of the other ingredients for perceptual
representation, and why they are also satisfied by the object representations posited
to explain recognition. I will also finally return to discussion of the Job Description
Challenge.
5.5.1 Recognition and Varieties of Robustness
I have focused on perceptual robustness, since it was this kind of robustness
that was necessary for perceptual representation. The kind of robustness that I
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have referred to as “resilience”, or robustness with respect to intervening causes,
is also necessary. In Chapter 3 I argued that in general, it is a safe assumption
that representational schemes posited by the information-processing framework are
presumed to be resilient. I believe this is also true when it comes to the internal
representations posited to explain object recognition.
Consider, for example, the study of Afraz et al. (2006), who administered
micro-stimulation to clusters of face selective neurons in the inferior temporal cortex
of macaque monkeys, a region strongly associated with object representation. They
found that administering the stimulation strongly biased the monkeys to make a
face response, in a face/non-face recognition task. The rationale of the experiment
is clearly dependent on the idea that the face-selective cells are in part constitutive of
the neural implementation for object representations in the monkey visual system.
If micro-stimulation was thought to alter the content of the representations, the
experiment would be deeply flawed. Furthermore, the fact that a bias is observed
in the response of the monkey supports the idea that the neurons are partially
constitutive (in some way) of object representations for faces. Of course, over-time,
repeat use of micro-stimulation might cause a learning effect, so that the monkeys no
longer trusted tokenings of their representations of faces as reliable (at least, under
the conditions of the experiment). But this would not be an instance of a change in
the content, but rather an instance of the reorganizational learning discussed earlier.
So I think we have good reason to believe that the representational schemes must
be resilient.
What about robustness with respective to tokenings caused by other mental
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processes? In Chapter 2 I referred to this as “cognitive robustness”, which I sug-
gested was not necessary for perceptual representation. Still, one might wonder
whether object representations must have this other ingredient in order to explain
facts about recognition. There is an ongoing debate as to whether the internal repre-
sentations utilized in recognition are the same as those recruited for mental imagery
and visual simulation, such as tasks which involve mental rotation of imagined ob-
jects. Tarr and Pinker (1989) proposed that recognition and imagery rest on the
same representations, which would suggest that the internal representations they
posited are cognitively robust. Based on fMRI results, Gauthier et al. (2002) sug-
gested that object recognition and mental rotation process are localized to distinct
streams in the visual system, which would seem to suggest Tarr and Pinker were
wrong about there being a shared encoding scheme. While it is true that imagery
and simulation in mental rotation tasks recruit several other areas not involved in
recognition, the inferior temporal cortex is also recruited (Zacks, 2008), which runs
counter to the results of Gauthier et al. So it is at present an open question whether
object representations for recognition are thought to be cognitively robust.13
13This isn’t to deny that recognition and mental rotation exploit share resources—even if the two
processes can be dissociated (Cheung et al., 2009). But what I think is unclear is whether the sorts
of internal representations for object identity and category that are recruited during recognition
are among these resources.
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5.5.2 Recognition and Representational Function
Another necessary ingredient for perceptual representation is having an ap-
propriate representational function. In Chapter 2 I identified such a function as, in
general, that of being a perceptually robust stand-in. Having such a representational
function—which is tied to properties of intentional content—was also necessary for
meeting Ramsey’s Job Description Challenge. Recall that Ramsey (2007, p.27) laid
out the demands of a job description as follows.
There needs to be some unique role or set of causal relations that war-
rants our saying some structure or state serves a representational func-
tion. These roles and relations should enable us to distinguish the rep-
resentational from the non-representational and should provide us with
conditions that delineate the sort of job representations perform, qua
representations, in the physical system.
It seems safe to say that object representations that are posited to explain
recognition serve as perceptually robust stand-ins, and can therefore meet Ramsey’s
challenge. First, the functional significance of object representations, under anyone’s
view, conforms generally with that posited by Marr and Nishihara, which is in terms
of a stand-in function. Second, one can find explicit evidence that internal states
that function as perceptually robust stand-ins are posited to explain recognition, in
so far as they function as stand-ins in the face of transformations of viewpoint. For
example, here is how DiCarlo et al. (2012, p.416) define the information-processing
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task of recognition:
. . . we and others define object recognition as the ability to assign labels
(e.g., nouns) to particular objects, ranging from precise labels (“identifi-
cation”) to course labels (“categorization”). More specifically, we focus
on the ability to complete such tasks over a range of identity preserving
transformations (e.g., changes in object position, size, pose, and back-
ground context). . .
To explain recognition, internal representations are posited that have content
that is viewpoint invariance and object specific. In light of an objective reading of
this invariance, and my argument from object constancy, this entails that the content
of these representations must also be perceptually robust. So they must be viewpoint
invariant stand-ins, which entails they must also be perceptually robust stand-ins
as well. So given my argument from object constancy, and the fact that object
representations must function as perceptually robust stand-ins for object identity
and category, I think there can be little doubt that these posits meet Ramsey’s Job
Description Challenge.
5.6 Conclusion
We have, then, an argument for my second main conclusion. To explain facts
about object recognition, internal representations are posited with content that is
both viewpoint invariant and object specific. And since these “object representa-
tions” have all the ingredients for perceptual representation, a notion of perceptual
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representation is therefore indispensable to the explanations.
So we have seen why a notion of perceptual representation is indispensable to
certain explanatory practices in vision science. Without such a notion, one would
fail to adequately explain the phenomenon of interest. What I will now show is that
typical explanations of object recognition rest on problematic assumptions about
how representational content is fixed, which are endemic to research within the
information-processing framework of vision science. Informational theories of con-
tent, I believe, offer hope of a cure.
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Chapter 6: Representation Transformed?
6.1 Introduction
We have now seen why a notion of perceptual representation is indeed in-
dispensable to theories and models aimed at explaining facts about visual object
recognition; in particular, the viewpoint invariance and object specificity of object
representations. my argument for this conclusion amounts to a defense of the Distal
Object Thesis as a theme in the story of vision:
The Distal Object Thesis : the end-stage internal representations that
underlie object vision track properties of entities in the distal world.
The other main theme of interest, recall, was the Transformational Thesis:
The Transformational Thesis : the function of the visual system is to
reformat (“transform”) information latent in the retinal image into a
representational format that makes it available for use by further per-
ceptual or cognitive systems.
In this final chapter I return to the topic that I began with: how the Transfor-
mational Thesis is in tension with the Distal Object Thesis, and why informational
theories of content provide strategies for relieving this tension.
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In this chapter I do three things. First, I argue that the Transformational
Thesis rests on the presumption that representational content is fixed by a reli-
able, information carrying causal relation between a representation and what it is
about. In other words, these explanations tacitly assume an informational theory of
content. Since explanations of object recognition tend to depend on the Transfor-
mational Thesis, they make the same assumption. Second, I argue that the success
of explanations of object recognition depends on a solution to the disjunction prob-
lem. At its core, the disjunction problem shows why informational theories cannot
account for the robustness of intentional content (Fodor, 1990). Explanations of ob-
ject recognition attempt to characterize the reliable causal mechanisms that produce
representations that are both viewpoint invariance and object specific. As argued in
the last chapter, the content of an object representation has these properties only if
it is perceptually robust. If content is fixed solely by a reliable causal relation, then
it is not perceptually robust, and it cannot have these ingredients for intentional
content. In which case, if explanations of object recognition are to succeed, the in-
formational theory they assume must be supplemented. Third, I very briefly review
how some of the usual (suspect) solutions to the disjunction problem—which appeal
to learning (Dretske, 1981), teleological function (Dretske, 1988; Neander, 2012), or
counterfactuals (Fodor, 1987, 1990)—might be paired with explanations of object
recognition. Although each of these purported solutions faces problems that put
them in tension with the story of vision, the general upshot of my discussion is that
informational theories do provide promising strategies for resolving a tension in the
information-processing narrative of vision science.
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Subsection 2, I describe
the structure of informational theories in more detail, and their shared origins with
the information-processing framework in vision science. I also clarify the connection
between the disjunction problem and robustness. In Subsection 3, I provide evi-
dence that an informational theory is a presupposition of the information-processing
framework in general (via the Transformational Thesis), and of explanations of vi-
sual object recognition in particular. I further argue that for this reason, the success
of explanations of viewpoint invariance and object recognition depends on a solution
to the disjunction problem. Thus, any theory of content that solves the problem is
of relevance to these explanations—which was Conclusion 3 of my project. In Sub-
section 4, I briefly review the usual proposals for solving the disjunction problem.
I evaluate these solutions with respect to how well they cohere with the facts of
object recognition, and the story of vision. In Subsection 5, I provide a summary
conclusion of this chapter, and the project as a whole.
6.2 The Disjunction Problem for Informational Theories of Content
In this section I describe informational theories, and their disjunction problem,
in a bit more detail. I emphasize two things. First, informational theories are in
part motivated by the organization of information-processing systems. Second, the
disjunction problem is at its core a problem about how informational theories are
supposed to account for robustness—as opposed to how they are supposed to account
for error (as is sometimes claimed).
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6.2.1 The Character of Informational Theories
What all informational theories have in common is the idea that the following
provides at least a constitutive condition on how intentional content is fixed, for any
mental representation:
(Inf) There is a reliable, information carrying relationship between the
representation and its content.
The sense of “information” here is that of what has been termed natural infor-
mation (Dretske, 1988), which I introduced in Chapter 3. To rehearse the examples
from earlier, this is the sort of information that tree rings carry about the age of a
tree, smoke carries about fire, the whistle of a kettle carries about water tempera-
ture, mercury in a thermometer carries about ambient temperature, and a compass
needle carries about the direction of the nearest magnetic pole. In each of these
cases, due to the dependence of one event on another event, the former is informa-
tive about the occurrence of the latter. While there are many different proposals
about how we are to understand the notion of natural information, at least when
it comes to intentional content, the usual assumption is that it is a kind of nomic,
causal dependence (Dretske, 1988; Fodor, 1990). This is the characterization I have
been assuming so far, and I will continue to assume it in what follows.1
What is often passed over in discussions of informational theories is the initial
motivation for the view. Why is carrying information a plausible constitutive con-
1Hence, what I am terming informational theories are also often called “causal”, or “causal-
informational” theories of content (Rupert, 2008).
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dition for intentional content? Informational theories were developed, in part, with
the vertical aim of naturalizing intentional content, and hence the mind. However,
at least initially, they were also supposed to: “make sense of. . . the theoretically
central role information plays in the descriptive and explanatory efforts of cognitive
scientists. . . ” (Dretske, 1983, p.55). And it was in part reflection on this role that
provided the initial motivation for informational theories.
The backdrop for informational theories of content is a commitment to RTM.
Often going hand-in-hand with RTM is the empirical hypothesis that the brain is
some kind of representational, or information-processing system (Pylyshyn, 1984). If
the brain is such a system, then neural states carry and process natural information
in a manner that is similar to artificial systems. And when it comes to the sorts
of information-processing devices that humans engineer, their internal states have
their content by carrying natural information about the signals that the devices
process.2
Consider some simple (non-information-processing) artifacts: the whistling
kettle, mercury thermometer, and magnetic compass. The reason the whistle of the
kettle, height of the mercury, and position of the compass needle are (respectively)
informative of water temperature, ambient temperature, and the cardinal directions
is because they were designed to exploit certain nomic dependencies. One thought
that motivated the development of informational theories is that the brain is also
built so that there are nomic dependencies between its internal states and states of
2Here the terminological assumptions about “information-processing” in Chapter 3 still apply:
by “information-processing” I have in mind the processing of natural information.
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the distal world. Assuming that we can discharge the need of a designing agent,
then we have a naturalistic basis for content. All we need to do is simply identify
the content of a internal state with the information it carries. (Dretske, 1988, p.54)
makes the same point using the example of a weight scale:
Although a great deal of intelligent thought and purpose went into the
design and manufacture of an ordinary bathroom scale, once the scale
has been finished and placed into use there is nothing conventional, pur-
poseful, or intelligent about its operation. This device indicates what it
does without any cooperation or help from either its maker or its user.
All you do is get on it. It then gives you the bad news.
Let me give two examples of this sort of reasoning—from natural information-
processing in devices, to the fixing of representational content—in action.
1. Dretske (1981) was the first to explicitly propose an informational theory of
intentional content (there are antecedents in Stampe, 1977), and took as his inspi-
ration Shannon’s theory of communication (Shannon, 1948). Crucially, information
in Shannon’s sense is not an semantic notion. As a probabilistic measure of un-
certainty it does not require there to be a message in the sense that something is
in fact being communicated between a “sender” and “receiver”. However, Dretske
believed that Shannon’s work brought into focus what does determine the content
of a signal:
. . . though [information] theory has its attention elsewhere, it does. . . highlight
the relevant objective relations on which the communication of genuine
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information depends. For what this theory tells us is that the amount
of information at [a receiver] about [a source] is a function of the degree
of lawful (nomic) dependence between conditions at these two points. If
two conditions are statistically independent (the way the ringing of your
telephone is independent of the ringing of mine), then the one event
carries no information about the other. When there is a lawful regular-
ity between two events, statistical or otherwise, as there is between your
dialing my number and my phone’s ringing, then we speak of one event’s
[sic] carrying information about the other. And, of course, this is the
way we do speak. (Dretske, 1983, p.56 emphasis in original)
Even though Shannon was not interested in questions relating to the quality
of information, Dretske believed his theory highlighted the fundamental sort of de-
pendence that establishes what a signal is about. Fundamental to Shannon’s theory
are conditional probabilities between different events, which Dretske interpreted as
measures of the degree of dependency between the events. In which case, we need
only identify the content of a signal with the events it is dependent on:
. . . the quantities of interest to [information] theory are statistical func-
tions of these probabilities. It is this presupposed idea that I exploit to
develop an account of a signal’s content. These conditional probabili-
ties determine how much, and indirectly what, information a particular
signal carries about a remote source. One needs only to stipulate that
the content of the signal, the information it carries, be expressed by a
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sentence describing the condition (at the source) on which the signal
depends in some regular, lawful way. (Dretske, 1983, p.57 emphasis in
original)
Dropping the requirement that the content being described in sentential terms,
much the same idea is found in other probabilistic approaches to natural information
(Scarantino, 2015; Skyrms, 2010), which take Dretske, and Shannon’s communica-
tion theory, as their starting points. Under these other proposals it is still the case
that some information-theoretic measure of the quantity of natural information can
be used to identify the content of an informational signal based on the strength of
the dependency relation between a receiver and a signal. Although it has been com-
mon to dispense with a probabilistic account of natural information, what should be
clear is that informational theories of content were derived from thinking about how
the content of internal states of an information-processing system is determined.
2. Similar reasoning to Dretske’s is also found in Enç (1982), who was inter-
ested in RTM, and providing a functional analysis of psychological states. Here is
what he says about the content of internal states of some information-processing
system:
Suppose now we shift our terminology and speak of the content of a func-
tional state of a system as being constituted by the specific construction
of the properties of the event which the system has the functioning of
responding to and as result of which the system, under the conditions
of normal function, enters that state. In other words, the content of a
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functional state will be determined by certain properties of the event
that causes the system to enter that state. . . The appropriate specific
construction of these properties will be determined by the nature of the
mechanisms by means of which the system, when it is well function-
ing, processes the information about these properties that is contained
in its internal representation; in other words, it will be determined by
the correct aetiological account of how the system normally enters the
functional state. (Enç, 1982, p.175-176 emphasis in original)
Enc makes explicit reference to “normal functioning”—a topic we will return
to—which raises other issues as we shall see below, but what should be clear is
that Enc, like Dretske, is making an inference from how content is determined in
information-processing systems. Like Dretske, Enc proposes we now apply the same
picture to human psychology, for which we give a functional treatment:
. . . analogous to the way the contents of the functional states of physical
systems are determined, the contents of psychological states will be de-
termined by the specific construction of the relevant properties that are
involved in the aetiology of these states. (Enç, 1982, p.180)
Here Enc draws the same conclusion as Dretske: content is fixed in a manner
analogous to other information-processing systems. So we have now seen that the
motivation for an informational theory comes from reflecting on how content is fixed
in other information-processing systems. We now turn to the primary challenge for
informational theories.
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6.2.2 The Disjunctive Difficulty of Robustness
The disjunction problem was initially proposed by Fodor (1984), who saw it
as a fundamental challenge to all informational theories of content—though Dretske
(1981) seemingly anticipated the difficulty. There are of course many objections
that have been brought against informational theories. Some of these are idiosyn-
cratic to particular theories, while others apply to informational theories in general.3
Some of these might also present difficulties for explanations within the information-
processing framework that presume an informational theory. For example, one issue
we shall touch on later is how informational theories are to allow for the representa-
tion of distal causes—a problem arguably as relevant as the disjunction problem (cf.
Godfrey-Smith, 1989). Still the disjunction problem is widely regarded as perhaps
the most fundamental challenge to informational theories. Hence I will set aside
other potentially relevant objections to informational theories.
Let us remind ourselves of the structure of the problem. As we have seen,
some tokenings of a representation are wild in the sense that they are caused by
something other than what the state represents. So the causal dependence between
a representation and its content is imperfect (Fodor, 1984, p.240). But if the content
of a representation is determined simply by whatever reliably causes the state to be
tokened, then the representation will be about the disjunction of its reliable causes.
The problem is traditionally illustrated using instances of misrepresentation. Recall
3There are several reviews that cover informational theories, and their difficulties (Adams and
Aizawa, 2010; Cohen, 2004; Loewer, 1987; Rupert, 2008).
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Raccoon from Chapter 2. When walking down a back alley on a dark night I
might mistake a raccoon (or as is more likely in Maryland, a possum) for a cat.
In this situation, I misrepresent the world, as my concept cat has been caused
by something other than a cat. Misrepresenting is an instance of a wild tokening
of a representation. Even though raccoons or possums might be reliably mistaken
for cats under degraded viewing conditions, it is implausible that this dependency
entails that my concept cat also represents these animals.
Misrepresentation is a fact about how we represent the world. A “crude” infor-
mational theory cannot capture this fact. If reliable causation is taken as sufficient
for determining content, cat-ish looking raccoons and possums are indeed part of the
disjunctive content of my concept cat. Put differently, a crude informational theory
gets the content ascription in the case of misrepresentation wrong. This descrip-
tive inadequacy brings out an important difference between the sort of systems and
devices that inspired Dretske to develop an informational theory. Thermometers
and compasses register information about temperature and polar direction, and are
quite reliable in carrying out these functions—assuming appropriate environmental
conditions. Change the altitude of the thermometer, and it will not accurately gauge
ambient temperature. Sail close to the equator, and a magnetic compass will vac-
illate between the directions of the magnetic poles. In these situations, the devices
make no “errors”, and indeed they seem incapable of doing so—though we might
make plenty of mistakes, if we are careless enough to use them (Dretske, 1986). So
while all informational theory holds that intentional content is fixed in a way that
relies on the same naturalistic ingredients as these devices, further ingredients are
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clearly required.
While the disjunction problem strikes at the heart of informational theories,
there is persistent confusion in the literature with respect to what the problem is
really about. Part of this stems from the fact that the problem is typically illustrated
using examples of misrepresentation, which has resulted in it being characterized as
a facet of the “problem of error” for theories of content—the purported requirement
that theories of intentional content must account for, or explain, how representations
can be mistaken. Thus under what we may call the erroneous interpretation of the
disjunction problem, it is simply an aspect (or alternative characterization) of the
problem of error.
The erroneous interpretation errs in two ways. The first harkens back to
some of the discussion from Chapter 2, where I tried to distinguish questions of
intentional content from those of representational function. Many philosophers claim
that all theories of content must explain how misrepresentation is possible, but
explaining how representational errors can occur is arguably a task for an account of
representational function, not of intentional content (Cummins, 1996; Fodor, 1990).4
The second is to presume that the disjunction problem thus simply illustrates the
problem of error for informational theories. However, this is to have matters in
reverse. Rather instances of error such as misrepresentation instead are illustrative
of what the disjunction problem is really about: robustness. The point is made
4For some instances of this “error about error” see: Cohen (2004, p.216), Dretske (1988, p.65),
Godfrey-Smith (1989, p.537), Neander (012b), Ramsey (2007, p.129), and Rupert (2008, p.356).
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clearly by Fodor (1990, p.90 emphasis in original):5
Errors raise the disjunction problem, but the disjunction problem isn’t
really, deep down, a problem about error. What the disjunction problem
is really about deep down is the difference between meaning and infor-
mation. . . Information is tied to etiology in a way that meaning isn’t. If
the tokens of a symbol have two kinds of etiologies, it follows that there
are two kinds of information that tokens of that symbol carry. . . By con-
trast, the meaning of a symbol is one of the things that all of its tokenings
have in common, however they may happen to be caused . . . So, informa-
tion follows etiology and meaning doesn’t, and that’s why you get a
disjunction problem if you identify the meaning of a symbol with the
information that its tokens carry. Error is merely illustrative; it comes
into the disjunction problem only because it’s so plausible that the false
tokens of a symbol have a different kind of causal history (and hence
carry different information) than the true ones.
So the disjunction problem is not about error. Rather, it is about:
what one might call the robustness of meaning. . . Solving the disjunction
problem and making clear how a symbol’s meaning could be so insen-
sitive to variability in the causes of its tokenings are really two ways of
5An interpretive note: Fodor uses ‘meaning’ and ‘content’ more or less interchangeably. As I
outlined in Chapter 2, when talking of intentional content I have in mind the distal referent of a
mental representation.
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describing the same undertaking. If there’s going to be a causal theory
of content, there has to be some way of picking out semantically rele-
vant causal relations from all the other kinds of causal relations that
the tokens of a symbol can enter into. (Fodor, 1990, p.91 emphasis in
original)
All informational theories hold that a reliable, information carrying causal
dependency obtains between a representation and its content. This is constitutive
of the representing relation. However not all such dependencies are content deter-
mining. In this respect, intentional content is robust. As discussed in Chapter 2,
misrepresentation constitutes an instance of perceptual robustness, but there are
other kinds of robustness as well, including cognitive robustness (e.g., when think-
ing causes a token of cat when none are present) and resilience (e.g., when knock
on the head causes me to token cat). In these cases, there is no misrepresentation,
but the disjunction problem can be raised just the same (Fodor, 990b; Rey, 1998).
Let us call this the robust interpretation of the disjunction problem.
I believe the robust interpretation provides the correct characterization of the
disjunction problem. A solution to the disjunction problem should allow for the
possibility of error, as exhibited by instances of misrepresentation, but what it must
explain is the relevant forms of robustness. This is significant since we have already
seen that perceptual robustness is closely related to the explananda of research on
visual object recognition. Thus, for present purposes we may focus on the disjunc-
tion problem specifically as it relates to perceptual robustness. The question then is
229
how (Inf) from earlier can describe a content determining relation, but the following
does not:
(Mis) There is a reliable, information carrying relation between the rep-
resentation and “wild” events.
Where (Mis) holds for any mental representation, and some set of “wild”’
events on which the state nomically depends, but which are not part of what it
represents.
We have now seen why the disjunction problem presents a fundamental chal-
lenge to informational theories. We have also gotten clearer on what the problem is
really about. What I now wish to show is that the problem also presents a funda-
mental challenge to research within the information-processing framework in vision
science that relies on the Transformational Thesis, including research on object
recognition.
6.3 The Disjunction Problem and Vision Science
There is the perception among some philosophers that the disjunction problem
is a quaint reminder of the trouble you can get into when one becomes too invested
in trying to naturalize the mind. The problem does not reflect, and has no bearing
on, research within cognitive science. For example, here is Burge’s discussion—or
rather, dismissal—of the problem:
A problem that has exercised those who try to find reductive expla-
nations of the notion of representation is called the Disjunction Prob-
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lem. . . The challenge is to explain conditions on representation that show
why representations represent one range of entities rather than other en-
tities that co-vary with, and in many cases play a role in causing, the
representation. . . [Dretske and Fodor] pose the problem with no reference
to specific empirical work in psychology. Their versions of the problem
are correspondingly artificial. The Disjunction Problem is largely an ar-
tifact of reductive programs, detached from explanations in perceptual
psychology. . . (Burge, 2010, p.322)
I believe Burge, and others who share his sentiment, are mistaken, at least
with respect to vision science. The disjunction problem is not an “artifact” of the
project of naturalization, and has real consequences for the explanations of visual
object recognition.
In this section I first provide evidence that an informational theory of content
is a general presumption of the information-processing framework in vision science,
via the Transformational Thesis. This tacit assumption of an informational theory
puts explanations that rely on the Transformational Thesis at risk of the disjunction
problem. I go on to show why the problem therefore poses a threat to explanations
of object recognition.
6.3.1 Informational Theories and the Transformational Thesis
It is easy to find cases where an informational theory is explicitly identified as
a core assumption of the information-processing framework in vision science. For
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example, in his influential textbook, Palmer (1999, p.78) justifies the assumption as
follows:
The causal factor. . . is important for two reasons. One is that for the
representation to be current, as a perceptual representation must be, it
requires constant updating. A causal chain from events in the external
world to events in the internal representation is an ideal way (though not
the only way) to achieve this. The other is that for the representation
to be authentic, rather than accidental, there must be some linkage to
the world it represents. Again, a causal connection seems to be the ideal
solution.
The second reason provided by Palmer is clearly connected to how the content
of perceptual representations is fixed: to represent the world a state must be con-
nected to the world, and causation provides this connection. Pylyshyn (2007) also
identifies an informational theory as an assumption of vision science, while pointing
out that it provides a starting point, rather than a complete picture, of how content
is fixed:
The implicit understanding is that what representations represent is in
some way traceable to what caused them, or at least what might have
caused them in a typical setting. . . This is certainly a reasonable starting
assumption, but it is incomplete in crucial ways; there are generally very
many ways that any particular representation could have been caused,
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yet the representation may nonetheless unambiguously represent just one
scene. (Pylyshyn, 2007, p.5)
As Pylyshyn is careful to point out, carrying information does not provide a
sufficient condition because there is a: “gap between the incoming causally linked
information and representational content” (Pylyshyn, 2007, p.3 emphasis in origi-
nal), when it comes to the internal states of the visual system. To the extent that
these passages can be taken as representative of the prevailing viewpoint within the
information-processing framework, they show that an informational theory is often
a (tacit) assumption of the framework.6 But what I need to now show is why the
Transformational Thesis presupposes something close to a crude informational the-
ory, according to which carrying information is taken to be sufficient for determining
content.
The Transformational Thesis amounts to the claims that all the needed natural
information about a stimulus is latent in the retinal image, and the function of the
visual system is to reformat, or “transform” this information into a format that
6Though I do not think that it is the only theory of content that is assumed. For example,
Palmer (1999) also appeals to similarity relations between an internal representation and what it is
about, in line with the notion of s-representation from Chapter 2. Also Shagrir (2010) has argued
that a notion of s-representation is tacit in Marr (1982). And it is not implausible that the notion
of encoding and decoding information suggests some sort of “two-factor” approach, according to
which content is determined by both information, and conceptual role. But my goal here is not
to provide a complete account of the assumptions that vision scientists make about how content
is fixed, but rather just those related to the Transformational Thesis. Those who deny the thesis
may not even be committed to an informational theory at all.
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makes the information available for use by further perceptual or cognitive systems.
I will now provide an illustration of the importance of the Transformational Thesis
to explanations within the information-processing framework, and why it appears
to depend on a commitment to a crude informational theory.
The Transformational Thesis has been quite central to recent methodologi-
cal developments in the cognitive neuroscience of vision. Increasingly researchers
are using multi-variate pattern analysis, or “decoding”, methods to determine what
sort of information about experimental conditions are latent in measured patterns of
brain activity. In this research, machine learning classifiers are trained to discrimi-
nate patterns of neural activity (from cellular recordings, or non-invasive techniques
such as fMRI or EEG/MEG) from different experimental conditions. If the clas-
sifier is able to perform above chance when assigning labels to activity patterns,
then this minimally shows that (natural) information about the conditions is latent
in the patterns.7 However, decoding results are typically pitched as revealing the
content of the representations implemented in the brain region that produces the
measured patterns of activity. For example, in a discussion of decoding methods in
fMRI research, Mur et al. (2009, p.1 emphasis in original) draw a contrast between
traditional “activation-based” methods—which look for signal amplitude changes in
the hemodynamic response—and “information-based” approaches:
Activation-based analysis aims to detect regional-average activation dif-
7This description is quite cursory. For an introduction to decoding methods for fMRI see
Norman et al. (2006). A more technical introduction to the machine learning techniques they
depend on is provided by Pereira et al. (2009).
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ferences and infer involvement of the region in a specific mental func-
tion. Pattern-information analysis, by contrast, aims to detect activity-
pattern differences and infer representational content.
Norman et al. (2006, p.425) offer a very similar theoretical rationale for de-
coding methods:
The MVPA approach assumes that cognitive states consist of multi-
ple aspects (‘dimensions’), and that different values along a particular
dimension are represented by different patterns of neural firing. This
implies that we can measure how strongly cognitive dimension x is rep-
resented in brain region y, by measuring how much the pattern of neural
activity in region y changes, as a function of changes along dimension
x. Here we are using ‘region y represents dimension x’ to mean ‘region
y carries information about dimension x’. . .
To further drive the point home, here is how Kriegeskorte and Kievit (2013,
p.402) define “explicit representation” within the context of decoding research:
[as a] neuronal representation of a stimulus property that allows imme-
diate readout of the property by downstream neurons. If the property
can be read out by means of a linear combination of the activities of the
neurons. . . the property is explicitly represented.
So the inference relied on by decoding research appears to be as follows, when
it comes to evidence of above chance decoding from some set of neural activation
patterns:
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(D1) Natural information about experimental conditions is latent in
some pattern of neural activity.
(D2) Therefore, we have good evidence that the patterns implement a
internal representation of the experimental conditions.
A good deal of the most important work using decoding methods has been on
visual object recognition (e.g., Haxby et al., 2001; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008), so it is
safe to assume that this sort of inference is used to draw conclusions about object
representations (a point to which I will return). Clearly the one would only infer
(D2) from (D1) if one thinks that carrying information is sufficient for determining
content. So given our discussion of informational theories, it is a bad inference.8
But (D2) follows quite naturally if one endorses the Transformational Thesis. As
pointed out by Cox (2014, p.189), decoding research:
implicitly recognizes that the problem of vision is not one of information
content, but of format. We know that the activity of retinal ganglion cells
contains all of the information that the visual system can act upon, and
that nonlinearity and noise in neuronal processing can only decrease (and
never increase) the absolute amount of information present. However,
the information present in the firing of retinal ganglion cells is not in a
format that can be easily read-out by a downstream neuron in order to
guide action.
8For further discussion of the problematic role this inference plays in decoding research, see
Ritchie et al. (shed).
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So it is part of the Transformational Thesis that carrying natural informa-
tion suffices for determining content (when it is appropriately formatted). It is
worth emphasizing that the thesis, and specifically, the idea that all the information
needed for vision is “in” the retinal image, has been a reoccurring theme within the
information-processing framework since its early beginnings. The root of the Trans-
formational Thesis is often associated with Gibson (1950, 1979), who held that all
the information the observer can act upon is available in the retinal image. While
Gibson sought to move from this claim to reject representation and process in vi-
sion, it has been a common move, as exemplified by the passage from Cox, to grant
that the information is present, but not appropriately formatted (hence the need
for further internal representation and information-processing).
That research in the information-processing framework shares this common
point of departure with Gibson has been frequently observed. For example, the
neo-Gibsonians Withagen and Chemero (2009, p.382 n.2) claim that Marr: “argued
that Gibson was right about the variables that animals rely on [in visual percep-
tion], but argued that the detection of specifying variables still requires computa-
tional/inferential processes.” In fact, this common point of departure with Gibson
goes back to the birth of the information-processing framework, which occurred with
the first application of Shannon’s communication theory to visual perception. At-
tneave (1954) hypothesized that the function of vision was to reduce informational
redundancy.9 Whatever the merits of this idea (see Barlow, 2001, for a critical ret-
9Roughly, the idea was that different portions of the visual input are highly predictive of each
other. Thus, it should be possible to form a more compressed formatting of the visual input
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rospective), it rested on the claim that the challenge for vision is one of formatting
(i.e., reducing redundancy). For example, in a review of early approaches to per-
ceptual psychology Bevan (1958, p.42) says the following of Attneave’s then novel
approach:
This view, like Gibson’s, assumes an isomorphism between the spatial
properties of the external object and the organism’s perception. . . The
theory thus implies an intact, completely developed scanner, the char-
acter of the perception reflecting essentially the character of the input.
In other words, Bevan is suggesting that, under Attneave’s view, the neces-
sary information for perception is there in the retinal image. Interestingly, even
Dretske (1983, p.62 n.1) acknowledges that his claim that the retinal input carries
information about a stimulus is close to the views of Gibson (1950). In fact, it is
not hard to see the same sort of considerations that motivated Dretske (1981) in
developing an informational theory at play when it comes to the Transformational
Thesis. Namely, it only makes sense to say that the function of the visual system
is to (merely) re-format the information made available in the retinal image if we
identify the content of a representation with the natural information that it carries.
Hence, again we see how an informational theory has fallen out of thinking of some
aspect of the mind in information-processing terms.
The foregoing suggests that, in general, the information-processing framework
requires some solution to the disjunction problem. But so far we have not seen
without loss of (Shannon) information.
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what sort of explanatory damage the problem can cause, absent a solution. Spelling
out potential for such damage, with respect to explanations of object recognition,
is what I turn to next.
6.3.2 The Problem and Explanations of Object Recognition
My argument from object constancy in the last chapter roughly ran as follows:
given the factual claim that the content of object representations is viewpoint in-
variant, then it follows that it is perceptually objective. Given the further factual
claims that inputs to the retina are underdetermining and variable, then it also
follows that the content is perceptually robust. Thus object representations posited
to explain recognition must possess the two key special ingredients for intentional
content of perceptual representations. It also follows, given the structure of my
argument from object constancy, that there is viewpoint invariance only if there is
perceptual robustness.
However if the content of some internal representation is determined by a
reliable, information carrying causal relation—and not much else—then the content
cannot be perceptually robust, and so the representation cannot be a perceptual
representation. This is the consequence of the disjunction problem. We have now
seen that the information-processing framework seems to presuppose something like
a crude informational theory, as evinced by the importance of the Transformational
Thesis within the research program. What consequences does this now all have for
explanations of object recognition, and the Distal Object Thesis?
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So far I have argued that the primary explananda for research on object recog-
nition are facts about the content of object representations: their viewpoint invari-
ance and object specificity. The sorts of explanations that are on offer pay homage
to the Transformational Thesis: they are attempts to explain the reliable, mech-
anistic process by which object representations are constructed, which have these
properties. But such a mechanism that establishes a reliable, information carrying
relation is not sufficient for content that is perceptually robust. Since object repre-
sentations are viewpoint invariant and object specific only if they are perceptually
robust, then such a mechanism cannot produce representations that have contents
with these properties. So the upshot is that by (tacitly) assuming an informational
theory that falls prey to the disjunction problem, the very structure of explanations
of object recognition entails that these explanations cannot succeed.
To make this all a bit more concrete, recall the general structure of expla-
nations of object recognition from the last chapter: an internal representation (a
structural description of an object’s 3D shape, or a view-centered representation) is
matched to a set of stored representations, and some object representation (of an
individual or category) is activated. This explanatory picture rests on the Trans-
formational Thesis: it amounts to matching one representation that makes explicit
some information available in the retinal image with a stored representation, which
by being activated, now makes explicit object-related information (e.g., category
membership). So the very process of recognition appears to be one of reformatting.
Compare here an early criticism of Tarr and Bülthoff (1998, p.3) of object-
centered theories and models of recognition:
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Reconstruction [of 3D shape from the 2D retinal image] assumes that vi-
sual perception is a hierarchical process which begins with local features
that are combined into progressively more complex descriptions. . . Note
that the types of features used and how they are combined is completely
deterministic. That is, particular types of features and the relations be-
tween them are pre-defined and used for reconstruction across all images.
Moreover, the presence or absence of a given feature is absolute—there
is no ‘middle ground’ in which there is partial or probabilistic evidence
for a feature.
However the problem is not that the approach makes recognition a determin-
istic process. Rather, it is that this picture is one of reformatting and hence making
explicit, natural information latent in the retinal image. This is a problem, even
if recognition allows for “partial or probabilistic” matches. In this respect, view-
centered approaches fair no better. For example, DiCarlo and Cox (2007, p.334)
state that:
. . . one can view [object recognition] as the problem of finding operations
that progressively transform [the] retinal representation into a new form
of representation. . . ...
They go on to describe a view-centered approach to object recognition that
characterizes object representations as manifolds in a high dimensional activation
space. The idea is that manifolds for objects in the activation space of early visual
areas are “entangled”, and that the process of recognition involves constructing man-
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ifolds for objects that are linearly separable in activation space. When we construct
a view-based representation of an object, it corresponds to a point in activation
space, and based on position, is mapped to some object manifold. Whatever the
merits of this as an approach to explaining the viewpoint invariance of object recog-
nition (for a technical critique, see Goris and de Beeck, 2009), it overtly relies on
the Transformational Thesis. Here is how DiCarlo and Cox (2007, p.335) describe
the background of their view, with respect to a hypothetical identification task that
requires discriminating between faces of two individuals:
. . . although the retinal representation cannot directly support recogni-
tion, it implicitly contains the information to distinguish which of the
two individuals was seen. We argue that this describes the computa-
tional crux of ‘everyday’ recognition: the problem is typically not a lack
of information or noisy information, but that the information is badly
formatted in the retinal representation—it is tangled. . .
So regardless of one’s preferred approach (i.e., object-centered or view-centered),
the process of recognition is characterized as a transformation and reformatting of
natural information available in the retinal image. I believe that this shows that
the disjunction problem cuts quite deep, as it reveals that the very structure of ex-
planations of object recognition (regardless of the details) render them inadequate.
And to some extent, this is as it should be. Recall that what was supposed to
make recognition hard as a computational problem is that object representations
manage to be viewpoint invariant and object specific given that the visual inputs
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are both underdetermining and variable with respect to their causes (Riesenhuber
and Poggio, 2000; Rust and Stocker, 2010). One way of thinking about the upshot
of the underdetermination problem is precisely that the information available from
the retina is, at any given moment, ambiguous. It cannot be that vision is merely
the process of reformatting natural information, unless one is willing to jettison the
very idea of underdetermination. In fact, to some extent, this is precisely what the
Transformational Thesis rests on—a rejection of the underdetermination problem
(which Gibson, notoriously did reject; Epstein, 1977).
6.3.3 Argument Summary
If explanations of object recognition are to do better, they must reject (or
revise) the Transformational Thesis, which means acknowledging that a crude in-
formational theory will not do. Some strategies for solving the disjunction problem
are required. But before briefly reviewing some of the most familiar proposals, let
me take a moment to recap. The core of my argument in this chapter can be spelled
out as follows:
(R1) Typical explanations of the viewpoint invariance and object speci-
ficity of object representations are adequate iff they entail that the con-
tent of object representations is viewpoint invariant and object specific.
(R2) The content of object representations is viewpoint invariant and
object specific only if the content is perceptually robust.
(R3) If the content of a representation is determined solely by a reliable,
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information carrying causal relation, then the content is not perceptually
robust.
(R4) Typical explanations of the invariance and specificity of object rep-
resentations entail that the content of object representations is deter-
mined solely by a reliable, information carrying causal relation.
(R5) Typical explanations of the invariance and specificity of object rep-
resentations entail that the content of object representations is not per-
ceptually robust. [From (R3)-(R4)]
(R6) Hence, typical explanations of the invariance and specificity of ob-
ject representations are not explanatorily adequate. [From (R1), (R2)
and (R5)]
Given (R6), it is easy to now see why any augmented informational theory
that solves—or provides a strategy for solving—the disjunction problem is quite
relevant to explanations of object recognition. This was Conclusion 3 of my project.
Far from reflecting obscure philosophical ruminations, the disjunction problem is a
fundamental challenge to the adequacy of explanations of object recognition. More
generally, it is a challenge to any explanation within the information-processing
framework that assumes the Distal Object Thesis, and must posit perceptual rep-
resentations, but offers theories and models of visual processing in line with the
Transformational Thesis. Now let us look at how proposed solutions to the problem
square with research on object recognition, and the story of vision more generally.
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6.4 Can the Usual (Suspect) Solutions Aid Explanations of Object
Recognition?
In this section I briefly assess some of the solutions usually proposed for the
disjunction problem. All these solutions have a similar structure. Since the challenge
is to determine why only some information carrying causal relations are determining
of content, each solution presents an attempt to specify two sorts of contexts in
which a representation is reliably tokened: the content determining ones, and the
wild ones. This division can be between actual, or counterfactual states of affairs.
Also, it is common to take the content-determining contexts to be ones that are in
some sense normal or optimal.
Typically, theories of content are evaluated based on both metaphysical and
explanatory constraints. I am not much concerned with the metaphysical constraints
that are usually emphasized, namely, that the representing relation appeal solely to
non-mental, natural ingredients (Fodor, 1984). Unless the view is viciously circular,
I believe a theory of content can still be of use if it satisfies the desired explanatory
constraints (cf. Rey, 2002). Along these lines I will primarily evaluate the usual
proposals with respect to whether they are consistent with relevant facts about
object recognition and the story of vision.
The three solutions I discuss appeal to either (i) learning, (ii) teleological
function, or (iii) counterfactual conditionals. My discussion is far from exhaustive,
as there are other possible avenues for addressing the disjunction problem that I will
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not consider.10 And for the proposals I do discuss, there is more that can be said
both in favor and against each of them. However, my aim is not to show decisively
which is superior, but rather to get a sense of how they might be paired with
explanations of object recognition. Thus for each I briefly summarize the approach,
how it purports to solve the disjunction, and one objection to the approach which
suggests that it is in tension with some background facts regarding the story of
vision.
6.4.1 Learning and the Underdetermination Problem
Dretske (1981) was aware of the fact that not all reliable, information carrying
relations could be content-determining. To address this problem, he appealed to
learning conditions, the idea being that misrepresentation only occurs after the
period in which a representation is acquired by an information-processing system.
Here is how Dretske describes the idea, where the content in question is that some
signal, s, instantiates the property F :11
In the learning situation special care is taken to see that incoming signals
have an intensity, a strength, sufficient unto delivering the required piece
of information to the learning subject. . . Such precautions are taken in
the learning situation. . . in order to ensure that an internal structure is
developed with. . . the information that s is F . . . But once we have mean-
10For example two-factor approaches that include both an informational as well as conceptual
role component to their theories.
11As quoted by Fodor (1987, p.102-103).
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ing, once the subject has articulated a structure that is selectively sensi-
tive to information about the F -ness of things, instances of this structure,
tokens of this type, can be triggered by signals that lack the appropri-
ate piece of information. . . We [thus] have a case of misrepresentation—a
token of a structure with a false content. We have, in a word, meaning
without truth. (Dretske, 1981, p.194-195 emphasis in original)
This solution in effect appeals to optimal input conditions during the learning
period. Since the content of a representation is acquired during the learning period,
and the only reliable case of a representation during this period is what it is about
(i.e., that s is F ), wild tokenings of the representation outside the learning period
are not content-determining. So the content of the representation is not disjunctive
with respect to the causes of wild tokenings.
We have already seen in the last chapter why learning is important to achiev-
ing viewpoint invariance, so it is not implausible that it might play some role in
characterizing how content is determined by a reliable causal relation. However,
the immediate objection to Dretske’s learning-based solution is that the distinction
between the learning period, and the later period in which wild tokenings of a rep-
resentation occur, is not principled (Fodor, 1984; Loewer, 1987). This objection is
all the more damning with respect to our interests since part of the upshot of the
underdetermination problem, as characterized in Chapter 4, is that there is never
a circumstance in which only the content is a possible cause of tokenings of the
representation. So the proposal is inconsistent with this part of the story of vision.
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There are perhaps ways of addressing this concern. For example, if the learning
period is supervised, then if a token of the representation had been caused by
something other than what it represents, the “Teacher” would correct the learner.
Fodor (1984, p.242) discusses this move, and suggests it does not work because it
makes the content of representation dependent on the intentions of the Teacher.
Ostensibly when it comes to perceptual representations, the “Teacher” is the world,
so what is important is that there is simply feedback from the environment (cf.
Godfrey-Smith, 1989). Whatever the merits of this suggestion, it is clear that if
a learning-based solution is to help discharge the disjunction problem, we would
need a more sophisticated story about how to demarcate the learning period (and
process) than Dretske (1981) provides (Loewer, 1987, p.300-301).12
6.4.2 Teleological Function and the Distal World
Perhaps the most popular approach to theories of content are those that make
some sort of appeal to teleological function. There is a great deal of variation among
such theories (Neander, 012b), which include the teleological and consumer-based
approach to generic representation that I discussed in Chapter 2 (Millikan, 1984,
1989; Papineau, 1987). Here I will focus on informational theories that appeal to
teleological function to address the disjunction problem.
The general structure of the proposal is that some internal state represents
12At the limit, Dretske’s account might work for one-shot, or near one-shot, learning (Biederman
and Bar, 1999), since in such a case there would be no chance of wild tokenings during the learning
period.
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some state of affairs if there is a reliable causal relation between the two, and the
state has been selected to have the function of being caused by the state of affairs.
Here is how Dretske (1988, p.65-66 emphasis in original) expresses the idea:13
. . . it is important to remember that not every indicator, not even those
that occur in plans and animals, is a representation, it is essential that
it be the indicator’s function. . . to indicate what it indicates. The width
of growth rings in trees growing in semi-arid regions is a sensitive rain
gauge, an accurate indication of the amount of rainfall in the year cor-
responding to the ring. This does not mean, however, that these rings
represent the amount of rainfall in each year. For that to be the case, it
would be necessary that it be the function of these rings to indicate, by
their width, the amount of rain in the year corresponding to each ring.
What sort of function is at play? Typically it is taken to be a teleological func-
tion. How exactly we are to understand teleological function is one of the issues with
this sort of move. Or for that matter, how we are to get the function attached to the
particular state via teleology, or whether the function is to indicate (Godfrey-Smith,
1992). However, assuming this can be cashed out, misrepresentation occurs when a
representation is tokened, and carries information about, something other than what
it has the function of being caused by. Thus, loosely, instances of misrepresentation
qualify as a form of malfunction (Neander, 1995).
13Note, an “indicator” is essentially equivalent to what I have been calling a sensory register,
and Ramsey (2007) calls a receptor.
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For my part, I think the very idea of appealing to teleological function is com-
pletely wrong headed when it comes to thinking about the constitutive conditions
for the representing relation (I think it at most relates to the function of represen-
tations, rather than the constitutive conditions for intentional content; Cummins,
1996; Fodor, 1990). However, here I will just focus on one difficulty for informa-
tional theories that appeal to teleological function, namely what I will refer to as
the “distality problem”. The problem is that merely tracking properties of proximal
stimulation might serve perfectly fine for adaptive purposes. So it is not clear how
we get past proximal stimulation, and represent the distal world. Proponents of a
teleological solution are well aware of this problem. For example, recently Neander
(2012) has defended a teleological approach to perceptual representation, and offers
the following account of why the teleological function of an internal state is to track
the distal property, and not proximal input. Her solution is introduced with respect
to an example of whether a toad represents worm-like motion of a distal object, or
proximal patterns of input to the retina.
The pathways in the toad’s brain were selected for responding to both
the distal worm-like motion and the more proximal patterns of light that
carry information about the distal worm-like motion to the toad. But
there is an important asymmetry here. These pathways in the toad’s
visual system were selected for responding to the light by producing
certain tectal firings because by that means they respond to the distal
worm-like motion, and not vice versa. That is, they were not selected
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for responding to the distal worm-like motion by producing certain tec-
tal firings because by that means they responded to the more proximal
patterns of light. That just isn’t how the means-end analysis pans out. I
believe this solves the problem of distal content. (Neander, 2012, p.34-35
emphasis in original)
Except Neander’s proposal does no such thing. As Epstein (1977, p.6) points
out, we might readily explain the presence of an adaptation in vision by how it allows
an organism to respond to some survival-related variable in the distal world, but
that does not tell us what it perceives. The same point applies when talking about
perceptual representation. We can readily acknowledge the asymmetry pointed
out by Neander, but it does nothing to show how teleological function gets us to
perceptual objectivity. Of course this is just one proposal, but the point is that even
granting that adding a teleological requirement addresses the disjunction problem
(which itself is controversial to say the least), unless such a picture also addresses
the distality problem, it will be inconsistent with some basic elements of the story
of vision.
In contrast to Neander, Dretske (1986) offers a more promising solution to
the distality problem, which relies on generalization across stimulus inputs, like I
discussed with respect to perceptual learning in the previous chapter. However, for
Dretske teleological function is not the basis for the solution to the distality problem.
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6.4.3 Asymmetric Dependence and the Distal World
The last strategy for solving the disjunction problem that I will discuss is
Fodor’s (1987; 1990) asymmetric dependence account. While the view has few ad-
herents I nonetheless believe it has some promise as a theory of content that could
be paired with explanations of object recognition.14 The basic idea is straightfor-
ward. The reason my concept cat is about cats, and not a disjunction of its other
causes is that the causal relations between, say, raccoons or possums on dark nights,
and the concept is asymmetrically dependent on the relationship between cats and
cat. On the one hand, if cats did not cause tokenings of the concept, neither would
these other creatures, while if raccoons and possums did not cause tokenings of the
concept, cats still would. This counterfactual dependence breaks the symmetry be-
tween (Inf) and (Mis) from earlier, as the tokenings of a representation covered by
(Mis) are in fact asymmetrically dependent on the nomic generalization (Inf).
I think that Fodor’s account at least provides the right sort of conditions
to supplement a crude informational theory. In effect, the proposal describes a
higher-order causal dependency between causal dependencies (if one assumes, at
least in part, a counterfactual theory of causation). The asymmetry shows that one
dependency relation is the cause of the other, but not vice versa. Another virtue
is that it is the only proposal explicitly based on a robust interpretation of the
disjunction problem. As promising as I think asymmetric dependence is, it does face
a problem related to the story of vision. As we have emphasized, the relationship
14Rare sympathetic discussions of the view can be found in Margolis (1998) and Rey (2009).
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between perceptual representations and the distal world is causally mediated by
proximal inputs. The problem is that it is not clear how asymmetric dependence
is supposed to work in cases of causal mediation. Thus, it also faces a distality
problem (Godfrey-Smith, 1989).
Fodor (1990, p.118) is seemingly aware of the problem. If occurrences of A
reliably cause proximal inputs B and these inputs cause tokenings of the internal
state C, then the dependency between A and C is asymmetrically dependent on
the one between B and C. In which case, we need to know why it is that C
does not represent the proximal inputs B. Fodor’s initial take is to say that since
the dependence of A− C on B − C is not robust, it is not “semantically relevant”.
Perhaps, but then so much the worse for asymmetric dependence. But the important
case is actually one where we have two mediated causal chains, like in my example
of misrepresentation. Raccoons and possums on dark nights cause cat-ish visual
inputs, and cat-ish inputs cause tokenings of cat. Cats of course also cause cat-ish
inputs, and hence tokenings of cat. Fodor says it is a “homework problem” to
formulate his account such that the former mediated dependency is asymmetrically
dependent on the latter.
However it is not obvious how to complete Fodor’s homework assignment.
Suppose raccoons and possums stopped looking cat-ish, and so no longer caused
tokenings of cat. This is one part of the homework. However, as pointed out
by Prinz (2011), one might worry that it is not clear that the other necessary
counterfactual holds: if cats stopped looking cat-ish, and no longer caused tokenings
of the concept, it is not obvious why it would follow that raccoons and possums
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would not still be mistaken for cats. Presumably, they would still look as cat-ish as
ever. But if asymmetric dependence is to work for cases of causal mediation, which
is what is necessary for perceptual representation of the distal world, then we need
a story for why this dependency would also be broken. Fodor never provides such a
story, though I think it is possible that one could be developed.
In conclusion, the usual suspect solutions to the disjunction problem, in one
way or another, seem to be in tension with basic facts about visual perception
that are crucial background to explanations of object recognition. Although my
discussion has been rather brief, I believe it is still possible that these proposals (and
others I have not discussed) could be developed in a manner that makes them both
consistent with the story of vision, and suitable solutions to the sort of disjunction
problem faced by explanations of object recognition.
6.5 Summary and Conclusion
The ultimate aim of my project, recall, had two parts: first, to show that
The Distal Object Thesis and Transformational Thesis, two common themes in the
information-processing narrative in vision science, are in tension with each other;
and second, to show that informational theories of content from philosophy offer
strategies for relieving this tension. This chapter served to meet these ultimate
aims. The root of the tension, as we have seen, is the disjunction problem, and
various strategies are available for addressing the problem, though how they might
be married to explanations of object recognition remains to be seen.
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Along the way to achieving these aims I defended the indispensability of a
notion of internal representation to the information-processing framework in general.
This involved a careful, and I think, useful, analysis of the influential work of Marr
(1982). Also, to show why the Distal Object Thesis is essential to explanations of
object vision, I showed how a notion of perceptual representation is indispensable
to explanations of object recognition. This involved retrofitting the argument from
constancy, a classic strategy for illustrating the objectivity of perception.
I think these arguments and conclusions are philosophically interesting in their
own right. They show why a notion of perceptual (mental) representation is funda-
mental to some of the explanations in vision science, and why philosophical theories
of content, which are somewhat out of fashion at present, might make a real con-
tribution to addressing a problem that these explanations face. More generally,
they show why questions of content are of central importance to how vision science
explains what we see, and how we see it.
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